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Introduction to the Conversation
CU LTU RE does not appear to square with the economy. In particular, art doesnot mix well with money. When asked the question whether it matters whatpeople are willing to pay for her art, the artist responds "To me? No,
nothing. All that counts is that I can work." And what if a work of hers would fetch
IQ million dollars? "It never will" she insists, "but no, it would not make a differ-
ence."" The artist prefers to keep the economy and whatever reminds her of it at
bay and concentrate on her art. Many in the artistic community appear to distrust
the operation of money, markets, and the commercial in their world. When critics
note that art work is "commercial" it is a put-down. A blockbuster of any sort is
artistically suspect because money is believed to co-Opt art. The value of art is to be
found in its aesthetics, in the meanings that it generates. At least those appear to be
the dominant beliefs in the world of the arts.
Then again, money plays a big role in that very same world. Singers will insist
on being paid well, visual artists haggle with their dealers about the prices to ask,
and artdealers can he as commercial as any other hard-nosed businessperson. The
suspicions of many of its inhabitants notwithstanding, markets operate in the
world of the arts, too, and that means that the arts get priced. Sometimes the price
is set very high: in 1989 the Van Gogh painting on the cover fetched 82.5 million
dollars. Who says money does not count in the world of the arts?
The problematic relations between the world of the economy and that of the
arts motivate this book. The immediate occasion was the inauguration of a new
chair in the economics of art and culture at the Department of the Sciences of Art
and Culture of the Erasmus University. As the first occupant of the chair, I had the
opportunity to start the conversation, in an inaugural speech reprinted in Chapter
1. I saw it as my challenge to connect the world of the arts with economics, yet to
respect the obvious tensions between the two. To that end I found myself introduc-
ing "culture" in its general anthropological sense and recovering the old norion of
"value" in economic discourse. To explore these notions I invited scholars and
artists for a series of conversations. This book is the product.
Before you, the reader, join the conversation, a few preliminary remarks. Know-
mg some of the main themes might facilitate reading. The dominant theme is with-
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out doubt this tension between the world of the economy and that of the arts. That
it preoccupies us, should not come as a great surprise. After all, it is a fact of every-
day life, though in the arts the contrast shows better than in other realms.
In the world of art moments abound where issues of costs and price are sup-
pressed and avoided. The suspicion shows in the lack of interest In, or outright hos-
tility to, my own discipline, that of economics, in the circle of artists, as I have
found. It often seems as if a taboo rests on the subject of money and money making.
The term IS not meant to sneer: I ca!! those who hold out for a separate sacred place
for the arts, where money does not interfere, the romantics. Just as Jesus chased the
motley changers from the Temple the romantics close out anyone who carries the
smell of money. They passionately Ignore the realists - again, I do not use the word
to either praise or blame - who stress that money plays an important role in the arts
anyway, and that the economic realm is an integral part of the world of the arts.
The question is now what we do with these tensions between the worlds of art
and economics, the romantics and realists. One possibility would be to adopt the
realist sneer, and dismiss the romantic stance with its claims to the sacredness of
the arts as a selfserving cover-up. This is the strategy that Tom Wolfe exemplifies in
The Painted Word.2. Ruthlessly he exposes the commercial hypocrisy of American
artists In the fifties and sixties.
The ambitious artist, the artist who wanted Success, now had to do a bit of psy-
chological doubletracking. Consciously he had to dedicate himself to the anti-
bourgeois values of the cenaclesof whatever sort, to bohemia, to the Blooms-
bury life, the Left Bank life, the lower Broadway Loft life, to the sacred squalor
of it all. (.. ) What is more, he had to be sincere about it. At the same time he had
to keep his other eye cocked to see if anyone in le monde was watching. (.. )
Success was realonly when it was success III lemonde. (Ibid, pp 16-17)
In their art the artists loathe everything bourgeois, including its money, yet for the
sake of success they have to court le monde and that includes the bourgeoisie and
its money. It makes for what Wolfe coined an "Apache dance" in which the artists
try to stick to their artistic values while dancing around their enemy to get atten-
tion and sell their paintings.
The inclination of economists is to follow Wolfe and dismiss the romantic senti-
ment In the world of the arts as just that, mere sentiment. Their strategy is, as in all
the other subjects they tackle, to see III the world of the arts the operation of self-
interested behavior in market settings. In their eyes art is like any other commodity
and pnce is the best indicator of its value. rhave found this strategy unsatisfactory,
because it does injustice to Important characteristics of the world of art, including
indeed its romantic sentiment. I propose to take seriously the awkwardness with
which money figures, and the distinctive qualities attributed to the arts. (Implied is
the proposal to do the same for the realms of religion, science, and personallife; hut
art is the main subject here.)
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Several economists join in the conversation. Not all agree with my suggestion that
the study of art calls for a change in strategy. Robert Goldfarb and joseph Cordes
stick to the economic strategy in their investigation of the value of public sculp-
ture. Ruth Towse IS most vehement in her opposition. She wants economists to
stick to their conventional, well-tested tools when they venture out. r don't, at
least not when the tools don't help me understand phenomena such as the ten-
sions between the realms of economics and the arts. That does not render their
economic analysis useless or uninteresting. As always, economists excel in sorting
out motives and pointing out constraints in the choices people face, in this case
those that artists face.
Hans Abbing is another economist who prefers to think of art as just any other
commodity. Yet he IS an artist as well. Here he exploits his intimate knowledge of
the world of art and tells us about how artists sustain the magic of art. According to
him the crux is the construction of an artistic conscience, which implants the dis-
trust of the commercial in the arts and generates the values that are necessary to
play the game of art and dance the Apache dance. His interpretation supports the
claim that the world of art has distinctive processes by which artists and their
entourage interact, deliberate, negotiate, and exchange. Although he claims to
remain faithful to the dominant economic dogma by reading in all this behavior the
pursuit of self-reward, he acknowledges that the artistic conscience is strongly dri-
ven by group interest. Many young artists disregard their own interests for the sake
of the magic of art, and thus serve the interests of the art world as a whole - which
partly can exist because of that very magic. Implicitly, Abbing comes around to
recognising the need to identify and characterise the culture, that is, the shared val-
ues that distinguish the world of art.
Abbing's interpretation supports Michael Hutter's suggestion to look for the
workings of a play in the world of art. Hutrer, who is also an economist, develops
a framework that goes beyond conventional economic analysis and enables us to
figure out what is going on when different games get tangled up, as when the eco-
nomic game interferes with the artistic game. The tensions the arts generate among
us economists are creative.
The disagreement among economists about the economics III the world of art,
strikes the core of our discipline, and calls the modernism of the core into question.
At least that is my perception. The modernist core consists of a series of dualities.
A square may represent one side of these dualities and a circle the other.':
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The square contains the objective, the circle the subjective. The square stands for
science and rationality, the circle for passion, emotion, and morality. The square IS
the domain of the scientist, the circle of the therapist. The square might be said to
accord with masculine values, the circle evokes feminine ones. This modernist
mold has influenced sciences everywhere, and the arts, architecture, management
too. In economic science the objective is to capture the phenomena to be explained
in "square" terms, that is, III terms that can be formalised and quantified. The strat-
egy is to rely as little as possible on the circle. In a truly scientific analysis in eco-
nomics the only circle concept left is "utility", and that is presumed given. The con-
straints under which individuals maximize their utility are made out to be square.
The modernist mold dictates a strategy for the study of the art world. Aesthetic
values and romantic sentiments pertain to the circle, do not fit the square, and so
have to be Ignored. All behavior is to be reduced to moments of "choice", where
preferences are given and all the relevant variation is in the constraints (income,
prices, technology). Culture, III the sense of shared values, has no place in such an
analysis because it does not fit the square. Economists have been proficient in this
strategy and continue to be so, as the contributions in the volume show. But it is
the source of much of the disagreement among the economists in these pages.
Along with colleagues across the spectrum of the arts and the sciences
McCloskey, Huuer, Amanglio, Ruccio, Graham, I and many others in econorrucs
want to break with this modernist mold because it is confining and threatens to
render economic analysis sterile (see McCloskey's remarks in chapter 12). That is
not to say that we would disregard conventional economic reasoning altogether -
although Amariglio, Ruccio and Graham would celebrate such a move, fed up as
they ate with the dominance of traditional economics - but we would want to
make economics more interesting by bnnging the circle into the square and the
square into the circle. One way of doingso is to make utility, the only element of
the Circle III square analysis, explicitly the subject of our inquiry. Certainly when it
comes to art, taste can hardly be called "given" and assumed to be beyond reason.
After all, much of what happens III the arts 1S geared to the formation of tastes.
Artists persuade each other and critics to appreciate their newly invented forms.
People learn to appreciate a Mondriaan by frequenting musea and discussiog art.
The negotiation about what art to value, about what constitutes good art and what
bad is what the world of art is all about. To identify, characterise and comprehend
it requires us to go beyond the square and circle and apply concepts like value and
culture which are neither square nor circle, neither objective nor subjective.
McCloskey proposes to call such terms "conjective" because they acqUlre meaning
only III conversation.
If the modernist mold had informed our conversation, only economists would
have been at the table for the conversation. The urgc to incorporate non-modernist
concepts like value and culture involves colleagues from other disciplines. The
philosophers Antoon Van de Braembussche and Barend van Hcusden, for example,
helped out with philosophical explorations of the concepts of value and culture. In
part IV the conversation broadens to incorporate culture III the general sense of
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shared values. Here we exploit the dual meanings of the concept of "culture." The
question that drives the discussion of Prances Gouda, jos de Beus and Deirdre
McCloskey is what the value of culture is for the economy as a whole. The connec-
tion with the earlier question abour rhe value of art is veiled, yet is unmistakably
there. As the philosophers pointed out, other values operate in the world of art
apart from econonuc values. These other values, such as aesthetic values or moral
values, inform the valuation of art work and therefore need to be accounted for in
our investigarion.e The values come from specific cultural contexts. For example,
the culture that makes up the realm of art generates different values from those that
constitute the realm of the economy. Culture and value come linked.
Part V concludes the conversation with a reading of Andy Warhol by the artist
and minister Peter Kattenberg and an exchange with the artists Liesbeth Bik,
Ronald Glasbergen and Joep van Lieshout. Kattenberg advances the life and work
of Warhol as an example of art that straddles the worlds of art and economics. Here
the value of the art work is partly its ability to generate economic value. Warhol's
act is about economics. With his shameless courtship of the rich and famous he
seems to be out of step with the romantics among his colleagues who dance the
Apache dance to cover up their need for attention and money. Yet the value of
Warhol's work is more, as Kattenberg argues, and consists of the priestly quality of
his presentations. The three artists subsequently cope with the tensions between
the realm of money and their life in the world of art. Romantics at heart, they cope
with the realist dimension, too. Money matters. But meaningful appreciation mat-
ters more. It is not, I would say, any different 111 the world of science.
The conversation with Bik, Glasbergen, and van Lieshout demonstrates con-
cretely what many have been alluding to in the abstract tensions, confusions, and
ambiguities that the inevitable intermingling of art and economics generate.
Several of the participants in this conversation have been talking with each other on
and off over a long time, others are Joining for this particular purpose. Virtually all
of them I already knew in one capacity or another. The art was to compose the
group on the same themes while being sufficientlydiverse to keep the conversation
interesting. In the representation of any discussion the monologue usually prevails,
even if the actual discussion involved dialogues, interruptions, and other forms of
interchange. Monologues make up the bulk of the book too, but In an attempt to
recover some of the discursive qualities of our conversation I conduct brief conver-
sations with each author after rhe monologue. They will convey to you, the reader,
a sense of the conversation.
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IThe Value of Culture
ARJO KLAMER
After 17 years at American universities, many conversations with economists and
research into the rhetoric of economics, I moved to the Erasmus University in the
Netherlands to occupy the new chair in the Economy of Art and Culture, the only
such chairin the world. Apart from the challenge ofenteringa new field of inquiry 1
had to cope with a culture from which 1 had become somewhat estranged. That got
me to the subject ofthe value ofculture. But how to make the connection between cul-
ture in the sense ofthe arts and culture in the anthropological sense? In the following
text, which I delivered as the inaugural(or the chair, I try to deal with this and a few
other relatedproblems."
T H E TOPIC of the value of culture is a strange one for an economist, sinceculture as a concept has been virtually banned from academic econorrucs. Ihave always been uncomfortable about that verdict. The culture of a group
of people, as it IS usually understood, stands for the values and beliefs the people
share. So by banning culture from our conversations we economists deprive our-
selves from any insight into the role that values play in the economy. That cannot
be right.
When we want to understand the strength of the Dutch economy, for example,
we need to take into account the values that inform so much of what the Dutch do,
such as the value of solidarity and the value that gets expressed in the typically
Dutch expression "Act normal, then you're already crazy enough." Such values
make for a society that is quite different from the American one with its veneration
of ambition and self-actualization expressed in slogans like "Be all you can be" -
which the American anny uses effectively - and the "Go!, go!, go!" with which
coaches and managers inspire their troops. Such a contrast in values must have
important economic consequences, as I found out for myself. If you want a favor
from the Dutch, such as a job or their money, get their sympathy, make them feel
bad by exaggerating your hardships and they will want to solve your problem just
to get rid of their bad feelings. But don't do that in the United States. There you
earn your money by making yourself seem better, more impressive, more desirable
than you really are.
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An mquu-y Into the economic role of values calls for the restoration of a rich tradi-
tion within ccononucs starting from Aristotle, including Adam Smith, In particular
his Theory of Moral Sentiments, with a modern continuation in the work of Max
Weber, Karl Polanyi, E.P. Thompson, and most recently Deirdre McCloskcy and
her treatises on bourgeois virtues. Tills is the tradition that defines economics as a
moral science and ultimately concerns the conditions for and characteristics of a
good and meaningfullife. This concern is all my mind in the subsequent discussion
of culture in the more narrow meaning of the arts.
The Economics ofArt
Take a good look at a famous picture from an economists' perspective. The Portrait
of Dr Cachet by Van Gogh, reproduced on the cover of this book, is the highest
priced painting ever. In May 1990 it was hammered at the pncc of 75 million dollars
by Christie's in :'-Jew York to Rioei Saro (aJapanese paper manufacturer, who had
to pay an additional 7.5 million dollar for the buyer's premium). Van Gogh "vas
unable tu sell the painting himself. Should we conclude either that the conrempo-
rancs of Van Gogh were blind to the value of this painting ur that Mr Sato was out
of his mind?
Not so, the economist in me responds. There is a reason for everything, includ-
ing the paying of ridiculous sums for a painting. One reason is that Van Gogh
paintings are currently hot and very much in demand while their supply IS fixed.
When the quantity demanded exceeds the quantity supplied, the price goes up;
when the difference is ridiculously large, the pnce will skyrocket. Many would have
wanted this painting - the directors of the Van Gogh Museum and the Krollcr-
Muller Museum might have committed murder for it - but they could not afford it.
A painting like this is an investment. Mr Saro may even have liked it, but the only
justification for laying out such a large sum fur paint on canvas IS that it is an asset
that will maintain its value, more or less, so that he can sell it again. It is elementary
- elementary economics, that is. (As it turns out, Sato really wanted to be cremat-
ed with the Van Gogh. Fortunately, although he has died, the painting is still alive.}
Elementary economics tells us to see things like paintings as commodities that
are costly to produce and have their value determined in the interplay between
demand and supply III the marketplace. Economists presume that people arc rea-
sonable enough, that they never pay more for a work of art than they consider it
worth. People pay nothing for art that they do not value and they do not pay infi-
nite amounts for priceless art. William Cramp, an economist, concludes from this
that price is the best indicator of the aesthetic value.I It is a shocking perspective if
you can: about the value of art. But try to prove him wrong.
Another Issue that an economist of art and culture has to confront IS the eco-
nomic significance of the cultural sector. It is a popular issue nowadays. Economic
arguments are fashionable, so advocates of subsidies for the arts would like to be
able to argue that their arts make sizeable economic contributions. If a subsidy to a
The Value of Culture
'5
museum or a festival translates into jobs and income for the local economy they
would have a good additional reason for awarding it. Economists are the Immediate
beneficianes of this development because they are asked to make the calculations.
Famous is the one billion guilder study of the Foundation for Economic
Research of the University of Amsterdam, which calculated that the cultural sector
in Amsterdam contributes more than one billion guilders to the Amsterdam econ-
omy.s It sounds like a lot; the number is used left and right in the art world. Unfor-
tunately, the econorruc perspective seriously pursued is sobering. In this study the
problem is that total sales have been added up and not added value so that there is
some serious double counting. In other studies researchers have been able to pro-
duce even larger numbers by using the so-called multiplier method. Made famous
in Keynesian macro-economic models it boils down to the idea that a guilder spent
on an artist will not only generate an extra guilder of spending by that artist but
also additional spending by those receiving (hat guilder and so on. Sounds like a
great idea, doesn't it?
Let us agree that all readers hand me one hundred guilders. I will promise you
that I will spend the money well so that it will generate plenty of additional spend-
Illg with a large multiplier effect. I might even promise you to subsidize the arts.
Great, you will say, the Dutch economy will get a big injection. There is only one
little problem: you will all have one hundred guilders less to spend. It is the same
with every guilder that gets injected into the arts sector; it has to be withdrawn
first, by means of a voluntary transfer as III our case or by means of obligatory tax
payments. The withdrawal is responsible for a negative multiplier process, leaving
the total effect undetermined. A positive net effect on the Dutch economy is
assured only when the guilders come from foreigners who would not have spent
their money in the Dutch economy otherwise. Even in that case we would probably
do better III terms of jobs luring foreign spending by exporting more tulips and
pork.
Spending on the Arts
The reason that we should not expect great economic feats from the cultural sector
is that the sector is small, very small. The next figure shows how small. Arts and
culture here include the visual and performing arts, but not pop and rock concerts;
it also includes museums, but excludes the media, libraries, the book, movie, cd and
other cultural industries. Total spending on arts and culture thus defined amounts
to one third of one percent of total economic activity (as measured by GDP) in the
Netherlands and less in the US) The Dutch and Americans spend quite a bit more
on shoes and the Dutch obviously prefer to spend more time and money III cafes
than III rhearers and museums. In short, the arts are not big, economically speaking.
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Another story is how people pay for their arts. Take the theater. Good tbeater is
costly to produce anywhere but in a country like the Netherlands those who enJOY
it pay only a small portion of the costs. According to the CBS, the Dutch statistical
bureau, each visitor to a subsidized play pays on average eleven guilders, with the
government contributing ten times that amount, that is, lIO guilders.' Local gov-
ernments add to that amount about another 65 guilders for the upkeep and opera-
tion of the thearers. Accordingly, those who like plays of Euripides and Kushner get
generous treatment, in contrast to enthusiasts for commercial musicals, who pay
virtually the full costs of what they see, with maybe a small government subsidy for
the building in which they see it. (Those who like to go to the opera m the Nether-
lands do even better with a subsidy of about 500 guilders per visit))·
As you may expect the Dutch government is quite generous, certainly if com-
pared to the direct support that the American government gives to the arts. The
American government awards for each American only $ 3 to the arts whereas the
Dutch government puts in $ 27 per Dutchman. The Swedish government does best
with S 33 per Swede." The American government, however, contributes indirectly
by giving a tax break to those who donate their money to cultural activities and
institutions. It forsakes a revenue, as it were, to benefit the arts. Still, even with this
correction the official commitment of the US to the arts lags far behind the public
commitments in Europe.
Public Support ofthe Arts
The government subsidies are not only small, they also become suspect when sub-
jected to the economists' perspective. As a matter of fact, conventional economics
does not produce a convincing economic rationale for the public support of the
The Value of Culture
'7
arts. Some economists are therefore unequivocally opposed. Their position has
gained political force in the US where the Republicans under the leadership of
Newt Gingrich passionately rally against the National Endowment for the Arts, the
main public funding agency for the arts, and in particular against its subsidies to
public television. Those subsidies are unfair, Newt Gingrich argues, because they
force everybody to pay for the enjoyment of a selected and usually well-endowed
few. He has a point. And there is no good defense against it, at least not from the
conventional economic perspective. The literature on this issue is, as you may
expect, extensive and the arguments varied."I summanze at the expense of nuance.
Economists prefer efficiency arguments, that is, arguments that demonstrate
that with public support of the arts some people would be better and none worse
off. That would be the case if art is a public good, that is, a good which can only be
collectively enjoyed, or if there are positive external effects, that is, spillover effects
of cultural production that are enjoyed by the entire community. The arguments in
the present case are hard to sustain.f It IS not dear, for example, how my enjoy-
ment of subsidized theater is shared by other Dutchmen. There may be some
spillover effects on my environment - although I would not know which ones -
and, who knows, on future generations, but they remain undetermined.
Politicians and the inhabitants of the art worlds tend to favor equity arguments.
They want us to believe that a policy of low prices for cultural events and products
lowers the threshold for low income groups. The intention IS noble but like many
noble intentions this one produces unintended consequences. In reality low prices
for cultural products mainly benefit those who already enjoy them and seduce only
a few of the target group. Watch the crowd that attends the heavily subsidized Con-
certgebouw concerts and you will look in vain for people in need of public support
of their pleasure. Australian research has indicated that if you balance taxes paid
versus subsidies received, public funds for the arts benefits the well-to-do at the
expense of low income people.? So the realized result is the opposite of the intend-
ed one.'?
The trickiest argument refers to the merit of cultural goods. Culture is impor-
tant, the advocates say, and even though not everybody recognizes it, we should all
make sacrifices to guarantee high-quality cultural products and their distribution
throughout the nation. It is a culture-is-good-for-you-whether-you-want-to-know-
it-or-not argument. An economist like Jan Pen has no trouble with this argument
but it IS incongruent with the dominant economic perspective. JI It implies that
some people have better taste than others - in accordance with the old aristocratic
idea - and violates the modern principles of individual sovereignty and equality.
According to good anti-aristocratic and democratic values no one, not even a gov-
ernment, can tell an individual what to like. If my neighbors prefer musicals over
serious theater and do not care for art programs on television, I cannot tell them
they should, and still expect them to contribute, without any contribution to their
musicals and soaps in return. Such a position is justifiable only if I recognize it for
what it IS: anstocracy III a modern disguise. Yet, it might be the only convincing
argument.
IS
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Finally, an interesting argument for public support of the arts evokes the signifi-
cance of the cultural inheritance. The French seem to have a patent on this argu-
ment. They nearly prevented the GATT agreement by insisting on an exclusionary
clause for cultural products. They wanted to be able to protect thei r film industry
because of its importance for the sustenance of French culture. Even the self-effac-
ing Dutch can get excited about their cultural possessions , as the city hall of Hil-
vcrsum experienced recently.
In 1932 the city received a Mondrian, Composition with two black lines, as a pre-
sent from a now defunct institution for its monumental city hall. The city officials
never knew what to do with the painting and allegedly used it even as a partition
for some time before it was stashed away in the attic, In 1951 it was given on loan
to the Stedeliik Museum of Amsterdam.
During the eighties the city experienced serious financial difficulties and so its
officials re-discovered their prized possession. After some wavering the city council
decided in 1987 to sell the painting to the highest bidder. Thus the market was
given its chance. To ward off the anticipated criticism, it was st ipulated that the sell-
er guaranteed public access to the painting and that the estimated 30 million
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guilders in revenues would be allocated to the renovation of the former Hotel
Gooiland, an architectural monument, to serve as a cultural cenrer.P Accordingly
the intended deal would be entirely cultural.
A public uproar followed, questions were asked in parliament and the Minister
of Culture ended up blocking the sale on the ground that the Mondrian was part of
the Dutch cultural heritance. The Mondrian was not to be lost to the Dutch com-
munity. In a compromise arrangement the city of Hilversum received a payment of
2.5 million guilders after transfer of ownership to the Stcdelijk Museum. The
amount was far below what it would have received on the market and proved to be
insufficient for the renovation of Gooiland, which was subsequently sold for one
guilder to a businessman who made it into a grand cafe and a Japanese restaurant.
The Mondrian was saved for Holland at the price of a new cultural center for Hil-
versum and the lost opportunity to experience Dutch pride while viewing the
Composition with two black lines in the Paul Getty Museum or some other well-
endowed foreign museum.u It is the price of cultural heritage. The irony can't
escape anyone even a little economically minded.
Need for Correction
As you have noticed by now, the economists' perspective is not very inspiring when
applied to the world of arts. Viewed through economists' glasses the cultural sector
looks small and otherwise similar to any other sector. Paintings and performances
are reduced to commodities, their values to prices. Reasons for public support dis-
solve before your eyes. Before you know it you have turned into Oscar Wilde's
cynic who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing.
I will show you how we can alter the economic glasses to get a more interesting
but also more truthful picture of reality. But before you conclude that I'm about to
debunk the economists' perspective wholesale, I will affirm here that it gets some
things right. When politicians demand that if the government cannot pay the full
costs of health care or the arts, businesses should (by means of mandatory contri-
butions or sponsorship), you need economists to point out that businesses never
pay, their customers do. When a bank spends generously on the arts, its customers
should wonder why they are not the beneficiaries.
However, the sobering effectsof the economists' perspective to the world of arts
shows that something has to be amiss with that perspective. The insighrs gained
are limited and do not seem ro do justice to the phenomena studied. The perni-
cious effectsof the economic way of thinking become especiallydear when it takes
over everyday life. When everywhere people turn to econormc calculations as their
guide to action and believe that "management' and "marketing" will solve all their
problems, we economists must have done something wrong. Calculation, manage-
ment, and marketing cannot pave the way to a good life. It IS not the way to deal
with friends, children, spirituality, and yes, the arts. Even our former Prime Minister
Ruud Lubbers, who is identified with this economising trend, admitted as much
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recently and feared moral decay because of it. It may seem that by saying this I am
cutting the legs from under my chair. The opposite is rather the case. For the
encounter with the world of art and culture reaffirms the need to correct the ccon-
omists's perspective.
Two Worlds
The argument begins with the observation of differences between the worlds of
economics and the arts. Differences tend to reveal themselves in discursive situa-
tions. Try to raise problems, as we academics are used to do, and the non-academ-
il: will just want to know your solution. The difference is that we want to keep the
conversation gOlllg, and for that you need problems and issues, whereas they want
closure, I will try to meet that demand in the condusion but that does not put an
end to what I am doing.
Radical differences also occur in the interaction with artists, as I had to discover.
In every audience of artists that I have addressed there will inevitably be someone
whu stands up to say something like "hullshir". Each time I am at a loss for words.
The person may be quite right, at least from her point of view. The lifeworlds of
artists and academics are simply too far apart. Both are quire abstract, incidentally,
but we do it with words which happen to be suspect in their lifeworld. This differ-
ence that I experience, points at a really significant difference, that is, the contrast
between the world of money and that of the arts.
Body artist Stelarc perfonning at V2 ill Rotterdam
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Art is different. The illustration on the previous page is a still taken from a video
and shows a performance of an Australian body artist named Stelarc at the opening
of the V2 building in Rotterdam in September 1994.14 The artist is connected to
medical equipment which transforms the various stimuli of his body into move-
ments of the robot and various sounds. If you are wondering what this means, why
this must be called art, or if you simply were fascinated with the technical wizardry
and the effects displayed here, you got it. If you are worried about the costs of this
performance, on the other hand, you did not get it.
[At this point the speech was interrupted by a performance piece by the artist Peter
Zegveld.]
This was commissioned work and the artist was at liberty to do what his artistic
spirit inspired him to do. I did not quite get it, just as I did not quite get the video
ot va, and that is just the point. For if you and r understood perfectly what just hap-
pened it would not be art. Art has to be experienced as such; the experience might
be an aesthetic one but is not necessarily that. Art also happens in the sensation of
a problem, that is, a problem of meanmg. In either case art exists not m the physi-
cal form of a painting or performance but in the moment of wonderment, of the
question mark that the physical form evokes III our mind.
Admittedly I have no authority to speak about art. Everything I am saying here
is based on what students of the arts have said, and is tested in conversations with
them. You can decide whom to hold responsible. After an Incisive survey of theo-
ries of art, Antoon Van den Braembussche dares to conclude that mimesis is what
art IS about; only the subject of the mimesis is left wide open.'! A Mondrian paint-
mg represents, but what it represents is subject for interpretation. And who knows
what the V2 video represents. It might be about human technology - a human
steering inhuman machines -, about technological innovation, human loss and
technical gain, or whatever else you want to suggest. The producers appear not to
care as long as their work is talked about. Art critics are allowed ro make sugges-
tions and explore the variety of meamngs that the art piece allows, without solving
the problem, because that would destroy the art.
Barend van Heusden, a semiotician, argues that a text constitutes art insofar as
it succeeds in representing problems of meaning without solving them. His argu-
ment is complicated and requires a semiotic background.t'' This is how I under-
stand it. You, the reader, are experiencing a problem of representation; you arc
reading something you have not read before. Some of you will quickly solve your
problem by subsuming my text in what you already know, after a few adjustments.
When it does not fit into what you already know you have basically two options.
Ether you ignore what you do not comprehend, or you have the artistic response
and represent in some fashion or another the problem that you are experiencing
without solving it. Art requires ambiguity to allow the experience of wonderment.
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Measuring in Money
Money is not art; it IS in its modern use even antithetical to it. To many people
money has a magical force that needs to be venerated and worshipped. Most of my
students are mystified by its creation. Kids arc less so. Ask them how to make
money and they say: "Oh easy, you get it out of the wall." How sobering econom-
ics has to be once agam, with its story of fractional reserve banking and its 111S1S-
rence that money does little more than pay, measure, and hold value. Our sobering
wisdom dates back at least to Aristotle. After noting 111 the Nicomachean ethics that
to allow for exchange the things exchanged must be comparable, he characterizes
money as a mere convention. I? It is by agreement that certain assets are designated
as means of exchange; it is by agreement, or convention, that here in Holland we
measure things in guilders and that the Americans measure in dollars.
A measurement is an intervention. In modern times we have grown accustomed
to measure with great precision. We now measure time to the second with our
watches and distances to the millimeter. Not so long ago, however, people were
still content to keep track of time by measuring the length of shadows; distances
they measured with their feet and stone's throws. As Witold Kula in his study Mea-
sures and men observes: "The attitude of today's civilized man towards measures
reveals a highly developed capacity for abstract quantitative thinking. Of the many
features exhibited by every object in a variety of contexts, we abstract one, and con-
sequently, objects as qualitatively diverse as, say, a man's pace, a suit of clothing, a
stretch of road, or the height of a tree, acquire a commensurability in our eyes, for
we view them from but a single perspective, that of their length. "18 Or pnce, when
the measurement of the thing is in terms of money.
The pomt IS that any measurement, whether in time, length, or value units,
intervenes in the nature of rhe thing. What would happen if a friend were to mea-
sure a conversation with you with a stopwatch? First you would wonder why he
did it and when he tells you he just wanted to know, see whether you arc as com-
fortable talking as you were before the introduction of the stopwatch.
Karl Marx, the most cited economist ever and still relevant, made a big ISSUt of
the mystifying effect that a measurement in money terms has on the thing mea-
sured. Use value, so he argues in Das Kapital, is particular to the thing valued and
depends on rhe need it meets. The imposition of an exchange value forces the thing
111to the straighrjacket of the monetary form; the thing becomes a commodity to be
compared with other commodities in order to make exchange possible. By com-
modity fetishism Marx means the preoccupation with the commodity form of a
thing so that you turn a blind eye to its distinctive characteristics as well as the social
relations that underlie is production. It may happen when you look at van Cogh's
Portrait ofDr Gachetnow you know that it carnes a pnce of 75 million dollars. That
fact, which highlights its characteristic as a commodity and makes it comparable
with, say, a large office building, distracts from the experience of its art. The money
measurement usually intervenes in the art form and devalues the experience.'?
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Measurement versus Reciprocity
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Money measurements also intervene in human relationships. Their intervention
resembles the intervention of the stopwatch In a friendly conversation. Just imagine
we would start to price friendly exchanges: "Let's see, I listened to your sob story
for ten minutes, that makes ten guilders, I still owe you five for the compliment you
paid me so five will do." The monetary Intervention would alter the relationship.
There may be friends who would appreciate the elimination of ambiguity, but most
friends will be turned off by the intervention. Sense the violence of the reduction of
the value of transactions to prices and you may understand why Aristotle consid-
ered commercial transactions unnatural and therefore immoral, and could exoner-
ate them only if they served the sustenance of households. His verdict was com-
mon in pre-modern times and caused merchants great trouble everywhere. The
trade in goods such as land, labor and money was a taboo. With the development
of commercial society this taboo became untenable. The moral philosopher Adam
Smith wrote the Wealth ofNations partly to address the outdated moral sentiments
of his time: "In civilised society [man] stands at all times In need of cooperation and
assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the
friendship of a few persons." In such circumstances, it "is not from the benevolence
of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their
regard to their own interese.''>'
The commercial transaction implies a contract. The deal is that both parties
exchange equivalents, thar is, two goods of the same value. The deal IS possible
only when the two goods can be measured. That's where money enters. It serves
as a unit of account and facilitates the exchange. Chnsue's and Mr Saw agreed
that Dr Cachet would go for 75 million dollars. It was understood to be a quid pro
quo. As soon as the two measured equivalents changed hands, the deal was done,
the story was over, and each could go on with their business without any remain-
mg obligations.
However, most transactions are not like that. When we exchange favors with
friends, make deals with our spouses, and trade niceties with business relations we
do so on the basis of reciprocity. The difference with commercial transactions is
that these are not measured and are not well defined. When I help out a friend in a
big way, I do not expect an equivalent favor in return. More poignantly even, if my
friend would make the offer, he would devalue my gesture of friendship. Even a
mere "thank you" might be too much. This does not mean that my assistance was
a pure gift. There is always the expecration that something will come in return.
Even the selfless work of Mother Theresa has rewards in the form of admiration
and ultimately God's blessings of course. Fnendships, like all relationships, are
based on reciprocity.
We do favors, hand over gifts, pay compliments, and extend our love with the
expectation that something will come in return. Only the what, how, and when of
the reciprocal deal are undetermined. A relationship demands a give and take but
their equivalence is a matter of interpretation and hence the cause of a great deal of
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trouble. Because of their built-m time element and the complicated mutual obliga-
tions, these exchanges make it difficult to walk away from the relationship, finish
the deal and end the story. Reciprocity is the basis of each relationship as long as
the values to he exchanged are left open for interpretation. Measurement is
enforced only when relations break up. Just think of divorce proceedings.
Accordingly, measurement can not only devalue the good measured, but also a
relationship. You may think this is obvious but conventional economics glasses,
with their focus on individualsand prices, prevented me from seeing this. Econom-
ic theory does not account for relationships and does not recognize a value that is
beyond measure. It was through my engrossment with the subject of the value of
culture that I hit upon this oversight in my discipline. I subsequently had to discov-
er that sociologists and anthropologists have been preoccupied with relations all
along.
Directand Indirect Payments
Incorporation of relationships and values beyond measure will require a shift III
focus and most likely in method. We will for example, have to do mote interpreta-
tive work and rely less on our analytical models.>' I would like to open the chase
with the following theses: I. A commercial transaction devalues a good whose
value is beyond measure; 2. When direct payments devalue the good traded, the
parties have an incentive to establish roundabout ways of financing the costs of
producing the good.
The evidence is already pouring in. Consider the good called a child. Not so
long ago, parents considered a child a commodity whose value was to be measured
III terms of the income and the old-age pension it could provide. In our world, we
do not allow each other to think about children that way anymore. Even though
children cost their parents a great deal, don't generate economic benefits, and have
emotional benefits that are dubious, their value is beyond measure.w The mere
suggestion that a child has a price, would devalue the parent-child relationship.
In the US patents customarily place congratulatory advertisements in the grad-
uation newspaper of their child's University. An advertisement in the George Wash-
ington University newspaper of a few years ago read: "Congrats Pete, Love your
parents. By the way, you owe us $ 213,OOO." The joke -I presume it is one - brings
out the anomaly of parents presenting their children with the bill of their upbnng-
ing. That is what the transaction is in a strictly economic reading. The better the
upbringing, the greater the rate of return. We, who all have been children, owe our
parents - some more than others - yet it is a modern value to disallow the explicit
specification of that debt. And so the burden to provide for the parents when they
grow dependent is shifted to the community as a whole.
The practice of indirect payments is pronounced when it comes to religious
transactions. Last year the Rode Hoed, a church in Amsterdam, expected an over-
flowingcrowd for its Christmas Eveservices. The economists' solution would be to
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charge an entry feeand have discounts and free tickets for people oflow means. But
a church service cannot be priced. Even though the production of church services is
very expensive, pricing them would devalue the expenence. Therefore, de Rode
Hoed requested [hat people make reservations and, as usual, asked for voluntary
contributions during the church service. Thus the appearance of a commercial
transaction was avoided.w
The problem in regard to my first thesis is the ubiquity of commercial transac-
tions in the world of the arts. Artists sell their products outright and some do so at
very high prices; we pay for art performances, the Americans more than the Dutch.
It is all quite commercial, you would say. Some artists, likeJeff Koons and Marko
Kostabi, are blatantly commercial and like to speak about their art as if it were a
business. Servaas, a Dutch artist, sells hernngs and by calling it art has been able to
get the special tariff of the value added tax for art transactions, to the great annoy-
ance of commercial herring salesmen. It is business, he says, yet art. All this does
not square with the thesis.
However, indirect payments are ubiquitous as well III the world of the arts. They
certainly are in the government-oriented Dutch arts world. They are paramount
even in the market-oriented US. Take the Metropolitan Opera with its budget of
over one hundred million dollars. Less than 50 percent of its income is in the fonn
of direct payments for servrces rendered, that is, tickets and sponsorships. The
remainder gets financed indirectly. Government subsidies make up about 7 percent
of the total amount, the rest is collected by means of individual and corporate
donations.
Activity and Experience or Product
The reason for the mixture of direct and indirect payments for the arts lies in its
nature. In accordance with the views of philosophers of art likeJohn Dewey and
economists like Michae! Hutter, my first step is to distinguish the product of art
from art as activity and art as experience. Art as activity and as experience has a
value that is beyond measure and therefore clashes with the form of money. In this
respect the romantics are fight with statements such as "W'here any view of money
exists, art cannot be carried on" (William Blake) and "High Heaven rejects the lore
// Of nicely calculated less and more" (WilIiam Wordsworth). That some artists
exploit this conflict only attests to the possibilities for artistic activities, but does
not resolve it.
The story for art as a product is different. As the economist Lancaster has theo-
rized, products have a variety of characteristics and hence can have several (use)val-
ues.t-t One characteristic of a painting as a product is its potential to givean artistic
experience. But it also can serve as an investment, as decoration, or as a prestige
object. In the seventeenth century painting did well as wallpaper. Each of these
characteristics does not have the tenderness of art as experience and therefore lends
itself to measurement. That's why they usually will be paid for directly.
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The same tension occurs in the case of theater. On one hand a performance is a
product with qualities for which people will be willing to pay directly. Think of its
entertainment value but also of the additions to one's social value and "cultural
capital" (Bourdieu's term for one's cultural knowledge and experience). On the
other side of the scale are the uncertainties about the values that watching the play
generates - there is no guarantee that you will be inspired and stimulated so why
pay a hundred guilders. Moreover, commercialization of the play as expressed III
high prices and slick marketing techniques, will devalue the art in the play. For the
latter two reasons rhearer producers who want to keep up the claim to art, are con-
strained in their attempts to join the market for entertainment and will have to be
inventive III the financing of their work.
And so the exploration of the value of art has lead me into the realm of values. To
sustain the values that are communicated by means of art products, people have
through all ages been inventiveto circumvent the quid pro quo of commercial rrans-
actions for the very good reasons that their requirement of measurement devalues
the art experience but also that a strictly commercial transaction ends the relation-
ship. For the very same reason that we avoid commercial deals with friends and
children, we avoid the intrusion of the commercial world on the world of arts. The
values that are communicated in that world are tender and defenceless-a against
calculation, and can be sustained only ill the relationships that people form with
each other and in the ongoing conversations among them. The same applies to sci-
entific values. To sustain the values of critical thinking, questioning, abstract argu-
ment, and intellectual engagement, we scientists have to fight the encroachment of
commercial and political values (Please, hand me your solution) to sustain the con-
versation among each other and keep those values alive.
I am not worried that this Insight will get lost, all the observations of moral
decay and the penetration of the commercial spirit notwithstanding. The trend has
already been reversed in the business world where a recvaiuanon of business rela-
tions and the significance of values and culture is underway. The same trend
towards a reevaluation of values is occurring in political discussions. A study of the
ways in which values are changed and affirmed in the world of the arts, indicates
the importance of relationships that are not purely commercial and rely on reci-
procity.
Government Subsidies
There is enough to the subject of [he economics of art and culture to sustain the
conversation with students, colleagues, and anyone interested in economics and
arts. We can have a conversation, but scientific inquiry cannot tell politicians what
to do. The task of critical inquiry is to highlight problems, not to solve them. Politi-
cians are for the solutions. Accordingly, with respect to the much-discussed system
of government subsidies in the Netherlands, my inquiry points at a series of prob-
lems. Let me name a few:
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"Every system contains the seeds of its own destruction," warned Mane Well, gov-
ernment subsidies which are meant to stimulate the arts and enhance their value,
are currently in danger of stifling new initiatives and Impoverish the world of arts,
that is, they are about to realize the opposite of the intended objectives. Gradually,
the system starts to resemble the commercial circuit with its emphasis on calcula-
tions as the basis for the allocation of scarce means. As many have pointed out, the
other danger is that interests are getting entrenched, and more and more time,
energy and money is expended to increase one's stake in the subsidy pot at the
expense of investments in the artistic process itself.
Connected to the above is the problem that the system frees the art producers
from the responsibility to commurucate with those who seek art as an experience.
Interactions are basically non-committal. All these factors impede the valuation of
the arts. Appreciation of the arts, especially of the art that is ambiguous and diffi-
cult, relies on ongoing relationships between the producers and seekers of the art
experience. One way to intensify such relationships is to make them reciprocal. If
we want people to be committed to the value of art, we want to get them to con-
tribute and invest in it. W'hen the government does it all for them, one good reason
for that committal is absent.
Commercialization is only an alternative insofar art products produce values
that can be measured and paid for directly. Sponsorships are not the alternative
either, because they are just another form of a commercial transaction. The only
conceivable alternative is that the art producers recover their inventiveness and
explore arrangements that bring them in closer relationship with art seekers.
Expansion of the still modest friendship organizations is one possibility.The build-
IIlgup of capital funds for the support of the arts is another, but then the financing
should not occur by means of national lotteries, but by national campaigns with
the express purpose to support the arts. W'hen the government decreases its
support, the Dutch are put in the position to demonstrate what the arts are worth
to them. The likely result would be a more active participation and a reevaluation
of the arts,
Epilogue
The last remarks I added to cater to practical concerns of those listening. They trig-
gered mostly responses from the world outside. Cultural pulicy is all but sacred
among the art establishment in the Netherlands. To suggest that the government
retreat is a blasphemy, even if such action would be goud for the arts in the Nether-
lands, as is my claim. What people hear me arguing is that markets should value the
arts because they are thinking either in terms of government or market. But I am
pointing at the possibility of a third way where parties form partnerships for the
production and enjoyment of art with indirect ways of financing by means of dona-
tions, for example. The intent is to avoid the impersonal and objectifying relation-
ships that characterise transactions with the government and in markets. The key is
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to generate relationships that stimulate ongoing interactions that are needed to
sustain and develop the values of art.
In the meantime, I had a chance to practice what I preach through involvement
m a thearer project that starts from the principle of partnership. The objective of
Het Toned Speelt (The Theatre Plays) is to produce quality Dutch plays with a
minimum of subsidies and sponsorship and a maximum participation of so-called
share holders. The idea is to persuade people to buy shares in the company which
give them a say. The hope is that this will give the company a sound financial basis
independent of the government (in itself a startling feat given that all major rhearer
companies relie on subsidies to cover more than 80 percent of their expenses) and
at the same time makes for intense and productive interactions among directors,
actors and the partners. Such inrcracrions might very well add to the value of pro-
ducing and experiencing the plays.
Much criticism has also come from fellow academics.2.6 Several criticized my
characterisation of the artistic experience for being romantic. Another criticism is
that In my eagerness to call attention to the non-economic dimension of the realm
of the arts, I overlook the economics. Bruno Frey, for example, pointed to the pos-
sibility that measument In money terms increases the value of an art work - the
crowding-in effect he calls this. He furthermore suggested that I do injustice to
work that has been done in cultural economics. Ruth Towse, editor of the Journal of
Cultural Economics, will amplify this criticism in her contribution to the ensuing
conversation. What separates me from these critics is that whereas they are intent
to determine the commonalities between art and other economic activities and thus
to demystify art as something special, I want to find out what distinguishes art. To
that end I position myself as an anthropologist would and take seriously what the
"natives" think and say. \Vhen they tell me that art is different - and they do in
many ways - I wonder why. In a sense this entire book might be considered In the
light of this wonderment.
PART ONE
On Value

2The Value of Art
A Philosophical Perspective
ANTOON VAN DEN BRAEMBUSSCHE
The re-introduction of value into the discussion runs into conceptual problems right
away_ For what is value? And what does culture stand for in the "value ofculture."
This part combines three, mainly philosophical, explorations of these conceptual
issues. Antoon Van den Braembussche starts off probing the concept of value. The
influence ofdeconstructionist thinking will show in his tendency to turn the concept
inside out and bring out its multiple meanings. In the end he callsattention to mani-
festations of the sublime which would not only make measurement impossible but
would render theapplication of the notion ofvaluepointless.
Antoon Van den Braembussche is a philosopher ofhistory and art. He teaches at
the Erasmus University. His latest book is Denken over Kunst (Bussum: Dick Coutin-
ho, 1994, English translation forthcoming) which is an introduction to the philosophy
afart.
I N HIS inaugural speech "The value ofculture" (seechapter I) Ario Klamer set thetone for the discussion during the conference that led to this volume. Afterexploring the economic way of thinking, in which art and culture are valued
exclusively in terms of commodity and measurement, Arjo Klamer expressed the
need to correct the economists' perspective. The conventional economists' per-
spective is too single-minded and tends to devalue important distinctive features of
art and culture. One important feature of art is its ambiguity: it represents problems
of meaning without solving them. This essential ambiguity explains why aesthetic
experience is an experience of wonderment. Another important feature of culture is
the intrinsic role of reciprocity in human relationships, which IS embedded III values
that are "beyond measure". Both features are wholly neglected by conventional
economics, which reduces cultural goods, paintings and performances to com-
modities and their values to prices. This commodification of culture and art misses
the point completely: "Art as activity and as experience has a value that is beyond
measure and therefore clashes with the form of money" (p. 25 in this volume
[Klamer, 1995, 308}}.
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This straightforward criticism of commodity fetishism, which is ascribed to con-
ventional economics, may seem outrageous, especiallybecause it is expressed by an
economist. Economic thinking, however, has not always been so alien towards
moral values, as is the case III its conventional and present day practice. In that
respect Klamer's plea for a morally oriented economics of art can be seen as a
revival of a rich tradition within economics, which sees it primarily as a systematic
study of moral sentiments and virtues (Klamer, ibid, p xx 1J995, 298); the contribu-
tion of McCloskey in chapter 12). The revival of moral perspectives liberates eco-
nomics from its otherwise crude and positivist assumption that art can only be val-
ued as a commercial enterprise. This assumption, which is both morally and
ideologically suspect, is even antithetical to our basic, everyday intuition about the
value of art: "For the very reason that we avoid commercial deals with friends and
children, we avoid the intrusion of the commerciallifeworld in the world of arts"
(Khmer p. 26 {, 1995, 308)).
The Essential Tension
Time and again the tension between the conventional economists' perspective and
the moral or aesthetic point of view re-emerged dunng our discussions. Let us call
it "the essential tension". It remains indeed a matter of debate whether we should
see art as a commodity or something which has a value of its own, be it a moral or
aesthetic one or both. In his comments on Klamer's speech Hans Abbing ques-
tioned the relevance of arguing that something is "beyond measure". Don't we
introduce some mystical or metaphysical element into economic discourse, which
is maybe no longer a characteristic of actual practice in the world of art? Artists
transact everyday. The world of art is part and parcel of capitalist society. Commer-
cial standards have been fully internalized by different actors, artists included. The
ranking of artistic quality is a matter of measurement in terms of economic value
and prices. The so-called "purity" of artistic experience has not prevented this gen-
eralized commercialisation and commodification of art.
More particularly, he criticized Klamer's distinction between productof art and
art as activity or experience. Everything can be "experienced". There are no inherent
characteristics of the arts, which warrant a borderline between art and other prod-
Ul"1S or activities III the economic sphere. Even the emphasis on non-monetary
exchange cannot serve as a line of demarcation, because many economic activities,
such as gifts and services, do belong to the same category. This does not prevent all
these non-monetary activities from heing subjected to exchange-rates, which
should only be elaborated to show their genuine economic character.
At one moment, however, Hans Abbing asked himself "why do we value art so
highly?". Another participant wondered: "Why do we still feel uncomfortable
about commercialisation of art?". Another one asked "why should we stop the
commercialisarion of art?". According to some participants our uneasiness about
the commercialisation of art is a modern phenomenon. In the Golden Age com-
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modification of art was accepted as something natural and unproblematical. Only
with the advent of capitalism did the tension between the "economic" and "irurin-
sic" value of art emerge as a hot issue on the cultural agenda. As I will point out
later, the tension lies quite deeper and was already problematicized in more gener-
al terms in the eighteenth century by Kanr.
Is the "essential tension", which is at stake, still a hot issue? In view of the ever
increasing incorporation of art within an expanding cultural industry, it looks like a
problem which is outdated and obsolete. Art projects and manifestations have
become so dependent on private sponsoring and government subsidies that all talk
about the "intrinsic" value of art seems inadequate and meaningless. Given the
oversupply of art the role of cultural intermediaries, entrepreneurs and managers
has become so Important and decisive that every claim to artistic autonomy seems
to vanish into the requirements and determinants of an all-embracing economics
and politics of art.
Why should we indeed stop the commercialisation of art in view of this massive
and seemingly inescapable commodification and politicization of art? Why should
we bother about the "intrinsic" value of art if even some artists, like Jeff Koons,
Marko Kostabi and many others, have no scruples whatsoever to operate as if there
is "no business like art business"? Arenc't we incurably romantic to believe that art
still represents a value of its own, which transcends the economics and politics of
art? Or, as Ruth Towse phrased the problem, have artists become "rational eco-
nomic beings" or do they still make "rational choices" which are to a large extent
normative and oriented towards "intrinsic rewards"? In that case the concept of
rationality of classical economics is totally inadequate. This would not only explain
why most artists' earnings are typically low, but also why many artists freely
choose self-creativity above career chances. To speak in Weberian terms, artists
seem to be oriented more towards "value rationality", in which artistic demands
and principles supersede economic rationality and economic prerogatives.
If the diagnoses of both Klamer and Ruth Towse are right, then art remains a
challenge to both classical economic rationality and its alleged "disenchantment of
the world" (Weber). Then art still confronts us with an experience of wonderment,
indeterminacy, and ambiguity, which resists any reduction to econormc calculation
and rationality. The value of art still transcends its purely commercial value and so
the "essential tension" remains, even within the neo-capiralisr tendency to dissolve
it entirely into the interplay of demand and supply.
Our Basic Intuition
Our basic intuition is that we can value a work of art without being in a position to
buy it. We can even value it in spite of the fact that we own it. We know that to
Invest III a piece of art is an experience which is quite different from its aesthetic
experience. Someone may buy a piece of art because he regards it as a good invest-
ment. He might be utterly indifferent towards its aesthetic qualities: from his eco-
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nomic point of view it doesn't really matter at all. But this plain fact does not
exclude, as our basic intuition tells us, that aesthetic experiences transcend the
sphere of economic transactions. This may be pointed out in many other ways. So
we may have aesthetic experiences of objects, which are simply not for sale. Wc
may be touched by the beauty of a sunrise and only dream of buying it. We will
never be able to invest m it, except in a very indirect and collective way, by taking
ecological measures in order to preserve the beauty and purity of nature. And even
that sort of investment will never allow us to own the sunrise III an economic way.
Confronted with works of an, with concerts or performances, we constantly
Judge them in terms of aesthetical qualities. After attending an expensive concert
we may feel disappointed and even betrayed, because it did nor fulfil! our aesthetic
standards. Our discourse on art and beauty is Imbued with aesthencal judgments.
Critics of art even criticize heavily subsidized or sponsored artistic manifestations
because they do not live up to our aesthetical norms or standards.
Kant's aesthetics, which is still widely discussed, IS wholly in line with our basic
intuition. Kanr tried to justify in a transcendental way the autonomy of our aes-
thetic experience. Indeed, in his analysis of the aesthetic judgment he emphasized
time and again the disinterestedness of the aesthetic experience. The same idea is
embodied in his well-known definition of beauty as "purposiveness without pur-
pose", which presupposes that not the matter or the function but only the pure
{ann IS at stake when we are experiencing beauty (See Kant, 1951).
Consider a nouvelle cuisine plate. If we want to consume it, then we have,
according to Knnr, a genuine interest Jtl the "existence" of the object. Our pleasure
is determined by the very availability of the plate. On the other hand, as soon as the
plate becomes <In object of aesthetic experience, our interest in the "existence" of
the object disappears altogether. Only the subjective experience of its pure form
matters. In order to experience the plate as a harmonious whole of colors and
forms we need not be III a position to consume it. We even do not need to know
that we are actually seeing a nouvelle cuisine plate. And we certainly do not bother
about the moral qualities of the beautiful plate. The aesthetic dimension as such has
nothing to do with conceptual or moral reasoning.
The Double Discourse o("Value"
Our basic intuition tells us that we must distinguish between art as a commodity
and as an object of aesthetic experience, between mere price and intrinsic value,
between mere consumers and discriminating taste, between extra artistic criteria
and truly artistic demands, between objects of pleasure and objects of beauty, and
so forth. This omnipresent axiological duality has inspired Barbara Hernnstein
Smith to speak of the "double discourse of value": "On the one hand there is the
discourse of economic theory: money, commerce, technology, industry, produc-
tion and comsumprion, workers and consumers; on the other hand, there is the dis-
course of aesthetic axiology: culture, art, genius, creation and appreciation, artists
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and connoisseurs. In rhe first discourse, events are explained in terms of calcula-
tion, preferences, benefits, profits, prices, and utility. In the second, events are
explained - or, rather (and this distinction/opposition is as crucial as any of the oth-
ers), 'justified' - in terms of inspiration, discrimination, taste (good taste, bad taste,
no taste), the test of time, intrinsic value, and transcendent value" (Smith, 1988,
127).
Seen from this perpective the essential tension is embodied by two opposmg
discourses. The one discourse is speaking in terms of "utilitarianism" or "utility
theory" and presupposes "instrumental rationality" as the only legitimate and
defendable concept of "value". Its idealtype IS embodied by the traditional utility-
maxlmlzmg or "rational-choice" model of neo-classical economics. The other dis-
course speaks m the name of "humanism" and "anti-utilitarianism" and presuppos-
es "value rationality" or "substantive rationality" as the only legitimate concept of
"value". With respect to the value of art its idealtype IS embodied by the traditional
viewpoint that art and the aesthetical experience have a value of their own, which
transcend any "utility" and should be protected against any sort of reductiomsm.
Klamer's speech is a good example of this anti-utilitarian and humanist discourse,
which echoes predominant discursive practices within the philosophy of art.
On Binary Logic and Deconstruaion
Within the philosophy of art the anti-utilitarian discourse rests on a binary logic,
which exemplifies two different and opposing meanings of the word "value". First
of all it is understood as "that quality of a thmg according to which it is thought as
being more or less desirable, useful and important". This is the broadly UTILITARI-
AN at INSTRUMENTAL mealllng of the term. Here the value of art is always related
to specific purposes or uses, which lie outside the realm of art or aesthetic expen-
ence. Secondly, "value" is understood as "that which is desirable or worthy of
esteem for its own sake; thing or quality having INTRINSIC worth". This is the
purely AESTHETIC or INTRINSIC meaning of the term. Here the value of art is
always related to intrinsic criteria, which lie within the realm of aesthetic values,
conceived as a separate category of values Irreducible to other values. Either we are
valuing works of art "instrumentally" or "as a means to some end" or we are valu-
ing them "for their own sake" or "as an ends III themselves".
It can easily been seen now that the conventional economists' perspective is but
an instance of the instrumental meaning of "value", though it is a very specific one.
Here "value" IS understood as "the worth of a thing in money or goods at a certain
time; the market price". This is the COMMERCIAL. or ECONOMIC meaning of the
term. Here the value of art IS always related to its degree of commodification (the
degree in which it is incorporated in the circulation of commodities).
So, philosophical discourse on art rests on a binary logic, in fact on a whole
range of binary distinctions, which, however, upon closer examination, do reveal a
number of inconsistencies, hesitations, inner tensions, blind spots or aporia's.
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These tensions between rhetoric and logic, between that which the text wants to
convey manifestly and that which it betrays latently, are precisely the sort of
tensions on which Derrida concentrates when he tries to deconstruct philosophi-
cal texts (See, for instance, Derrida, 1967a; 1967b; 1972a; 1972b; J984; 1989;
Culler, 1982; Norris, t982; Eagleton, 1983; Leitch, 1983; Berman, 1988 and Sarup,
1993,32-57).
It IS, therefore, not surprising that many classical texts on aesthetics have been
the subject of deconstruction. Kant's third critique is a case III point. From a decon-
srructive point of view some inner tensions of Kant's discourse are strikingly evi-
dent. Let us consider briefly only a few of them, which have been revealed by Bar-
bura Hernnstein Smith and Derrida (Smith, T988, 64-72; Derrida, T978, 19-209). A
first inner tension concerns Kant's claim that aesthetic Judgment is subjective and at
the same time universal: in any aesthetic judgment we are not judging for ourselves,
but for everyone because, if not, there would be "no taste whatever, i.e. no aestheti-
cal Judgment which can make a rightful claim upon everyone's assent" (Kant, 19S[,
sect. 7, my emphasis added). This argument begs the question because it rules out
a priori any serious alternative by excluding it form the very definition of taste! A
second mner tension pertains to Kant's claim that the beautiful is the object of a
necessary pleasure because we all possess a common sense (sensuscommunis). The
.lrgument runs as follows. In aesthetic judgment we assume agreement on the part
of everybody, who percieves the beautiful object. The possibility of universal agree-
ment presupposes a sense common to all human beings. This sensus communis or
our common capacity to shared feelings presupposes itself "universal communica-
bility". Without the latter there would be no harmony between cognitions or Judg-
ments and the object. And suice this accordance itself "must admit ofuniversalcom-
municability, and consequently also our feeling of it (. . .), and since the universal
cammunicahiiity of a feeling presupposes a common sense, we have grounds for
assuming the latter. And this common sense is assumed (. .) simply as the necessary
condition of the universal communicability ofour knowledge, which is presupposed
in every logic and in every principle ofknowledge which is not skeptical" {Kant, 1951,
section 22, emphasis added). So, judgments of taste presuppose agreement because
every cognition and judgment presuppose universal communicability, which itself
presupposes a common sense, which [S III its turn presupposed by judgments of
taste! This clearly is a circular argument, which cuts off any possible criticism or
skepticisrn.
Less CIrcular but no less problematical IS the assertion that the claims of taste to
universal validity are ultimately unjustifiable, except as "(... ) a regulative principle
for producing m us a common sense fur higher purposes". The indecision is quite
clear when Kant writes "( .] whether the ought, i.e. the objective confluence of the
feeling of anyone man with that of another only signifies the possibility of arriving
at this accord, and the Judgment of taste only affords an example of the application
of this principle - these questions we have neither the wish nor the power to investi-
gate as yet" (Kanr, 19SI, section 22, emphasis added). Kant is here wavenng
between the deus ex machina of grounding aesthetics ultimately in ethical pnnci-
The Value ofArt 37
pies and the dead end of losing its justification altogether, In the first possibility the
beautiful becomes a symbol of the good, and appears to derive its intrinsic value
from the ideas of Reason, which stood at the center of practical reason. In the sec-
ond possibility the whole fabric of the third critique crumbles. In both cases his
analysis is faced with its own limits.
The same holds true when Kant dismisses ornaments (parerga), such as frames
of paintings, draperies over statues or collonades beneath buildings, as being
inessential embellishments, which remain external to the pure form of a work of
art. As is welI-known,Jacques Derrida has tried to show that this matter of demar-
cation is utterly complex. A frame of a painting has an internal and external bor-
derline, which tends to dissolve accordingly either into the surroundings or mto the
painting itself.This confronts us with an inescapable ambiguity. The frame belongs
to the painting and at the same time it does not. It is inside as well as outside, or, to
put it otherwise, it is neither inside nor outside. This ambiguity is for Derrida the
starting point from which he thoroughly deconstrucrs the binary oppositions upon
which the whole fabric of Kant's third critique rests. Mote specifically, it cuts
through the oppositions between inside and outside, intrinsic and extrinsic, essen-
tial and inessential, formal and material, interest-free and utilitarian, pure and
impure form, autonomous and heteronomous, and so on (Derrida, 1987).
From Universality to Radical Contingency
After this deconstrucrion of Kant's aesthetics we are left with the presumption that
the radical opposition between the utilitarian at instrumental and the intrinsic or
aesthetic value of art is quite problematical. Ulitimately the intrinsic value of art
always appears to be "contaminated", at least partly tainted by elements of impuri-
ty. The essentialist or transcendental definition of art, its axiological purity and its
corrolary dualism, always appears to meet its own limits. To put it in the words of
Barbara Hernnsrein Smith: "The recurrent impulse and effort to define aesthetic
value by contradistinction to all other nameable sources of interest or forms of
value - hedonic, practical, sentimental, ornamental, historical, ideological, and so
forth - is, in effect, to define it out of existence; for when all such utilities, interests,
and other particular sources of value have been subtracted, nothing remains. Or, to
put this III other terms: the 'essential value' ofan artwork consists ofeverything from
which it is usually distinguished" (Smith, 1988,33- Own italics).
Given this diagnosis, which echoes even the fierce criticism by Nierzsche of
Kant's aesthetics, any essentialist, formal, pure, timeless, interest-free and alustori-
cal metaconcept of aesthetic value is out of place. A good deal of the fundamental
criticism on Kantian aesthetics and on any talk about the value of art rests on the
affirmation that any valuation of art is III pnnciple relative, Impure, historically and
socially conditioned, interest-bound and thus radically contingent. Fashionable
accounts of this fundamental criticism not only unmask the essentialist view as an
unwarranted way of binary thinking, but also and at the same time as an outdated
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belief in a transdiscursive Archimedan point of view, an inherent tendency towards
stability, homogeneity, regularity and exclusion. In contrast, these accounts claim
to criticize binary thinking in the name of discursivity, radical heterogeneity, differ-
ence and incommensurability (See, for instance, the contribution by David Rucio,
Julie Graham and Jack Amariglio). In all these cases the essentialist discourse seems
to be simply inversed in its many counterparts.
One such strategy of reversal can be found m Barbara Hemnstein Smith's
thought-provoking Contingencies of value: "All value is radically contingent, being
neither a fixed attribute, an inherent quality, or an objective property of things but,
rather, an effect of multiple, continuously changing, and continuously interacting
variables or, to put this another way, the product of the dynamics of a system,
specifically an economic system" ( Smith, 1988, jo). Her argument runs as follows.
like its price in the marketplace, the value of an entity to an individual IS also the
product of the dynamics of an economic system, i.c. the personal economy consti-
tuted by the subject's needs, interests and resources. This personal economy is con-
tinuously fluctuating III relation to an ever changing environment. In its response to
its environment the personal economy always includes "( ) strategy, instrumen-
tality, (self-)interest and, above all, the profit motive" (Smith, 1988, 112).
Needless to say that for Smith this applies to art as well. In each work of art each
step taken by the artist is a decision or value-Judgment, which IS calculated to the
extreme and is therefore genuinely economic: "Every literary work - and, more
generally, artwork -IS thus the product of a complex evaluative feedback loop that
embraces not only the personal economy of the artist's own interests and resources
as they evolve during and III reaction to the process of composition, but also all the
shifting economics of her assumed and imagined audiences, including those who
do not yet exist but whose emergent interests, variable conditions of encounter,
and rival sources of gratification she will attempt to predict - or will intuitively sur-
mise - and to which, among other things, her uwn sense of the fittingness of each
decision will be responsive" (Smith, r988, 45).
Towards a Critique ofRadical Contingency
Undoubtedly, Smith has an important point III stressing the economic and social
dimension of value and art. Economic and social determinants play an Important
role in the production, distribution and reception of arrwnrks, as the work of Pierre
Bourdieu on the social stratification of aesthetic Judgments has revealed quite con-
vincingly (Bourdieu, 1979). But her alternative analysis falls short in terms of a gen-
umc deconstrucnon. What Smirh does is simply to reverse the binary logic of the
essentialist view on value and art. Against the essentialist or intrinsic tradition she
simply revalorize, and vindicates the utilitarian and instrumental point of view.
Such a strategy of reversal, however, remains utterly problematical: it is still caughr
within the logic and the limits of the thought system it is supposed to deconstruct!
As Derrida, at least in principle, repeatedly emphasized, deconstruction should go
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further than a simple reversal and exceed the prevailing oppositions of the system,
which it is meant to deconstruct (see, for instance, Derrida, 1967a, ]26).
Anyhow, this tendency towards a simple and radical reversal explains, I think,
some blind spots within the discourse of Smith herself. How can Smith claim that
ail value is radically contingent, because if her own statement is likewise radically
contingent how can it rise above itself and be valid for allvalue? On which grounds
does her own statement rise above the "inescapable consequence" of her own
premises? If her own sratement IS radically contingent, then it can never attain the
kind of universality which is clearly suggested here. Apparently, she IS contending
that contingency IS an inherentquality of everyvalue, thus presupposing the kind of
essentialism, which she manifestly and radically rejects!
The same holds true for her depiction of art. The artist is described as a calcu-
lating machine, which continuously anticipates and readjusts herself to the
assumed expectations of the audience. How could this be possible m a world of
radical contingency? Does intuition about the audience not rest on a kind of regu-
larity and generalisation, which is inadmissible within a radical contingent world? Is
the vigilant and constant self-consciousness of the artist not indebted to a philoso-
phy of the presence, which is so characteristic for the kind of metaphysics she
wants to deconstruct? And does she not ascribe to artistic creation a homogeneity,
which is not only far removed from any radical heterogenity, but also presupposes
a very specifickind of rationality, which is so exclusive that it does not allow for any
difference, any alternative, any contingent deviation, to the point of cutting off any
real incommensurability? And does this strategy of exclusion not explain why she
can pinpoint the contingent always as exemplifying an economic system, which
again reveals the inner structure of all value in a transparent and essentialist way, far
beyond the "inescapable consequence" of radical contingency?
From Symbolic Value to the Radical Commodification ofAn-
In the approach of Smith any value-judgment becomes a commodity. This reminds
us of the way Baudrillard criticized the concepts of "use-value" and "sign-value". In
his diagnosis of contemporary cultural practices, Baudrillard confronts us with a
radical instrurnenralisation of culture, which rests on a double and parallel reduc-
tion. The explosion of commodity circulation reduces any "use-value" into
"exchange-value". This goes hand in hand with an implosion of "meaning", in
which the signified is reduced altogether to the s.gnifier. The signifier and
exchange-value become omnipresent, equal and perfectly interchangeable, leading
to a radical commodification of cultural practices (see Baudrillard, 1972).
\Vhen someone looks at a painting of Van Gogh, the one which depicts Docteur
Gachet, this painting will for him be reduced to a signifier, that can be used at ran-
dom, for instance in advertising to signify "good taste". The painting loses its orig-
inal meaning and at the same time its original use-value: it becomes simply an
Antoon van den Braembussche
object of exchange-value. It loses any authentic value. The same happens when The
Sunflowers of Van Gogh are sold at an auction. Here too the painting m question
only serves as an alibi for financial expenditure. The symbolic value of the painting
is destroyed and the auction only legitimizes the idea of Painting in an absolute way.
Towards a Critique ofRadical Commodification
But, still, what is the "real" value of this work of art? Granted that The Sunfluwers
can be seen as a commodity and rightfully be studied accordingly, does it also have
a value, which transcends the simple opposition between commodity and authentic
value, between instrumental and intrinsic value? Did the painting have a value of its
own, before it was ever sold? Yes and no. At an earlier stage BaudriIlard claimed
that the real value of the painting pertains to its genealogy, its creation, the signa-
ture of its origin, in short, the originality of the work (Baudrillard, 1972, 140). But
such a view still betrays a nostalgic move towards an authentic, aesthetic value,
which subsequently has been destroyed and absorbed by exchange-value, the over-
all commodificarion of our culture. So still the antagonism remains and the real
value IS still caught m a kind of metaphysics of the origin, which is definitely out-
dated and untenable. At a later stage, however, BaudrilIard tries to cure himself of
any "melancholic modernity". Here the work of art is fully immersed in the circula-
tion of commodities, an object between objects, a pure signifier but at the same
time it challenges its objcctivarion by transcending it, because it becomes - in the
words of Baudelaire - an absolute commodity (See Baudrillard, 1983, r71-173).
In acknowledging the work of art as an absolute commodity, Baudelaire not
only accentuates the abstraction of the formal exchange-value to the extreme, but
opens the possibility of a strategy which does not revert to the old essentialist view,
which rests on truth, beauty, authenticity and so on. It embodies an indifference
towards utility and value, towards instrumental and intrinsic value, towards
exchange- and use-value. This permits us to perceive the work of art as something
totally new, original, unsuspected, brilliant. What is at stake here is the eternal
modernity of the work of art: a present which is gone as soon as we try to fix it. In
the enchanting-ironic logic of BaudeIaire it does not matter if the work of art IS
immersed in a world of commodities, because even as a pure commodity it has a
strangeness of its own, which is akin to the experience of the sublime. This may, at
least partly, explain why great works of art are sold at such exorbitant pnces. Why
indeed they exceed the test of time and any balanced and "rational" measurement
in terms of price and money.
One drawback of Baudrillard's reaffirmation of Baudelairc's concept of absolute
commodity IS that it remains to a certain extent caught up in the logic of commod-
ity fetishism. It puts fetishism to the extreme, it is only a radicalisation of it, though
it aims at transcending it altogether. The inherent danger of such a strategy, how-
ever, is that it exerts a kind of fascination and seduction, which merely reflects the
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spirit of the market. Or, to put it III the words of Lyotard: "In this way one thinks
that one is expressing the spirit of the times, whereas one is merely reflecting the
spirit of the market. Sublimity is no longer in art, but in speculation on art"
(Lyotard, 1989, 210).
Dialogue
KJamer: You really took us for a loop. First, you make it seem that it makes sense to
distinguish two discourses on value, then you show, with Baudrillard in hand, that
in practice use or aesthetic value get easily mixed up with exchange value. So the
argument ends up undermining my point that the arts, like religion and friendship,
embody special values that are beyond measure. The final few paragraphs boosted
my spirits again as they appear to hold out for some special quality of the arts.
Vanden Braembussche: Well, let's go back to your initial plea in favour of those fea-
tures of art which are irreducible to the conventional economist's perspective. I
think that only [he discourse of the sublime can give an account of those very fea-
tures, without being prone to easy deconstruction on the part of the sceptic. In this
discourse, which has a longsranding tradition in the philosophy of art (see, for
instance, Lyotard, 1982, 1989 & 1991; Crowther, 1992; Saint-Girons 1993), it is
affirmed and reaffirmed time and again that the experience of the sublime intro-
duces an element of indeterminacy, which at the same time conveys an experience
of astonishment on the part of the addressee.
Instead of ambiguity and wonderment, the terms you use, I would thus prefer to
speak of indeterminacy and astonishment. The indeterminacy of the sublime has
the advantage that it transcends any fixed categories, which are so characteristic, as
we have seen, of binary logic. The sublime IS neither extrinsic nor intrinsic in a pure
sense. It is neither formal nor material, neither interest-free nor utilitarian, neither
autonomous nor heterenomous in a pure sense. It always is to a certain extent sus-
pended to the extreme, and thus indeterminate. The indeterminacy derives from
the fact that the sublime confronts us with something "incomprehensible and inex-
plicable", something which defies any rule, fonn or even taste in the usual sense of
the word. What is at stake in the sublime is not the consolation of beautiful forms
and conventional rules, but the indirect presentation of that which cannot, in prin-
ciple, be presented. It cuts through the established conventions and even shows
lack of taste, formal imperfection and so on. It belongs to the category of the
unnameable, the unspeakable, the unforseeable, which cannot be grasped or sensed
at experienced in a univocal sense. "The sublime", writes Boileau, "is not strictly
speaking something which is proven or demonstrated, but a marvel, which seizes
one, strikes one, and makes one feel" (Lyotard, 1989, 202).
As an instance of the sublime, the work of art thus creates a world apart, in
which the formless and the monstruous can only be revealed ill what Kanr calls
negative presentation. Or, as Kanr would have it, it bears witness to the incommen-
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surability between our mental faculties, between imagination and thought. In that
sense "it represents problems of meaning without solving them". In fact, the work
of art shows in an indireer manner why the representation is no longer possible.
The indeterminacy explains why aesthetic experience is an experience of astonish-
ment, sometimes even of shock. In sum, the sublime comes very near to the the
first feature of art which you borrowed from Barend van Heusden and which is,
according to you, irreducible to the conventional economists' perspective.
A second feature of art, which transcends conventional economics, IS according
to you, the intrinsic role of reciprocity III human relationships, which is embedded
III values that arc "beyond measure". No doubt the sublime confronts us with a
world which is "beyond measure". It remains, however, an open question if this fea-
ture of art is grounded m the intrinsic role of reciprocity in human relationships, as
you want us to believe. In a very specific sense the sublime is always ahead of reci-
procity, it is threatening reciprocity, because it conveys privation, anxiety, insecuri-
ty. As soon as the sublime, and indeed any authentic art, is part and pared of nor-
mal reciprocity or routine morality it loses its intensification and becomes
disenchanted as an object, we can understand and speak about.
In that sense the sublime is not only "beyond measure", but also in a very spe-
cific sense "beyond value". It embodies an experience which is ahead of any specif-
ic value. And though it is akin to the category of Reason, the noumenal, which is in
Kant's vtew the transcendental category par excellence of practical reason, of ethics,
it can never be reduced to a determinate value, be it a moral or an aesthetical one.
The sublime and supreme "value" of art resides in its axialogical indeterminacy, its
privation of any specific and already established value. The moment it is no longer
rejected as incomprehensible it becomes a mere object of art, which will he pre-
served in museums and cherished by the art market. As soon as it is canonized as a
work of art and dissolves mtc the calculation of profit, it loses its initial and sublime
challenge and its ultimate "meaning" and "value".
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The Value of Culture
A Dialogue between Barend van Heusden
and Arjo Klamer
7b further the philosophical discussion on the concept of value that Van den Braem-
bussche hegan in the previous chapter I sought the insights ofa semiotiaan, Rarend
van Hcusdcn teaches literary theory at the University ofGroningenand recently pub-
lished a pruvowtive study in which he claims to have found distinctive (semiotic)
characteristics oftexts that arecalledliterature', In the openingessayI appliedhis find-
ings in an attempt to characteriseart as the representation of "problems of meaning
without solvingthem." In thischapterwe continue the conversation that we havecon-
ducted over many years, this time to explorethe relevance ofhissemioticviews for the
subject at hand, whichis the value of culture.
KLAM E R ln the opening essay in this hook I have tried to deal with the con-cepts of culture and value. I had to because I wanted to see how I, as aneconomist, could come to an assessment of the value of culture. As was to
he expected, my use of the terms have caused some confusion. Anton Van den
Braembusschc has already pointed out philosophical grounds for caution in the use
of "value". \Xfhat is your first response as a semiotician?
Van Heusden I agree that we need conceptual clarity. Take the term "culture".
What does it mean? I'd say we have at least two options. Either the term refers to
the whole of historical organization of hnman practice, or it is limited to part of this
totality, that IS, to the artistic realm. The latter may he the more common use:
when people speak about culture they usually refer to art, and possibly the dis-
course about art.
Klamer I actually try to exploit the dual meanings of the concept in my essay, tak-
ing it to refer both to a system of shared values and to the arts.
Van Heusden So I've noticed. I was intrigued by the way you tried to weave both
meanings through your argument hut I was not entirely satisfied. I hope to he able
to clarify myself in the course of our conversation, but before doing so 1 want to
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note that further distinctions in the meanings of the term "value" are ill order. I
myself would distinguish the following three value concepts: I) value in terms of
funcrionts), 2) value in terms of formal relations; and 3)economic value. For exam-
ple, a painting can have value as an (aesthetic) experience, as a historical document,
or as a psychological experiment. These are values in terms of the functions of the
painting. Value can also be in the compositions or components as m the colors,
dimensions, light-intensity of the painting. That is value in terms of formal rela-
tions. You may in this case also think of the value of the pieces in a chess game
whichthey owe to their assigned moves. And then there is economic value, but that
should be obvious.
Klamer Van den Braembussche does not take into account formal values! Then
again, he showed us that the customary distinction between mtrinsic and extrinsic
values is problematic. But before telling us how your distinctions can work for us,
you may want to elaborate on the semiotic perspective of yours.
Van Heusden I had my academic training in semiotics and literary theory, more
particularly in the semiotics of literature and culture, so my approach to the prob-
lem IS a semiotic one. This means that questions relating to the value of culture
become questions about the use uf signs, or semiosis. If you ask me "What is the
value of culture?" I understand this as a question about the value of sign systems or
sign processes.
Klamer Let's see how that works. Take literature, which IS after all your specialism.
In your book you raise the question about the value of literature. How did you
answer it from your semiotic perspective?
Van Heusden That is a lot to ask, but let me try to give you an answer. In the book
I suggested that the question of literary value be answered on three levels of
abstraction, being the level of particular texts, historical convention and anthropo-
logical constraints. The three levels of abstraction are levels of description and
analysis. One can describe semiotic structures and processes on these three levels.
They can be chosen with respect to all cultural phenomena.
Firstly, the literary value is a value attached to a particular text by a certain read-
er in certain historical circumstances. This is the functional value that a certam text
of literature has for a person. Secondly, the literary value of a text is determined
within a specific literary context, say the Dutch literature of the seventeenth or
world literature in the nineteenth century. This constitutes the value of the text in
relationship to other texts. The historical and the personal values do not necessar-
ily coincide. A work of literature may be considered valuable within a culture and
yet it is quite possible that individual readers won't value it at all. Historical values
may change in response to changes in personal values. Under the pressure of a
growing number of "dissidents", the canon will have to change but how much it
will change and how fast the process will take place depends on the strength of the
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tradition. In Holland, for instance, VondeI has been and still is considered to be one
of the greatest authors, hut the Dutch don't read him - and if they do, probably
don't appreciate him.
Thirdly, the question about the literary value of a text can be answered on a log-
ical or anthropological level, relating it, in abstracto, to the semiotic function litera-
ture fulfills. On this logical or anthropologicallevel we start asking questions about
the specific function of a literary representation of reality. You may wonder, for
example, how such a representation relates to other representational genres like
SCIence, technology, magic, or common sense knowledge. In order to be able to
answer the question why a text IS considered to be literature on the lower levels of
abstraction, one needs a general theory about the anthropological value of litera-
ture, which is a theory about literature's semiotic function. That, at least, is one of
the points that I am stressing.
Klamer How do these levels of abstraction correspond with the three values you
distinguished?
Vall Heusden As I've said, cultural phenomena, including cultural values, may be
studied on these three levels of abstraction. The three values I distinguished are a
case in point. Take the economic value of literature. We should distinguish the eco-
nomic value of one work of literature for one person (what do I want to spend to
get hold of it?), the cconortuc value of literature, for msrance, in 17th century
France, or the general problem, which you pose, of the relation of economic value
to literature as a human practice.
Klamcr What about the value of culture?
Van Heusden On the third, anthropological, level of abstraction, the value of cul-
ture III a general sense shows. The function of culture, as many anthropologists
have said, is to structure reality, to make coordinated action possible - we need cul-
ture in order to know what we do and how to relate with others. Later contribu-
tions by de Beus, Gouda and McCloskey illustrate this point quite well. I'd speak
here of the semiotic value of culture.
Klanser What do you mean by semiotic here?
Van Heusden A culture as a whole is a complex of sign systems. It comprises all
sorts of sign systems: visual, verbal, bchavioral. These are used to reduce a poten-
tially open, undetermined reality to a limited number of possibilities. When I meet
you, the possible actions I could take are numerous, even uncountable. Bur because
of shared sign systems, I will choose between two, three or four options in order to
rclnrc to you. I use sign systems, I recognize them, eventually I change them.
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Klamer What I am particularly concerned with is the absence of any sense of cul-
ture in current econumic theory. Culture does not play a role in economic analysis.
That seems unfortunate as culture in the general sense, Dutch culture for example,
might make a difference to how economic processes evolve.
Van Heusden I would go further than that. Listen, economists study human behav-
ior and human behavior is in a large part cultural, that is, semiotic behavior. So if
economists decide to leave out culture from their theories of economic behavior,
they have at least the duty to explain how this human being, cultural from head to
toes, suddenly leaps out of culture when slhe is being "economic".
Klamer So you would ask us economists to think more thoroughly about eco-
nomic behavior as cultural behavior.
Van Heusden Of course. Both on the level of economic behavior, and on that of
econonuc theory. To do so, however, one needs a theoretical framework in which
culture, as well as the relations between various realms of culture can be thought
about.
Klarner Standard economic theory focuses on the logic of choice. The basic
assumption is that preferences are glven. So there IS no need to talk about those
anymore. This leaves us free to concentrate on the constraints under which people
make their choices, given their preferences. All econorruc analysis is about the
effects of changes in the constraints. Rationality here means choosing the optimal
option given the preferences and constraints. My proposal IS to shift attention
away from the moment of choice to the evaluation of the values inherent in eco-
nomic behavior. This would direct our thinking to people actively valuating the
things and events of the world as they present themselves to them. Such an activi-
ty is fundamentally social and cultural, I would say. Our starting point, therefore,
must be value,
Van Heusden And the basic value of all cultural behavior is related to whether it
helps you to understand what is going on. Doing so, it makes coordinated action
possible. As such, cultural behavior is definitely rational, although the rationality is
semiotic, rather than logical. From a more strictly logical point of view this ratio-
nality may well seem very irrational. Bur the value of a culture depends on its elim-
inating doubt successfully.
This POint about doubt is important. Semiosis, or the act of giving meaning to
the things that occur to us and solving the problems we encounter, originates with
doubt. According to Peirce, the primary goal of semiosis is the settlement of opin-
ion, the establishment of a beliefor habit, or the confirmation of such a beliefwhen
it IS threatened by perception. What Peircedescribes as "the settlement of opinion"
is the substitution of a known form for a perceived troublesome reality. Substitu-
tion, however, is only one of the possible strategies that we have at our disposa1. In
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semiosis we endow reality with a stable, known form, but at the same time this
reality forces us to adapt this form to it. Signs fulfil a crucial role In the process: real-
ity is given form with signs, and in the process these forms (or signs) often change.
Klamer So this economic rationality would be one type or instantiation of a more
general semiotic rationality.
Van Heusden That is right. There are different ways In which people deal with
uncertainty. One can distinguish a number of basic strategies. Three of them are the
magic, the substitutive, and the cognitive. In magic semiosis a concrete situation IS
recognized, not as the token of a more general type, but as the reenactment of a
concrete being or event. Reality is not understood as referring to general knowl-
edge, but to a particular situation which IS happening again and again. The magic
reality is a recurrent concrete system, a series of events, stories, myths. Thus a
totem is the Image of a concrete animal, and related to this animal are a set of sto-
ries in which it is related to other animals, to geography, cosmology and social
order. All concrete events are understood ill terms of the totem. The totem is the
form used to deal with a concrete and changing reality, but the totem is itself equal-
ly real, concrete, unique and, therefore, ambiguous. The totemic world is thus nec-
essarily highly unstable and changeable. What gives the magic form its semiotic
power is the fact that it provides the interpreting subject with a figurative system of
characters and events to be used in the confrontation with an ever changing reality.
The system creates order. In a sense, one could say that in this first step - because
a first step it is - in semiosis, reality itself is used to deal with reality, and the tokens
are tokens of other tokens, and not (yet) of general types. In this first stage of
abstraction, the reality of perception is separated from a remembered reality which
IS as concrete as the reality perceived bur which at least provides a basis for recog-
nition. Thus semiosis is born. The fact that man recognizes makes magic scmiosis
different from animal perception.
Secondly, there is the substitutive semiosis. The problematic situation, causing
doubt, is now substituted by a belief. Substitutive senuosrs entails authority and
with authority power, desire, and love enter the stage. \'Qhowill I follow, who must
I follow? With whom sbail l identify? This strategy brings with it a strong opposi-
ncnal thinking. The problematic reality is translated into a known form and as a
result, reality as such must be discarded, as well as other possible forms. Therefore,
subsritutive scmiosis is fundamentally conflictual. It creates two kinds of adver-
saries: on the one hand a disturbing changing reality, on the other a series of possi-
ble alternative forms to be chosen. Both seem to escape the stable forms established
by some authority.
Ritual seems tu be an extreme case of substitunve semiosis. It may be under-
stood, says Steal, as a phenomenon of regression, an attempt to escape - tem-
porarily, of course - from the complex and insecure world of man by surrounding
oneself with stable, though meaningless patterns of action. These patterns came
into being in periods of evolutionary history long gone.>
The Value ofCulture 49
Theoretical reason is the third semiotic strategy. The "first principles" of this
strategy arc the three forms of inference; abduction, induction, and deduction.
According to Peirce, the abductive inference establishes a similarity or iconic rela-
tionship, relating the new facts to what is known already, thus making possible
the development (by deduction and induction) of a scientific theory about these
new facts. Abduction is a possible reaction in front of a semiotic problem. It is the
first step of scientific inquiry: the iconic structure is taken to hide a logical or
necessary form. \Vhat one looks for, in abduction, is a known fonn explaining the
apparent contradiction.
Klamer Okay, let us find out what you mean by applying these ideas to the prac-
tice of econorrucs. We might say that the economic form of rationality eliminates
doubt or uncertainty by subsuming the problem, like a lack, in an existing system
of given preferences and constraints. So I take your point to be that there are other
options availablewhen a course of action is chosen.
Van Heusden Sure. There are, for instance, all the options based on authority.
There is authority based on physical power, but also the authority of traditions and
common sense. And there the problem of value pops up immediately, because a
strategy based on authority, say, has an important value. You can say that its value
is in most circumstances equal to the rational option (in the logical sense) because
it functions in a highly satisfying way.
Klamer Could you give an example?
Van Heusden Let's take a simple one. I read somewhere that people tend to be very
conservative when they buy laundry detergent. The reason is that they buy what
their parents, mostly their mothers, bought. To rely on tradition in this way, not
taking into account the quality and price of the product, must seem highly Irra-
tional if one adopts a strictly logical point of view. But of course a lot of behavior is
precisely like that. The value of this very small part of culture is that it gives a feel-
ing of security. One knows what to buy and one is happy with that.
Klamer So there is a value to the tradition.
Van Heusden Semiotic value, I'd say. That is; functional value (intrinsic in Van den
Braembussche!) The implication is that there are various realms of culture, like the
culture of science or of art. Each realm has its own distinctive semiotic strategies by
which people come to value things and events.
Klamer So how would this work when we consider the valuation of art objects?
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Van Heusden I first wane to take a step back and say a word about the aesthetic.
Van den Braembussche in his essay first shows how Kant's notion of the aesthetic
can be deconstructed and then holds out for the possibility that the value of some-
thing like art can be distinctive because of the experience of the sublime to which it
may give cause. I am not satisfied with that outcome and want to be more specific,
as I have been 10 my book.
I'd begin by claiming that we denve an aesthetic experience from the pleasure of
solving a problem posed by reality in perception. This aesthetic dimension of SCOli-
osis is related to the overcoming of the contradictions posed In perception and to
the emergence of form through semiosis. It is the point of doubt again: if the amhi-
guity inherent III perception remains unsolved, man experiences a sense of disarray
and loss.
Most of the time this sensation of the beauty of our "semiotic work" will hardly
he noticed. The resemblance between perceived reality and known forms verges on
identity. Only when perception forces us to deal with stronger semiotic contradic-
tions are we compelled to search for forms that enable us to deal wirh rhe contra-
diction in one way or another. The discovery of such a form is an aesthetic experi-
ence. We thus find the aesthetic wherever the concrete III reality is "dealt with"
successfully, that is, in representation. Representation can be successful when new
forms are discovered: III the perception of nature and man-made objects, in scien-
tific inquiry, in everyday communication and persuasion. Aesthetic experience is a
dimension of magic semiosis, of abduction (in scientific inquiry}, and inuentio (in
rhetorical substitution). This explains, for instance, the aesthetic satisfaction pro-
duced by parades, uniforms, and other strong "identities" with which a versatile
reality is controlled. Scientists often refer to the beauty of experiments and thco-
ncs. It IS not, however, the result which IS beautiful, but the semiotic process lead-
ing to it, the semiotic step from perception to a known form. Aesthetic satisfaction
is the goal of many a puzzle and game.
Let me point out that an aesthetic form is a contradictio in adiecto, because a
form as such can never be aesthetic, as it IS beautiful only in relation to a semiotic
problem solved by or with it. The notion of an aesthetic sign is a dormitive concept.
Here I side with Van den Braembussche. For it suggests the presence of certain
formal characteristics where in fact there are none. The aesthetic dimension is the
dimension of the emerging form. In fact the most beautiful experiences are those
when perceived reality does not gIve JI1 to our need for meaning and identity all
too easily. Leonardo da Vinci described such all experience quite strikingly: "By
looking attentively at old and smeared walls, or stone and veined marble of
various colors, you may fancy that you sec JI1 them several compositions, land-
scapes, battles, figures III quick motion, strange countenances, and dresses, with
an infinity of other objects. Ry these confused lines the inventive genius is excited
to new exerncns'". Thus aesthetic scnuosrs offers a satisfying solution to a form
problem, which IS, ] think, the reason why definitions of beauty so often stress
harmony, or unity in diversity, as in Aristotle's "orderly arrangement and
magnitude of ports't.s
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The aesthetic, however, is not synonymous with the artistic. Instead, it seems more
or less synonymous with the semiotic. The discovery of new forms is not the task
of art. This, I think, is the important difference between aesthetic and artistic semi-
osis: the former copes with form problems In perception, the latter represents the
semiotic process itself. This is, as I was pleased to note, also the point you used in
your discussion, so let me elaborate some.
\Xfhen in substitutive or cognitive semiosis :I form problem is solved, it is
replaced by a stable and known form. Sometimes, this will generate a new kind of
h~.Adoub~~ti~~~utt~fu~but~tt~~~~dcom·
plctcncss of the form as a representation of reality. Resolving the doubt that I had
about a particular tree, by recognizing it as an oak tree, for instance, I may begin to
sense the loss of the particularity of the tree as an object of experience by having
categorized it. The form does not render the experience of concreteness; in fact it
should not, if it is to function properly. But with this second doubt a semiotic
counter-movement is started, namely: the attempt to provide perceived reality as
such with a form. Here the artist comes in. In the work of art s/he doubles the form
of reality, thus forcing the spectator to create new forms, as s/he does 111 percep-
tion, and to achieve this, it confronts us with an image, consisting of two or more
forms at the same time. Without this semiotic contradiction, the image would dis-
appeat, and only a form would remain. The image is a semiotic structure, but it is
not yet a stable form. Only as an ambiguous entity will it eventually be substituted
by or analyzed as a stable form.
Thus in the work of art the semiotic experience is represented, not in terms of
forms, but through imitation or mimesis. In the artistic artifact two or more forms
slide into each other, creating a contradictory structure, exactly in the same way as
it happens in perception. Instead of fixing a belief, the work of art postpones the
fixation in favour of the representation of the form problem and the semiotic
process. Imitation or mimesis of semiosis (that IS, of the concrete reality and the
ensuing search for form) is the specific function of the artistic semiosis (which is not
necessarily only found m works of artl}. Art is therefore in a strong sense mimetic,
where it imitates semiotic experience. Mimesis thus conceived is a specifically
human, "strong" form of imitation. Animals as well as humans enjoy imitation, but
imitation becomes mimetic (and semiotic) only when the imitated reality is the real-
ity of semiosis. Artists do not create form. They create opportunities for semiosis.
The artist is capable of perceiving and representing "presentness", that is, the form
problem in perception. For men of this class, says Peirce,"nature is a picture". The
artist has "{...} the faculty of seeing what stares one in the face, just as it presents
itself, unrepluced by any interpretation, unsophisticated by any allowance for this
or for that supposed modifying circumstance."5
Both artist and scientist deal with the problem posed by perception. The one
representing it mimeticallv, the other reducing it to a formal identity through
abductive reaSOning. One often hears artists say: I did not try to understand reality,
I just tried to represent it. The "truth", and the value, of the work of art is the truth
of the semiotic process it brings about in the spectator. It is indeed a sign-construe-
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tion which updates our sense of presentness, as it creates space for individuality and
non-programmed action. Thus it realizes the representation of individual con-
sciousness. Art is thus re-presentation in a very strong sense: something is made
present again. It is as if the artist possesses powers that enable him to recreate life,
to make something (or someone) he present again in another medium (in wood,
stone, colours, dance, music, or languagcj.v
Klamer So the functional value of an depends on its being a successful imitation of
the reality of perception?
Van Heusden That's right. In other realms of culture, like the ones we discussed
earlier, the form problem which caused semiosis 111 the first place is eliminated
from our representation of reality. At the same time this creates a kind of uneasr-
ncss JI1 the sense that once these semiotic systems are used to understand reality
and to act, people may sense that they are n1JSsmg something Important. The rep-
resentation no longer represents all of reality. Art restores, or keeps alive, the expe-
rience of the beginning of the semiotic process. There lies its value. In a sense, it IS
a son of "counter value". It does just the opposite of what other strategies do - it
is complementary.
It may also explain the somewhat schizophrenic attitude we adopt towards art in
our culture. On the one hand, we value it highly because we so much need a realm
of culture where our expenence IS kept alive. But at the same time we are so much
focused on eliminating ambiguity in our rational cognitive culture that we have
become unable to sec what we need art for in the first place. By putting it away m
separate buildings, attending it only at particular occasions, we keep it at bay.
It would be healthy, I think, to reintegrate the various semiotic strategies, to cre-
ate a more satisfying semiotic environment. 'Why couldn't one he a litle bit of an
artist, a theoretician and an entrepreneur at the same time?
Klamer So you think about a kind of aesthetics of politics and management?
Van Heusden I would prefer: a more complex politics, a complex management.
The reintegration of the mimetic into the various realms of culture would make
culture as a whole more interesting and challenging. The combination of the two
semiotic movements: the one from ambiguity in perception to coherence in repre-
sentation, and the other from ambiguity III perception to ambiguity in representa-
tion, would prove, I believe, very rewarding. One would have to try, in manage-
ment, in politics, and in science, to keep alive the ongin of all representations. By
doing so one keeps representations open to new Interpretations. The price to pay
is a strong awareness of uncertainty.
Klamer Let's for a moment return to the concept of value. We have discussed the
functional, that is, in your terms, the semiotic value of strategies that underly van"
ous cultural realms. But what about the economic value of culture, the third con-
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cepr of value that you distinguish? What would you make, for instance, of the com-
mon distinction between use value and exchange value?
Van Heusden We dealt with the use value. The use value of a cultural realm is its
semiotic value which, as I said earlier, can be analyzed on three levelsof abstraction.
Our discussion of the four basic semiotic strategies, for instance, concentrated on
the most abstract level, that of the logic of scnuosis. The exchange value relates the
semiotic or use value to another not necessarily cultural realm, namely that of sup-
ply and demand.
The exchange value thus depends on the valuation by the public of the semiotic
function of a particular work or genre, in combination with the costs of production.
I value Musil's DerMann ohne Eigenschaften as much as a painting by Van Gogh.
The use value or semiotic value of both, therefore, is the same, whereas due to the
way it is produced the costs can be completely different. Of the Man without Qual-
ities millions of copies are sold all over the world whereas a painting of Van Gogh
sells for millions of dollars.
Klamer 82.5 million dollars to be precise, if you are thinking of the portrait of Dr.
Gachet.
Van Heusden Why not. So if you ask me what the value of culture is, meamng the
value of art, I would say that artistic value is determined by the semiotic value plus
its production costs, which change with every art form, of course.
Klamer As all economist I translate what you just said in terms of demand and
supply. Price equates the exchange value. Your account clearly indicates the diver-
gence between the individual and the social appreciation of art works. I may not
care for a painting that gets priced at 82.5 million dollar.
Van Heusden Of course. That is why I made the distinction between the three lev-
els of abstraction on which you can study the value of culture. I don't like opera, for
instance, while I am ready to acknowledge that opera is an important cultural fac-
tor in contemporary Western upper class life.
Klamer And what if people come up to you and ask for a contribution to keep the
opera here alive?
Van Heusden Well, I would not give any. My opinion is that people who like opera
should pay for it themselves. Here I am very much on your side. People should pay
for what they like. If there are not enough people who are willing to pay for the
opera, that would be really too bad.
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Klamer I want to come hack to my point that there can he a conflict between
exchange value as measured in the market place and the value of ambiguity, which
is most explicit in the realms of art, friendship, religion and science, but which, as
we agreed, can also operate in the realm of business. By keeping it away from the
measurement in terms of price, we keep alive the moment of wonderment, as you
express it.
Van Heusden But I do not agree. I think you should distinguish carefully between
realms of culture where the use value can perfectly well be expressed in terms uf the
exchange value, and the realm of friendship and character, where we are no longer
speaking about goods, but about states of affairs, in which case it seems senseless
to speak about an exchange value. Just compare the value of art with the taste of
fresh bread. Cm the use value of fresh bread 111 the morning be compared to its
exchange value which is just two guilders? It IS the same problem you false. An
economy is the expression of how people value different forms of culture, different
realms of culture. Economics, in turn, is a text about culture.
Klamer Yeah, but then it makes for a very particular moment in culture. Contrast
the moment of exchange with that what we expcnencc 1Il the realms of art and SCl-
encc. We are both scientists. Once a month we get paid. Isn't it true that that pay-
ment, the realisation of the exchange value of OUt labor, is only a minor part of all
that we experience? It may be an important moment and it may influence what we
do, but it does not determine the value of what we do.
Van Hcusdcn We are back at the distinction between the use and exchange value.
Klarner Don't you agree that the use value preoccupies us much more than the
exchange value?
Van Hcusden No, I don't agree. I consider my salary an expression of the value of
what I do for the community as a whole. It IS very important in relation to the value
of my scientific work. Actually, we are living through a crisis in the valuation of the
cultural realm of science. It is a thing which certainly preoccupies me.
Klamer You mean that people are losing jobs in academia.
Van Heusden People don't get the jobs. Society as a whole is uncertain about how
much to pay scientists. \'qhich means the use value of science is no longer as self-
evident as it has been for some time. The culture as a historical organization of
strategies of representation is in a crisis. I feel it and it worries me.
Klamer Does this crisis transfer to the arts?
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Van Heusden I am sure it does. What we see is a search for a new organization, for
a new system of valuation. The organization of culture which was based on the
opposition between rational and irrational is breaking down. Culture as we know it
has lost part of its value - it is no longer satisfying our need for sense. The result -
and this brings us back to our distinction between functional and formal value -
may well be that we start searching for and experimenting with new forms of cul-
ture - new forms of semiotics ~ in my eyes. Your multi-media, multi-genre tnau-
gural speech as well as the ensuing conference was a striking example of this search
for new formal values which will, in the end, give us more satisfying representations
of a changing experience.
4
"The Good, the Bad, and the Different"
Reflections on Economic and Aesthetic Value
DAVID RUCCIO,jULlE GRAHAM,jACK AMARIGLIO
lfVan den Braembusscbe and van Heusden have not alreadyconvinced the readerthat
value is a problematicnotion in need ofcritical attention, then Ruccio, Graham and
Amariglio will finish the job in this chapter. They bringto the table a Marxist perspec-
tive of the post-modernist kind. That means that theircriticisms arcrelentless - (orc-
ing us, their audience, to critically examine whatever beliefs and preconceivednotions
we hold onto. David Ruc.cio and Jack Amarigljo are economists. Ruccio is at the Uni-
versity ofNotre Dame, Amariglio at Merrimack College. Julie Graham is a geograph-
er at the University of Massachussetts/Amherst. They are all involved in the journal
Rethinking Marxism, Amariglioas the outgoing editor, Ruccio as the incoming edi-
tor. Grahamis the coauthorofThe End of Capitalism (As We Knew It), recently pub-
lishedby Rlackwell.
VALUE is a discursive construct. At first glance, this assertion may not appearto be controversial, nor may it appear to be very fecund. Allow us, then, tostate immediately some of the implications of this position. Perhaps by
doing so we can indicate from the outset what difference, in terms of consequences
and effects, such a position may make.
Discourse versus the Ubiquity o{Value
First, the discursiviry of value implies that value does not inhere, ubiquitously, III
any ohjecr or life-world. Value has no universal ontological referent. Any event can
be understood in terms of a value discourse - but need not be. And this Implies that
even in the realms where value is posited as "obvious" (for example, III the question
of how material goods are transferred from one person [Q another across a social
space, or how one may experience works of human creativity), seeing value III these
sites IS always an "imposition" or rather a particular lens through which a unique
sense can be made out of the events that are perceived there. The idea that all so-
called economic or aesthetic events must either reduce to or contain a value corn-
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ponent is often defended on the grounds that value is universal and ubiquitous in
the sense that it is given to discourse by the objects or subjects themselves. The
"naturalness" of value is then proposed as stemming from either its objectivity or
subjectivity. These positions are precisely ones we wish to elude in theorizing value
as discursive.
The idea that value is indeed ubiquitous (and must be so) in investigating any
particular event can be seen, briefly, in two examples. One involves the concept of
the gift. Much of the distinction of the concept of the gift in economic anthropolo-
gy and cultural theory is based on the premise that there can exist a sphere of trans-
fering things among and between people, conducted on a regular basis even if sep-
arated in time and space, that is outside of the logic of exchange and therefore
value. Yet,as writers as different as Phil Mirowski (forthcoming) and ]acques Derri-
da (1992) have argued, the problem of constituting this difference is a treacherous
one, and almost always breaks down into a glossing over of the elements of gift giv-
ing which, indeed, do suggest acts of economic exchange. Thus, in Mirowski's
view, for example, it is necessary to invoke - and conform to the dictates of - a the-
ory of value (even if it is not a neoclassical or Marxist one). The idea that gift giving
must, in the last instance, reduce to exchanging items or to an event that requires a
value theory (economic or otherwise) to make sense out of it implies the ubiquity
of value distinctions (since what is being discussed here is the idea that the com-
mensurability and/or incommensurability of value is constantly invoked 111 the gift
exchange). It is just as easy to think, for example, that exchange is as unstable and
undecidable - and therefore reducible to a theory of the gift - as is the opposite. In
any event, we have no prejudice that value is necessary to make sense of gifts, just
as we have no inclination to privilege the realm of "non-value" m looking at the giv-
ing of gifts. The discursivity of value means, for us, that it is possible to "see" the
transference of goods as involving or not the question of value.
A second example, drawn from the Held of aesthetics, is the issue of the univer-
sality of value or judgment. In the realm of philosophy, of course, the ubiquity of
aesthetic judgment was most cogently argued by Immanuel Kanr in the eighteenth
century. As]ohn Guillory points out in Cultural Capital, Kant's views on Judgment
made clear that all human beings have the capacity for aesthetic experience. The
humanism of Kant's position, of course, resonates well with any aesthetic theory
that works against the view that "good taste" is only within the ambit of those
lucky enough to have it (whether by training or by birth). On the other hand, the
universalizing of aesthetic experience, and thereby the potential for individuals to
translate this experience into a question of value (a translation, incidentally, that in
Guillory's view was not implicit at all in Kant's philosophy), means that, as a cate-
gory of the human mind, aesthetic judgment is historical and determinate to some
cultures and not others.
A more recent attempt, by anthropologist jacques Maquet (1986), to give ethno-
graphic backing to the universalist view depicts all societies in history as having
demonstrated, in some form or other, the transcendental character of aesthetic
experience. InMaquet's view, for example, aesthetic experience can be seen both in
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the languages and In the otherwise mute objects and artifacts produced by a diver-
sity of cultures in which ornamentation is seen to exist alongside the visible "utili-
tarian" form and function of these very objects. Again, while the leveling of cultures
that such a view Implies may have important egalitarian effects and consequences,
it keeps in place a view of the ubiquity of value. For example, Maquet strains might-
ily in order to keep alive the view (separating off what should be obviously orna-
mental from utilitarian forms) that all cultures have had some form of aesthetic
experience and, accordingly, have their own rules of what counts as good or bad
aesthetic expression. We posit here the alternative, that is, that it remains to be
shown that value is other than discursive and therefore relative to those cultures in
which it appears, while lacking in those cultures in which it does not (although
some other "positive" experience may exist there, one which is not reducible to an
aesthetic awareness or sensibility). The existence of what one culture, such as that
wluch prevails in much of the West, regards as ornamentation, for example, says
nothing about whether or not that "other" culture experienced said ornamentation
as deriving from an "aesthetic sensibility" which cuuld give rise to norms and dis-
tinctions about ornamental forms. In any event, the presumption that humans
always do anything in general has always occurred to us as the "self-flattery" of a
specific culture and historical period, a point that Marx made, of course, in regard
to the classical political economists' assumption of self-interest, of omnipresent
and eternal rational economic behavior,'
Value as Neither and Both "Objective" and "Subjective"
Another consequence, then, of thinking of value as a discursive construct IS exactly
to move outside of the polarity created by objective and subjective notions of value.
Beginning with the premise of the fundamental discursiviry of evaluation and val-
onzation, of preference and price, of use-value and exchange-value, and of taste,
truth, and treasure, we believe that there are problems and paradoxes that cannot
be contained within the supposedly secure boundaries of either subjective or objec-
tive notions of value. In our view, value is neither and, in some ways, both objective
and subjective. Insofar as discourse is social and material and in this sense "objec-
tive," beyond the choices and acts of any particular individual, value can be under-
stood to constitute an ontology. At the same time, since discourse involves the
positioning and constitution of subjects who, then, perform value and live its effects
through their different expencnces, value can be understood to exist as a category
of subjectivity. But, in taking the position that value is discursive, we want to be
careful not to privilege either of these poles and also to point out that discourse is
always "other" than objective or subjective.
This view is different from the main strands of arguments that can be found in
Barbara Herrnstein Smith's Contingencies of Value or, alternatively, Pierre Bour-
dicu's Distinction {as well as Guillmy's Cultural Capital, which takes it basic ten-
dency from Bourdieu}, While Smith has gone far in depicting value as discursive, as
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Guillory points out, much of her argument tends toward a form of subjectivism in
which individuals existing in "valuing communities" are the source of value judg-
ments (and this is why Guillory sees in Smith a soulmate of neoclassical economists
for whom taste is always individual and subjective). And while Bourdieu and Guil-
lory remind us of the importance of the class components and socializarion that
value judgments bespeak, the tendency (made clear in Guillory, if not Bourdieu) to
see cultural capital as "embodied" 111 material objects themselves is a reference to
objectivity that, in our view, blurs the point that objects will never be seen as con-
taining this capital unless a discourse of "value" says that it is so.
The Rea/m ofNon-Value
The discursivity of value also suggests to us that there are realms of non-value that
are constituted outside of value. This view has two components; first, that there
are discourses that produce understandings of events usually regarded as the pre-
serve of value without any reference whatsoever to value; and second, that there
exists something outside of discourse, which, if value is discursive, means that, in
these other realms, value does not live, even though it may be one of its
(overjdeterminants.
Suffice it to say that if one can demonstrate that there exist spaces of discourse
and social practice that are "outside" of value, then it is possible as well to project
social formations in which these discourses are hegemonic and obstruct the coming
to existence of discourses of value and judgment - that is, as long as one does not
hold the quasi-Hegelian view that the existence of these "other" discourses must,
by virtue of their negation of value, constitute value as a condition of their own
existence. As we write above, we reject the view that value must hegemonize the
space of any event or discourse. And, of course, this includes any description of the
"real" or any particular form of cognition and affect.
This point, we understand, is not novel since one can find in economic thought
as well as in the fieldof aesthetics movements over the course of the past fifty years
in theories of economic activity which do not require value as the organizing prin-
ciple. Thus, for example, for recent neoclassical economists, value (at least in terms
of something different from and regulating price - if price IS included III value, of
course, then most of neoclassical theory can be seen to be intimately bound up
with questions of value) has been relegated to the archives of the history of eco-
nomic thought, while for some Marxists, the class and surplus apparatus of past
Marxian econonucs, along with much else of the Marxian corpus, has been
rethought along non-value lines."
In any event, while we posit the discursiviry of value as contingent, specific, and
overdetermined, we also see that, for some economists (at least historically) and
aestheticians, value is necessary as the primary means to unify and center econom-
ic and aesthetic discourse. While emphasizing the discursive nature of value does
not imply in and of itself a "decentcring" of economic and aesthetic discourse, we
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have the ann at least In this paper of entertaining the differentiation and decon-
struction that thinking about value as a discursive strategy provides. Put differently,
we are interested in looking at the precise ways in which value often does hegemo-
nize an econormc or cultural discourse and how it is that value serves as a founda-
tional concept whose centralizing force is presumed to result from its mere appear-
ance within any discourse.
Different Discourses ofValue
Finally, for us, there does not exist now (nor probably did III the past) a master
trope or discourse of value. While we are concerned here with how worth, appro-
priateness, market pnce, Judgment, and so forth are constituted discursively, we
note that the differences among and between these terms and their appearance as
value cnregoncs III specific sites of communication and interaction suggest that it
may be mistaken to see them as all referring to a metaconcept of value) We adhere
to the view that value categones emerge in different ways at different sites, and we
accept any criticism of what follows below of our possible conflation and move-
ment to unify what may be radically distinct and heterogeneous concepts and dis-
cursive objects. Put bluntly, we acknowledge that m the fields of economic and aes-
thetic value, there is a multiplicity of discourses of value that constitute their
subjects in distinct and different ways.
Yet, the field of axiology does presume a common object, and so, if only III
order to challenge the coherence of that field and to proscribe the operations of
various catcgones of value, we will write about value as though it did indeed carry
its essence with it into whatever discourses it may thereby wander. It is possible, ill
fact, that problematizmg the stability and unity of the concept of value can best
proceed by initially positing its essential integrity. From such an initial premise -
suggesting, of course, a transcendent meamng - we can carry our more usefully a
deconsrrucnon of the term, showing, III fact, the instability and dissolution of the
concept - its impossibility to be what it is claimed to be - as attempts to fix its
meaning and mode of operation are incessantly carried out. The possibility of
deconsrructing the very term of value and showing that it cannot bear the weight
of the operations and multiple uses for which it is intended is an important pJ.rt of
our project.
The Good, the Bad, and the Different
We commence the remainder of our discussion with the following three quota-
tions:
"The Metropolitan Museum paid an enormous sum to acquire the portrait of
Juan de Pareja by Velazquez. The decision to buy the picture was made because
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it IS one of the finest works of art to come on the market In our time. It IS among
the most beautiful, most living portraits ever painted. Velazquez, whose works
are extremely rare, ranks with the greatest painters. This is precisely the kind of
object which the Museum has a historic duty to acquire."
"I own somewhat similar things to this and I have always liked them. This is a
rather more sophisticated version than the ones that I've seen, and I thought it
was quite beautiful .. the total composition has a very contemporary, very West-
ern look to it. It's the kind of thing that goes well with contemporary Western
things. It would look good In a modern apartment or house .. The best pieces
are going for very high prices. Generally speaking, the less good pieces in terms
of quality are not going up in price. And that's a fine reason for picking the good
ones rather than the bad. They have a way of becoming more valuable. I like
African art as objects I find would be appealing to use in a home or an office. I
don't think it goes well with everything, necessarily- although the very best per-
haps does. But I think it goes well with contemporary architecture."
"The substantial market appeal of this work can be explained partly by the fact
that it IS perfectly tailored to supply a kind of conceptual art for those who are
not conceptually inclined. The techniques and strategies associated with the
short history of idea art are everywhere in evidence, but they are martialed to
such didactic purpose that the designation "idea" rather valorizes the result
The most fitting contemporary analogue for Lernieux's project comes not from
art or literature but from Broadway - the box-office record-breaking Les Mise-
rabIes, which boasts the same noxious mixture of pretense and sentimentality,
and which produces the same sinking feeling where the uplifting IS being
proclaimed."
The first quotation appears in the opening paragraph of the lead essay in the cata-
logue for the exhibition at the Metropolitan Museum of Artof Diego Velazquez's
"Juan de Pareja," a portrait of Velazquez's apprentice and companion. The essay
was written by Theodore Rousseau, Vice Director, Curator in Chief at the Met on
the occasion of the showing of the painting in the early 1980s. To our knowledge,
when the Met purchased the painting in 1971, it represented the largest sum of
money they had paid to that date for any single work of art. A reliable correspon-
dent tells us that the painting was exhibited at the end of a long corridor, and that
the feelingone got from seeing it in these conditions was of visiting a sacred shrine.
The second quotation is from Kwame Anthony Appiah's In My father's House:
Africa in the Philosophy of Culture. The speaker in this quote is David Rockefel1er.
The occasion of his comments was his inclusion in a panel of "cocurators" for an
exhibit entitled "Perspectives: Angles on African Art" organized in 1987 for the
Cenrer for African Art in New York. Rockefeller's comments are part of his evalua-
tions of several different pieces that he recommended for mclusion in the exhibit
based on being shown slides of a large number of potential entries. As an incidental
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piece of information, Appiah describes the fact that of the ten cocurators asked to
make Judgments on the pll~ces for possible inclusion, the only one who was not
shown the whole range of African artifacts was a Baule artist (the only non-Western
artist in the hunch) whose exclusion was explained by the main curator as a func-
tion of the fact that, unlike the rest of the experts, "field aesthetic studies have
shown that African informants will criticize sculptures from other ethnic groups In
terms of their own traditional criteria, often assuming that such works are simply
inept carvings of their own aesthetic traditions."
The third quotation IS taken from a review in 1989 byJack Bankosky in Artfo-
mm lncemational of an exhibit by Annctre Lcmieux. The entire review, as the quo-
tation suggests, is quite critical and dismissive.
Let us take up first the issue of the distinction of good an versus bad art. In
many discourses on value, and certainly those that rely on binary distinctions 111
which a hierarchy is employed to constitute the relative positions of the two pules
1Il the scale of measurement, the notion of the suburdinate term - 111 this case, of
"bad art" - IS that it IS the negation of the qualities that inhere 1Il that which is des-
ignated "good." The attempt is made to define what is bad about bad art exclusive-
ly as the lack or absence of the good qualities that make superior art visible and
appropriable by a discerning public. We leave aside for the moment the Issue of
whether or not the quaiirires that are perceived by the viewer as "good" are attrib-
utes that are "there" in the object or are matters purely of the aesthetic categones
of the discriminating mind. Though, as we write above, in most Western philo-
suphical discussions of aesthetics, the interaction of these objective and subjective
elements is the basis for establishing the "truth" of aesthetic judgment. What we
arc interested 111 here more IS the way that Judgments of good versus bad 1Il art (or
for that matter, III many fields of evaluation, for example, the question of theory
choice lJ1 eC0I1011uCS) are rendered so as to posit the "positiviry" of the term of
supremacy (the good) and the negativity of the term of subordination. Another
way of saying this is that, while it is possible in many aesthetic discourses to derive
the bad as deviations from or errors or mishandling or poor copies of that which is
superior, it is very difficult, and to be avoided in any event for fear of devaluing the
good, to derive the category of the good starting with the subordinate term. While
the inferior or fake can always be seen as an absence, the supenor must be consti-
tuted in these discourses as a presence. The good cannot be a derivative concept, a
remainder whose existence is only attributable to its not being (bad). This interest-
ing point, that in many value discourses the subordinate term IS allowed its exis-
tence as a form of non-being, a hole, a lack, demonstrates that there is a close cor-
respondence between that which is determined to be bad (as 111 the Bankosky
quote, the utter ineptitude of the "fake" conceptual art) and the role of that term -
its substance consisting almost entirely of its negation of what might be good - 1I1
the value discourse. To put this otherwise, the absence of positive features means
that the subordinate term in the binary hierarchy IS a sign of its double negation. It
cannot exist unless the good is first defined, and then its existence consists in the
negation of the good.
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In such a discourse, the concept of difference appcars only as a scale concept. The
good IS different from the bad insofar as the bad is seen as not possessing those
amounts of what would be taken for good or not possessing the qualities of the
good. On a scale, then, the bad represents negative quantities of good qualities, or
at least a lesser amount of them than that which IS good. The good is the standard
of value, whereas the bad registers either absence of value measured in that start-
dard or the loss of value (devaluation). Differenceis presented here as positions in a
hierarchy or as the distinction between being and nothingness (or both). To be the
"other" in this schema is either to exist as a posiriviry (the good) or to exist (or not
exist) as a negativity.
Now, what should be apparent to all those familiar with recent poststructuralist
and postmodern theory is that these (hierarchical) notions of difference do not
exhaust the field of possibilities for value. W'hat the work of Derrida and so many
others shows is that the posirivity of the good is never possible, just as the negativ-
ity of the bad IS equally unsustainable. One possibility, of course, is that any deter-
minate artifact, such as Lernieux's bad conceptual art or the bad African art that
Rockefeller refers to, IS always a combination of both good and bad attributes and
qualities. This is a familiar position, but it does not question the essential purity of
the terms good and bad themselves. It is also possible to say, as do many post-
structuralists, that the good is never itself - it always deconsrructs under dose
scrutiny. Of course, the same is rrue for the supposedly negative or subordinate
term. The categories may be "indeterminate," to borrow a phrase that has become
popular among cultural theorists influenced by Derrida and Lyocard.In this case, as
soon as such categories are employed, they begin to unravel, as we can see in the
quotations above. In each case, the attempt to stabilize the "goodness" or "bad-
ness" - their aesthetic value - of the works of art under consideration immediately
calls up the terror, fear, uncertainty, and instability of the judgments that are being
made. For example, the fact that there is good and bad art, that IS, that they are
both constituted on a continuum called "art", presupposes some common set of
qualities between them. Similarly, the reliance on economic value to shore up aes-
thetic value suggests the very fluidity and possible instability of the judgments
being made.s The evasion of aesthetic judgments not only by economic caregones,
but by the reference to scarcity, the canonicity of painters and paintings, and much
else that often precedes the judgment itself speaks to the fear that the positive term
is afloat in a sea of uncertainty and is always under bombardment from those who
would undermine its claim to purity and self-identity.
Perhaps, though, our more important criticism here is that it is possible to con-
front such binary, hierarchical concepts of value with a notion of radical hetero-
geneity. Rather than constituting the subordinate term as the negation of the posi-
tive, it is possible to reconstitute the subordinate term as a positive as well. This
pluralist move is one that treats the terms in a value schema as containing distinc-
tive functions, potential audiences, methods, modes of enunciation, and so on. Or,
alternatively put, this move is one that regards the good and bad terms as consti-
tuting different discourses or, at least, possessmg sufficiently different elements that
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it makes as much sense to juxtapose them as it does to place them within a similar
space. Good and bad art may not occupy the same space, and therefore cannot he
seen as equally susceptible to the same criteria of evaluation.
It 1S interesting to note that traditional aesthetics has operated more as a way of
determining what is "deserving" of the appellation "an" than serving as a typology
III which categones of art, broadly conceived, are distinguished. In Art Worlds,
Howard Becker explains that "aestheticians do not simply intend to classify things
into useful categories, as we might classify species of plants, but rather to separate
the deserving from the undeserving, and to do it definitively. They do not want to
take an inclusive approach tu art, counting in everything that conceivably might
have some interest or value. They look, instead, for a defensible way to leave some
things out" (r37). In this way, the aestherician's practice is meant to preclude the
possibility of treating good and bad art as simply different subcarcgories.s
Yet, perhaps in subversion of its main function as arbitrating between good and
bad (and therefore art from non-art), we can glimpse even in the Bankosky quote
above an example of this possibility. We read in Bankcsky's statement the implica-
tion that Lcmieux's piece cannot be brought Into analogy with other art and/or lit-
erature but that it must be compared to a Broadway play, with which its functions,
modes of presentation, aesthetic tropes, and much else are held in common. Of
course, it IS usually meant as a form of disapproval, degradation, and dismissal to
say about a work of art (or an economic theory) that it is not art (or not econom-
ics). And yet, there may be a glimmer of truth in these statements since what IS
being gestured at here is the idea that the particular cultural object in question does
not exactly occupy the same space and therefore may not be subject to the same
rules regarding its evaluation as some other more "typical" element in the relevant
domain. While in some sense bad art may be "art," this does not imply that the
rules of its construction or evaluation are the same as those for good art.
Bad art may then be reconceived as a positivity. Art/cultural critics can, if they
wish, Investigate such forms of an for how and why they work the way they do.
They can note the differences (and similarities, if so inclined) between different
objects and the discourses or fields within which they operate. What we are saying
is that it is always possible to treat objects, elements, and discourses as appropriate
witlun some realms which they each help to construct (since we presume that there
is no fixity in the nature or character of these realms that simply predates the oper-
ation of these objects). In his sneenng, dismissive way, paradoxically, Bcnkosky
shows us some of the ways that Lcmieux's work can be read alternatively so that
rather than representing bad art defined as the absence of positive elements, her
kind of conceptual art appeals to other sensibilities for which it is highly appropri-
ate. Of course, whether one wants to include such work under the rubric of art IS
always being struggled over, as this quotation and the one from Rockefeller also
sbows." That Lemieux's piece could even be designated as fake or bad conceptual
art (possessing the forms but failing in representing them "authentically") shows
that Bankosky is perplexed, as may he his reader, by the indeterminacy that the
judgment rhar it is bad or inauthentic art sets off. It is not quite good art (and
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maybe not even art, as the comparison to LesMiserables shows), but then again, it
looks like art, and so forth.
If bad art defines a separate realm of existence which it only weakly shares with
good art, then its "goodness" for different purposes and for different audiences may
be easier to establish. But, of course, then it becomes very difficult to sustain the
category of its badness, or at least of its negativity. This move is what has been
behind the wave of revaluations that have moved objects of popular culture, such as
mystery novels, folk art, B movies, comic books, and much else out of being rele-
gated to subordinate forms living (but very popularly) in the shadows of the canons
of great art, poetry, literature, and so forth. This too has been the basis for the
revaluation of non-Western, so-called primitive art and other cultural forms as rep-
resentatives of different ways of constructing cultural lives. Similarly, this move has
given rise to the attacks on the icons of high culture as representing not universal,
disinterested, and eternally applicable standards of good taste but, rather, examples
of very local and particular cultural norms that have hegemonized Western culture
by power, force, and persuasion. It is no accident that the attacks on the canons of
great art and literature have relativized the terms of value by stressing that what
may be "good" for some folks reflects the overbearing and oppressive dominance
of their cultural norms to the exclusion of others. Indeed, there has been a move-
ment to make deliberately "perverse" the standards of evaluation in Western cul-
tural circles so as to call into question the exclusivity - class, race, gender, and sex-
ual-based, in many cases - of the standards that have been at play in the realm of
Western aesthetics." There is far less agreement today among many cultural
thinkers, let alone a broader public, about the terms of evaluation that may be
employed to judge the "truth value" of any particular work of art or literature. This
relativism has certainly scared many other thinkers who worry profusely about the
loss of standards and the moral (not to mention aesthetic and economic) devalua-
tions that occur when every art object and discourse are now seen as truthful in
their own terms.
Let us giveanother case in point. Wehave been intrigued with the determination
of our colleagues in economics to dismiss whole bodies of economic thought as
useless, bad, wrong, and so forth. As Marxists, we have usually been all the receiv-
ing end of such judgments, though we know a great many Marxist and radical
economists who have no problem In reversing the charges by declaring neoclassical
and Keynesian thought to be just as hopeless. \VItat is even more striking is the
great nervousness that we have noticed in most economists when the question of
theory choice is being discussed. There, if nowhere else in economics, one finds evi-
dence of extreme concern that economists not be free to choose since only certain
theoretical ideas (usually neoclassical ones) are redeemable and constitute the good
science to which we all, presumably, aspire. And, insofar as theory choice is seen as
a matter of persuasion, of power, of hegemony, and so forth, defenders of the sci-
ence claim, in response, that without "legitimate" standards of comparison by
which the wheat can be separated from the chaff, there will be a cessation of eco-
nomic theorizing altogether. The barbarians will be at (or perhaps inside) the gate.
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Is it an? This questionis evident in the Rockefeller and Bankosky quotes above, and
the idea that the "bad" can be discussed in its own positivity does not prevent a
judgment about its appropriateness as an example of the category art. Of course,
we believe that the very concepts of art, discourse, economic theory, and so forth
are all changed as a result of asking such questions and especially of attempting to
escape the binary logic of many value discourses. We regard each and every concept
of regularity to be contingent and constituted. So, for us, the process of evaluation
- what counts as an example of a type or category, what constitutes the standard
of measurement, and so forth - is one that is subject to a different logic, the logic of
contingency and historical construction.
The Interaction ofEconomic and Aesthetic Value
Economic and aesthetic value function m many value discourses as hedges against
uncertainty, Value, in fact, often connotes regularity, stability, and cenrriciry in the
relations to which the value categories are being applied. In this way, value dis-
courses are largely concerned with calming the fears that are produced In the wake
of the perception of uncertainty associated with aesthetic judgment and market
flucruations.f It is also true, ironically, that the very emergence of value discourse-
its attempt to stabilize value - creates the possibility of its opposite, that is, that
value may not stabilize and that the position that any object of material and/or cul-
tural SIgnificance even in the most structured value system can change suddenly
and, for some, carastroplucally. Today's bad art can become good art tomorrow;
today's lucrative asset can plunge III value overnight as a result of a new wave of
speculation. Hence, even in its own domain, value cannot prevent the possibility
that in many cases it IS designed to forestall: unpredictable and destabilizing
changes in evaluation.
As if it were not bad enough that individual value discourses cannot often pre-
vent the thorough shakeup of its elements (from a repositioning of the terms in
hierarchical scales to a reconsideration of the standards of evaluation), the interac-
tions amongst and between different discourses of value and/or different realms of
value make the situation even less secure. We can see the possibility of such threats
to stability and the fears that accompany them in the extracts above.
The need to make economic and aesthetic value "line up" in order to stabilize
both is apparent III the extreme In the quotation from Theodore Rousscau.
Rousseau's statement nicely captures the sheer bravado that sometimes must be
summoned up in order to make sure that the price one pays for a work of art cor-
responds perfectly with an aesthetic judgment about the work. In a series of feed-
back effects, Rousseau moves assertively (but, we think, with more than a hint of
nervousness), between the "enormous" sum of money expended by the Metropol-
itan Museum of Art on the Vciazquez painting and the "greatness" of the work as a
representation of the Met's uniquely informed aesthetic judgment. Indeed, the lan-
guage that Roussecu employs in which monetary worth and creative beauty are so
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inextricably linked leads him to claim as the Museum's "historic duty" the necessi-
ty of purchasing and displaying the piece. That is, economic and aesthetic value line
up so completely that it becomes the moral duty of the Museum both to possess
and to display this perfection. Of course, with the introduction of this moral oblig-
ation, a third realm of value is introduced which is in line with the other two.
Rousseau's explanation has the flavor of a defence. And this IS made clearer m
recalling that the purchase of the painting involveda decision to spend more money
than the Museum had presumably paid for any work of art prior to that acquisition.
Regardless of its status as the "most expensive" to date, what is dear is that
Rousseau feels the need to explain from the outset of his discussion (the quotation
is the entire opening paragraph of his essay) what, for him, the decision represented.
In their introduction to the catalogue in which Rousseau's essay appears, Douglas
Dillon and Thomas Hoving join the chorus m explaining how the diligence of the
Museum in waiting and looking for the best buys led them to make the purchase:
"Over the past year our focns has changed from buying objects on a broad scale to
the more difficult, but in the long-run mote rewarding, task of concentrating the
Museum's purchase funds, and waiting patiently for the tare and momentous occa-
sion when an exceptional work of art such as this becomes available."
There is a multitude of examples that can be cited to show that, for many buy-
ers and sellers of art or culture, the preferred relation between economic and acs-
thetic value is that of correspondence. But, of course, there are also many examples
of the opposite, that is, the preference for evaluations to be discrepant between
these alternative realms. For example, one can find statements by acsrbeticians,
artists, and others that call for the delinking of economic and aesthetic value since,
111 their view, the fact that something has a high market or asset price denotes pre-
cisely the aesthetic degradation of that particular object. Sure Tchaikovsky sells, but
111 the eyes of many music critics and musicians, the fact that Swan Lake has
become a box-office smash during the Christmas season is the best signal of its
general mediocrity. Cultural elitism IS built on the critical ability to trash that which
is popular and whose popularity is "reflected" (so it is believed) in the relatively
higher economic value it may command. Likewise, those involved making a living
in art or other market transactions often detest the imposition of anything other
than what sells as a denotation of the object's "worth." And, of course, it is often
true that decisions about what to purchase and why are inversely related to their
status in high cultural circles, since the attribution of goodness, especially where
avant-gardes operate, sounds the death knell of that object in certain markers."
This IS of course true in the production and distribution of films, such that "art
films" (those considered by a ccrtam cultural elite to reflect the highest aesthetic
and production values) often find little backing and a minuscule paying audience.
The devaluing of one sphere of value by another (the intervention of econonuc
concerns, for example, into the evaluation of artworks] is often seen as a matter of
sullying the very objects and field themselves. There is a longstanding romanticism
about the sanctity of aesthetic decisions; the market, in this view, is the realm of
filthy lucre that distorts and degrades the aesthetic experience for both producers
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and "consumers" of cultural artifacts. And, sometimes what is worse, one sphere of
value is thought to be so powerful as to displace another entirely. The fear that mar-
ket prices may hecome the sole arbiter of what is good and bad in art or that mar-
ket prices may be "regulated" according to a different set of values, aesthetic or
moral perhaps (something that institutionalist economists in particular have long
called for), indicates the degree to which the possible substitutability of different
types of valuations may be as wornsome as the fear that economic values may cor-
rode aesthetic sensibility, or vice versa.
'While discrepancies and their consequences are always III evidence, there
remains the sense for many that economic and aesthetic value must surely have
some clear correlation between them. Or at least this is hoped for. In the sphere of
their interaction, such forces as expertise and authority are used to stabilize the
relation between them so as to prevent random and therefore chaotic (or so it is
supposed) movements in either or both realms. As with Rousseau, Rockefeller's
quote is exemplary of the Imposition of authority as a means to produce this sta-
bility. That the market "reflects" superior aesthetic sensibility, and that superior
sensibility "reflects" the seemingly amoral and random detcrminations of market
value allows collectors of art objects to feel, for a moment, comforted that there is
sufficient evidence of the WIsdom of their purchases.
The introduction of discursiviry and difference IS an clement, at least in the
present, that is read as threatening to the correlation of aesthetic and economic
value.IQ In aesthetic circles, the relativism and pluralism that have emerged from
the critique of canons small and large hinge on the fear that without the divisions
between bad and good, high and low, art and non-art, the aesthetic experience of
making distinctions will be rendered impotent. l l The revaluation Involved in the
rejection of canons and the demand for relative equality in aesthetic effects also has
the consequence of affecting the monetary value of art collections, the income of
artists, and so on. And, this revaluation in the name of inclusion or the end of
elitism or the politicization of art or whatever produces a discourse of frustrated
uncertainty as to how to go about making distinctions of any kind and what the
economic, in addition to cultural, consequences will be. We have noticed, despite
all the cult of individuality that flourishes In art worlds, that artists and others long
for the days (if, indeed, they ever existed) or at least the hope of a "just price," one
that brings into line the distinctions created by discourses of aesthetic value with
market prices. Thus, the uncertainty that attends the introduction of a form of dif-
ference which "equalizes" art forms in the rendering of aesthetic judgments is
resisted by an insistence on the necessity for price to reflect what IS Justifiably
worthy in aesthetic terms.
While neoclassical economists often gloat that their theory of value is best suit-
ed to account for Incessant and immediate fluctuations, if not uncertainty, their
language also belies a fear of the indeterminacies that are implicit in movements
towards equilibrium prices as well as such forces as speculation. That is, just as cul-
tural relativism may be feared because it may radically alter and realign cultural val-
ues and aesthetic judgments, speculation and the constant fluctuation of prices to
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such a degree that movement toward a (possibly shifting) equilibrium and perma-
nent disequilibrium become indistinguishable. IZ. Hence, business people, stockbro-
kers, bond sellers, as well as economists, may express anger and outrage at the
divergence of asset and commodity prices from some notion of its "normal" or
"equilibrium" value as backed up by the solidity of a firm'soverall economic status,
past history of asset performance, the assessments by various rating companies,
and so forth. While much ink has been spilt in economic theory denying the exis-
tence or usefulness of ideas of "just prices" and the like (in which moral and aes-
thetic issues are evident), the language of over- and undervaluation - the diver-
gence of prices from some putative norm - in economic and business discourses is
an indication that the pure "relativity" and conceivable randomness of price move-
ments are experienced, not unlike cultural relativism, as the bane of stability and
predictability. Value (even if equilibrium price), once again, IS seized upon as a
means to neutralize the experience of instability and uncertainty.
The introduction of difference and discursivity, we have argued, can have the
effect of relativizing aesthetic and economic value. This relativism can produce dis-
courses of uncertainty in which much which has previously been settled IS now up
for grabs. Surely, as we have argued, introducing difference into the realm of the
intersection of aesthetic and economic value will likely mean redistributions of
resources, if nothing else. And this redistribution may, in our view, be desirable,
especially if it allows for some forms of "appositional" economic and cultural prac-
tices and processes to emerge from the shadows. While we cannot spell out here all
of what this might mean (now, let alone in the future), we conclude with the simple
statement that if revaluaticns and/or rejections of value that result from introduc-
mg difference open the space for some of these considerations, practices, and
groups {and of course, we have our favorites among them}, then the difference that
deconstructing value makes will be evident, we hope, to our readers.
Dialogue
Klamer: You have persuaded me that the value of anything is a complex thing and
is not to be essentialised. As a matter of fact, I read your collaborative piece as a
relentless criticism of all attempts to sharply differentiate good art from bad art. I
only wonder what this adds to the discussion over and beyond what many others
have argued, including several authors in this volume. Many of us appear to be
quite conscious of [he difficulties of defining the good in art in contradistinction to
the bad.
Amariglio: A key part of our argument is that value is discursive. There is nothing
natural to value - whether economic value or aesthetic value - in and of itself.
There is no inherent characteristic that givesa thing value. There are only discours-
es of value. But there are also, we want to argue, discourses of nonvalue, discours-
es where a concept of value plays a small, if any, role.
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Ruaio: A simple transaction between individuals or groups can be understood in
terms of different theories of value - neoclassical, Marxian, institutional, or what-
ever - hut also in terms of not value. We may want to think about gifts and other
transactions, or friendships as you mentioned III your speech [see chapter r], out-
side the notions of exchange and value. In other words, the notion of the gift which
excludes economic value IS a discursive choice, not something which corresponds
to and represents a particular event or domain of human interaction.
Amariglio: At the same time, our argument is NOT that there IS something better
about nonvalue discourses. Our point IS simply that value is one possible discourse.
There may be a realm of difference that cannot be encompassed by the concept of
value. We can make sense of aesthetic events by Imposing the concept of value. But
there is nothing inherent in those events that requires us to do this.
Graham, To go back to your question, we are making these arguments partly
because of the consequences that they have. We understand that we are 111 a mar-
ginal position in terms of economic discourse so, from our perspective, we need to
desrabilise existing value systems in order to be able to do our alternative discourse.
We also have the desire to add another dimension to aesthetic value which
would involve the reallocation of public subsidies and resources. It is our intention
to open up the discussion of the aesthetic to include, for example, the ways III
which the art work has been produced, that is, the conditions of production. The
allocation of resources, for example, could be more concerned with the communal
nature of art production. So we have different reasons for doing what we do.
Ruccio: Or, for that matter, the ways in which art is distributed and consumed. It
may also lead to a reallocation of pnvate resources. A change in perspective, one
which allows for the dcconstruction of economic and aesthetic value, represents a
different kind of subsidy or incentive: private individuals and institutions (such as
corporations and local and national governments) will change how they spend their
money on art according to whether they hold unified concepts of value or, alterna-
tively, more decentered notions of value.
Klamer: But is there not more to it? I am tempted to pose the "So What?" question
even though I know that it will annoy you.
Amariglio: Yes, that question does annoy us because it tells us that, once agam, our
text is not heing taken seriously. Then again, as Julie was saying, there IS a point to
all this.
We do introduce perspectivism mro the discussion of value. And the discursive
notion of value allows us to ask different sorts of questions.
Klamer: You do not say it outright but you seem to be critical of much of the dis-
cussion in this volume, including my own contribution.
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Amariglio: We question the hegemony of value discourse and the claim that art has
a special value that sets it apart from anything else. We plead for a change III the
function that the notion of value has. In terms of what you have said, we are skep-
tical of the alleged purity of aesthetic value as distinct from economic value - as if
aesthetic value is sullied or dirtied by the intervention of economic measurement or
commensuration. I do not think that the hope for the art world is in the privileging
of aesthetic value while keeping economic value at bay.
Klamer: Maybe we misunderstand each other because all I said was that actual dis-
course in the art world, as in many other worlds, is of the non-value type that you
referred to earlier.So what is your problem?
Amariglio: We agree with that point, but that does not mean that the aesthetic
value is privileged. The market does not, of necessity, "fuck up" the distinction
between good and bad, no matter how much people fear the interconnection
between those two realms. We do not want to romanticize the differences. That
does not do much for us. Market values can be destahilized by changes in aesthetic
valuanons. Those who have the work of Velasquezor Hans Haacke in their collec-
tion don't want people suddenly to say that their work is shit.
Klamer: To be frank, I do use your arguments and notions from time to time in
interactions with people. Recently I used it in a discussion with my wife. It was
about mother- and fatherhood. My point was that these notions are socially con-
structed. It made her furious and that ended our conversation. You all know my
wife. You know that she is a reasonable person. What do you do with this?
Graham: Well,in some moments we need stability; we need places of rest. It IS the
relentlessness of the kinds of criticisms associated with our work and of decon-
structionisrs mote generally that sometimes gets to people.
Rucdo: It is terrifying for some people but it can be quite liberating for many oth-
ers. It all depends. For Marijke, your wife, it may be (we don't know) terrifying to
think of motherhood - or friendship or artistic value or whatever - as socially con-
structed. For other people, however, that move can be rather liberating.
Graham: Whether you want to dcstabilise a position, depends. It depends 011
whether the position is your prison or your foundation.
Amariglio: For some people those two are unfortunately indistinguishable.
7' David Ruccio,JulieGraham,Jack Amariglio
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PART Two
On the Value ofArt

5
The Value of Public Art as Public Culture
JOSErH]. CORDES AND ROBERT S. GOLDFARB
At my request ]oseph Cordes and Robert Goldfarb tried their economic skills in the
areaofthe arts.Cordes is otherwisein publicfinance and Goldfarbhasa background
in tabor economics although he recently has been preoccupied with methodological
issues. They both work at The George Washington University with secretaries who
also happen to be artists or students in the museum program of their university. The
students brought the case ofThe Tilted Arc to theirattention. This is what they made
ofit.
Introduction
T H IS CHAPTER is about a particular subset of art, what we call "public art,"and how that art interacts with the broad culture of the society. By "publicart," we have In mmd art that is readily and easily available to "the public,"
art for which public display or performance looms large. It includes sculpture on
display in open, public places, music and dance performances open to the general
public, art on display in museums open to the genera! public, and so forth. Such art
is not only publicly displayed but also frequently relies on direct or indirect state
subsidies [Q fund its creation and/or make it available [Q the public. Government
support of public art raises a number of issues which we examine through the
prism of economic analysis. In so doing, we hope to show what econonucs can
contribute to understanding the arts, as well where its insights may falter.
Explainmg NationalDifferences in Public Support{orArt
Although the arts and culture receive some measure of public support in allindus-
trial countries, there are differences in the amount and form of such support. Table
I shows two notable differences between public support for art and culture In the
United States and Europe. First, by any measure, European countries devote signif-
icantly more resources to public support for the arts than does the United States.
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Second, in contrast to European coumnes, where indirect state support of the arts
- e.g. through tax incentives for private contributions and sponsorship - plays a
rather nunor role, such indirect support accounts for roughly $,75of every $I.OO of
public support for the arts in the United States (the fourth column percentage for
the V.S., .06%, is 75% of the sum of the second plus fourth column percentages,
.08%). What might account for these differing levels and patterns of state support for
public art In the U.S. versus Europe? What social and economic factors might cause
such levels and patterns of state support to change? We use the framework of neo-
classical economic analysis to try to shed light on these questions.
What arc the ingredients of this analytical framework? As both Arjo Klamer and
Donald McCloskey (1992) have noted elsewhere, economic models can be usefully
understood as offering narratives and metaphors that help us to think about the
world in particular ways. Bruno Frey and Werner Pommerehne (1989) provide a
very useful discussion of what is distinctive about the narratives and metaphors that
comprise neo-classical economics when applied to the arts. For our purposes, the
followmg features of the neo-classical model of economic behavior are especially
noteworthy.
The behavioral unit (or analysis) IS the Individual, who is assumed to take mto
account at least implicitly, the benefits and costs that particular actions involve
for him - or herself. It is thus assumed that people are capable of evaluating
alternative actions .. Man is supposed to be concerned with his uwn interests,
but regard for the welfare of other persons, especiallyrelatives and friends, is not
excluded.
Changes in human beliavior are attributed to changes in the opportunities that
people face rather than changes in preferences ... Such constraints are only pan-
ly economic, such as income and relative prrce (or cost). Other constraints are
physical, such as time and distance, or social, such as formal rules (e.g. govern-
ment laws), and informal rules (c.g. moral codes),
The production and consumption of the arts IS the result of the behavior of indi-
vidual persons.. and the demand for the arts is attributable to individual deci-
sions. This is the case even if the demand is exerted by, say, the state, i.e. by a coi-
lcetivity; ifone looks behind the state as a whole its behavior is the result ofactions
by voters, bureaucrats, and politicians. In the arts, as everywhere else, persons as
suppliers and demanders react systematically to incentives (Frey and Pom-
merehne, 1989, pp. 4-6. Emphasis added).
So how might application of this neoclassical economics framework, which seeks
tu explain social phenomena as the outcome of choices made by rational individu-
als, account for the national differences identified above? So-called interest group
models of public spending, such as the pressure group model of government
spending formulated by Becker (198J,1985), offer one way of approaching the ques-
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Table 1. Direct and indirect expenditure on artsand culture
---_.
DIRECT PUBLIC DIRECT PUBLIC DIRECT PUBLIC INDIRECT PUBLIC
SPENDING ON SPENDING ON SPENDING ON SPENDING ON
ARTS AS A IIRTS AS A ARTS PER HEAD ARTS AS A
PROPORTION PROPORTION PERCENT OF GDP
OF PUBLIC oFGDP
SPENDING
Canada 0·34% 0.18% $28·3 small
France 0·77% 0.2.2.% $35·0 very small
Germany 0·79% o.n% $39.1 small
Netherlands 0·45% 0·2.3% $33·5 very small
Sweden 0·42% 0·24% $45-2. none
United 0·4'% 0.14% $16.0 small
Kingdom
UnitedStates 0.05% 0.02% $3-3 0.06%
----------
Sourc", The first three column< are reproduced from Thro<by ('99'-)' Th~ last column is ba,~d On Table 3 in
Sch"ster ('985). Schmter "ses the terms "small", "very small", ete and thell gives all ahsulute dollar figure for the
US._ Thi, i, done hecause the individual m,mbcTh for the other countries are not readily available (~tax expendi-
ture" figures are not regularly generated), but arc de~tly 'mall Or very 'mall r.la,ivc '0 direct ,pending in com-
parison to the U.S.,
tion that is consistent with the neoclassical economics framework described by
Frey and Pommerehne. These models assume that policies are chosen by politicians
who seek to maximize political support by responding to political pressure exerted
by organized pressure groups for or against such policies.
Although the formation of organized pressure groups may be the visible means
of exerting political pressure, the focus of these pressure group models is on the
behavior of individuals rather than group behavior. That is, the amount of pressure
brought to bear for or agmnst a policy IS determined by investments of time and
money made by individuals who rationally balance the net benefits of exerting pres-
sure for or against particular policies with the cosr of doing so in the political
process.'
The original Becker model has recently been extended by Kristov, Lindert, and
McClelland (1992) (KLM), who developed a model thar allows different individuals
to form pressure groups based not only on whether they are directly affecred by
public spending on a particular activity (e.g. by paying taxes or receiving govern-
ment subsidies), but also on whether they favor or oppose spending on a particular
activity in principle (e.g. for reasons other than their own self-interest, narrowly
defined). This feature of the KLM model allows someone who is not directly affect-
ed through payment of taxes or receipt of subsidy payments to nonetheless active-
ly support (or oppose) the subsidy.
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A SIMPLE PRESSURE GROUP MODEL ApPUED TO THE ARTS
We have taken the KlM model and extended it to apply to the case where the object
of political pressure is public funding for the arts. The resulting model rests on the
following assumptions about behavior. First, like KLM, we assume that individual
preferences for public art reflect the value that people place on the broader benefit
of such art to society, as well as any personal benefit from directly expenencmg
such art. Second, we assume that public art can be provided either through direct
government subsidies or through private contributions. This is an important depar-
ture from the KLM model, which effectively assumes that a person's demand for a
collective good can only be satisfied through direct government spending. Third,
we assume that government and private support of public culture are not generally
seen as perfect substitutes. That is, the model allows government-financed art to be
viewed by some people as being intrinsically different from art that is not produced
with direct government support. This assumption implies that some people may be
willing to provide privatesupport for the arts yet oppose publicsupport for the arts
because III their view such public support produces "less desirable" art.
Finally, we assume that the individual makes economically rational calculations
about how much public art he/she desires and the form in which such art is to be
provided (c.g. publicly vs. privately financed). As part of these calculations individ-
uals are assumed to weigh the net benefits they expect to receive from exerting
political pressure III favor of or against direct public support of art against the time
and money cost of such political activity. Based on these calculations, some persons
will find it rational to exert political pressure in support of government art subsi-
dies; others will find it rational to exert political pressure opposing such subsidies;
and still others will rationally choose to remain on the political sidelines.
We do not present the formal mathematical version of our model here, though it
is available from the authors on request. Instead, we summarize what the model
has to say about how individual choices arc translated into political pressure for or
against government subsidies for public art, and the insights offered by the model
about differing patterns of support for public art and culture in the United States
and Europe.
The broad outlines of the discussion are as follows. First, we discuss certain indi-
vidual characteristics that, in the model, would prompt (economically) rational
individuals to support, oppose or be neutral about direct government arts subsi-
dies. An implication of the pressure group mode! is that the amounr of direct gov-
ernment support for the arts will depend all the distribution of these characteristics
among taxpayers and voters. This in rum causes one to look for differences in the
distribution of these individual characteristics as an explanation for different pat-
terns of public support for the arts in the United States versus Europe.
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SOME RESULTS FROM THE MODEL
8,
As noted above, the model assumes that there are two ways in which an individual
can strive to obtain the amount of public art and culture that he/she prefers. He/she
can use his/her time and money to exert political pressure to influence the amount
of direct government financial support for public art and culture; and/or he/she can
also use his/her time and money to provide private support for the arts by, for
example, making private contributions to a performing arts company or a museum.
The model identifies characteristics of individuals that influence these choices.
IndividualCharacteristics and Political Activity
Consider first the decision about whether to exert political pressure. What charac-
teristics of individuals might lead them to be more likely to devote resources to
shaping the amount of direct government spending on the arts through political
activity?The model suggests that the following factors wil1 influence this decision:
Taste (or publicartlculture. An individual will be more inclined to exert political
pressure in fever of government spending on the arts/culture, the mote highly
he/she values government-supported art. Conversely, she will be more inclined
to he politically inactive, or exert political pressure in opposition to direct gov-
ernment spending for public art/culture, the less highly she values government-
supported art/culture. Someone who believes that those artists applying for
government money are more grants entrepreneurs than artists might well exert
political pressure opposing such government support.
Perceived value o(governmentsupport. An individual will be more likely to invest
resources on exerting political pressure III favor of government spending on
arts/culture the more he/she perceives direct government support to be produc-
tive III the creation of public art/culture. Conversely an individual will be more
apt to be politically inactive, or to devote resources to political pressure aimed at
reducing direct government spending for public culture, the less productive she
perceives such spending to be. More concretely, someone who thinks govern-
ment funds will be channeled to excellent artists, with little "leakage" of funds
due to the operation of the government agency giving out the funds, is more
likely to favor the program and exert pressure for it. Someone who thinks that
government selection mechanisms will choose inferior artists, and/or that the
government agency will waste the funds on its own operations, is more likely to
oppose the program.
Tax burden. An individual will be more inclined to devote resources to political
pressure for direct government support of public art/culture, the lower the SOCial
cost of raising an additional dollar in taxes for the arts. He/she will be more
inclined to be politically inactive, or actively oppose such spending the higher
such social costs. One kind of social cost, what economists call opportunity
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costs, would involve possible decreases in other government programs (educa-
tion or poverty programs, for example) because tax funds were used for the arts
Instead of these alternatives. Other possible social COStS include the costs of
complying with tax laws, and economic costs arising from changes in individual
behavior prompted by taxes.
Attitudes toward taxes. An mdividual will be more inclined to exert political
pressure on hehalf of direct government spending for culture the lower his or her
general distaste for taxation IS. Conversely, persons with a relatively high dis-
taste for taxation will be more inclined to he politically inactive, or to exert polit-
ical pressure against direct government spending for culture.
Efficacy uf political pressure. An individual who would otherwise favor more
direct government spending for public culture, will be more inclined to invest
resources to exert political pressure to Increase such spending if he/she believes
that such pressure will in fact be effective in producing more direct government
spending on art/culture. Conversely, a person who would otherwise favor
reducing direct government spending for public culture will be more inclined to
invest resources on political pressure to decrease such spending the more that
he/she believes that such pressure will cause direct government funding to be
cut.
One important implication of the pressure group model is that if people act ratio-
nally, they must fall into one of three mutually exclusive categories of political!
pressure group activity, depending on the Interaction of the factors identified
above. A person may choose: (i) to invest time and money in exerting political pres-
sure in favor of direct government support for public art/culture; (ii) to invest In
exerting political pressure to oppose such direct spending; or (iii) to be politically
inactive and neither actively favor nor oppose direct government support.
An important insight from the model IS that these outcomes do not simply
depend on whether a person values public art/culture, perse.For example, it can be
rational for an "art lover", someone who enjoys and benefits from public art, to
actively oppose direct government spending for such art, if: (a) he/she believes that
direct government spending is a relatively unproductive way of creating it; (h)
he/she is highly concerned about the costs of taxation; and/or (c) the social costs of
raising extra revenue from taxes is relatively high.
This way of looking at things also provides an account of why persons will
remain on the sidelines in the political debate about the level of direct government
funding for public art/culture, even though their level of well-being would be affect-
ed if the level of such funding changed. Such behavior might occur if: (a) the net
effect on well-being were relatively small, and/or (b) the individual believed that
money spent on political pressure would have relatively little effect (one way or the
other) on the level of funding determined In the political process.
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Individual Characteristicsand Private Support for Public Art/Culture
Time and money can also be used to provide private support for the arts. The
model suggests that the following factors might influence the decision:
Taste for public artkulture. An individual will be more disposed to make private
contributions to support the creation and/or dissemination of public art/culture
the more highly he/she values public art.
Perceived value of private contributions. An individual will be more likely to
spend income on private support of public art/culture the more he/she perceives
such contributions to be productive in creating such art. For example, if a poten-
tial contributor believes contributions arc more likely to be used for staff cock-
tail parties than to fund actual artworks, that person IS less likely to make con-
tributions.
(Perceived) Costs of indirect subsidies and attitudes toward taxation. Private con-
tributions to arts organizations are tax deductible, at least in the If.S. In this sit-
uation, private contributions are subsidized through the tax system; they reduce
the amount of taxes the government collects from the private contributor. The
potential contributor's willingness to spend public funds as part of his or her
private contribution to public art/culture will be higher the lower the social costs
of providing such indirect subsidies, and the less that contributor is concerned
about such costs. Such fiscal considerations will vary with the size of the subsidy
per dollar of private contributions."
Efficacy of Individual private contributions. Finally, the decision to devore funds
to private contributions for public art/culture will depend on the extent to
which the individual believes that his/her own individual contribution will
increase the total amount of privately funded public art/culture. A simple sup-
position on the part of the individual might be that an extra $1 contributed will
increase private support of public art by $1. This outcome, however, is not cer-
tarn if individuals have an incentive to act as free-riders. For example, it is possi-
ble that an extra 51 donation by a particular individual will increase total contri-
butions by less than $1 as other persons reduce their contributions m response
to this increase.
Based on the interaction of these factors, individuals will fall into one of two cate-
gories: (a) those for whom the rational choice is to make private contributions to
public culture, and (b) those for whom it is rational to make no contributions. As in
the case of political pressure, whether a person falls into either category does not
depend only on their tastes for public art/culture. Thus, a person eould be an art
lover 1Il the sense of liking and getting utility from public art, and yet contribute
nothing to the private support of such art because: (a) he/she believed that private-
ly supported public art was a relatively unproductive way of creating public art/cul-
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ture; (b) he/she believed that the cost of indirect subsidies was too high, and/or (c)
he/she believed that private contributions would have a relatively small effect on
the total amount of pnvately supported public art actually produced.
EXPLAINING PATTERNS OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC CULTURE
The results of the model just summarized suggests that people will fall mto onc of
the six categories described in Table 2.
Table 2
----------------
Type 5
Type 6
--~---
$PE"lDlNC ON PUBLIC PRESSURI'
Spending in Pavor 1Spending against No Spending
ofArtsExpenditures __Arts Ex~n_d_,,_u_"_'_-l__
Typer Type3
Type 2 Type 4
---'----------'-
SPFNDlI\G ON
PRIVATE
CONTRIBUTIO:-lS
Recall that Table I described some striking differences between arts financing pat-
terns in the u.s. versus Europe. Broadly speaking, the different patterns of public
support shown in Table I suggest that there are relatively more "Type 2" persons in
European societies, who are willing to exert positive political pressure on behalf of
direct government support of the arts, while at the same time making little or no
contributions to indirect support of public culture through private contributions. In
contrast, there appear to be relatively more "Type 3" and "Type 5" persons in the
United States, who are either unwilling to exert political pressure on behalf of
direct government support, or whu ate willing to exert political pressure in opposi-
tion to such funding, while at the same time making significant contributions to the
support of public culture through private institutions.
What factors might account for these differences? The pressure group model
provides some clues about where to look and where not to look for possible expla-
nations.
Tastes (or Public Culture
An answer that is frequently given to this question is that Europeans have a greater
taste than Americans for public art/culture. In terms of the pressure group model,
however, such taste differences - if they exist - would explain differences in the
overalllevcl of government support for public culture, but not observed differences
in the pattern of direct government support versus indirect government support
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through tax deductions for private contributions to the arts. Greater tastes for pub-
lic art should make individuals more willing to spend their income on both private
contributions for public art and on political pressure in support of direct govern-
ment spending for culture.
Tax Incentives (or Private Supporto(PublicArt/Culture
Others have suggested that Americans are more willing to make private contribu-
tions to support public art/culture because they have more of a financial incentive
to do so through the tax system. If this is so, the observed difference in the level
and the pattern of support for public culture in Europe and the United States could
reflect stronger tastes for public culture among Europeans, combined with more
attractive tax incentives for pnvate support of public culture in the United States)
There are, however, a number of reasons why this explanation may not hold up.
First, although European income tax systems place more restrictions on allowable
tax deductions to artistic and cultural activities, these constraints do not appear to
be binding.e For example, European income tax systems set lower limits on the
percentage of income that can be claimed as charitable deductions than does the
United States. However, charitable deductions by US taxpayers fall well below
these lower limits. Moreover, because Europeans generally face higher marginal
income tax rates, one might expect that European tax systems would, if anything,
provide a stronger financial incentive for private support of public art/culture,
because the net-of-tax pnce of such contributions is actually lower in Europe than
it is in the United States.
The Relative Productivity ofDirect vs. Indirect Funding o(PublicCulture
An alternative explanation that is consistent with the pressure group model is that
Americans and Europeans may hold different views about the productivity of direct
government funding compared with private contributions in the creation of public
culture. For example, we would expect to find more Type 2 persons in Europe and
more Type 3 persons in the United States if Europeans generally had more positive
views of the productivity of direct government funding, while Americans had more
positive views of the productivity of private contributions. There are several rea-
sons, discussed below, why this might be the case.
Attitudes toward the State. One possible explanation is based on what is alleged to
be an underlying American attitude toward public sector activity. There is a gener-
al American suspicion of giving the government control over allocation decisions,
and an underlying social consensus favoring pnvare sector decisions for allocating
these goods and services. These socio-cultural attitudes are tied to Amencan views
of the undesirability of direct state action, and the attractiveness of relying on
decentralized allocation mechanisms.
Variability o( Tastes. Another explanation is based on differing distributions of
tastes for public culture. It has, for example, been suggested that there is consider-
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ably more variability in tastes in a heterogeneous society such as the United States.
If this is so, pnvate support may be seen as a more productive way of creating pub-
lic culture than direct government funding because it makes it easier to match the
output of public culture to a range of tastes - e.g. one private donor may adore
classical music and abhor Jazz, while another may have exactly the opposite
predilections.
There are also theoretical arguments associated with BUTton Weisbrod's model
of the nonprofit sector that reinforce this "variance of tastes" approach. Weisbrod
argues that "undersatisfied demanders for collective-type services can turn .. to the
private nonprofit sector. Nonprofits reflect the diversity of demands upon govern·
ment. The unsatisfied demand for collective-type goods IS a governmental 'fail-
ure' analogous to private market failures. That is, the combined willingness of part
of the population to pay for some additional collective-type goods exceeds the
incremental costs of providing them and yet government, responding to majorit.ir-
tan interests, does not provide them."(1988, p.26)
Weisbrod postulates that the size of the nonprofit sector relative to government
is likely to differ across nations "(i)f the nonprofit sector exists to respond to diver-
sity of demands for collective goods". He then points out that "(rjhe private non-
profit sector does seem to be particularly noteworthy 111 the United States, a coun-
try of unusual diversity." (1988, p. 27). He cites two examples. First, the separation
of church and state "with its concomitant requirement that governmental spending
on religion be zero," is "unique to the United States" according to Weisbrod.5 Sec-
ond, he cites new evidence showing "remarkably higher level of nonprofit activity
in the United States compared to Japan, a country of less cultural and economic
diversity," with respect to providing support for the poor and needy. He attributes
this to a "greater consensus in culturally more homogeneous Japan" leading to a
greater role for government and a smaller role for the nonprofit sector.
Comparative Disadvantage of Public Display. Private support of public culture may
also be an attractive option III cases where the direct government funding of public
art/culture has more potential for creating art works viewed negatively by some cit-
izcns; that is, for creating a "public bad" instead of a public good. Such possibilities
can arise because of two special characteristics of art: the possibility of particular
kinds of art generating negative reactions - negative "utility" - among some of
those who encounter it, and a "production/display technology" feature: the degree
of "publicness" of some forms of art can be controlled through the process of pro-
duction and/or display.
Display Technology. We begin by elucidating the "display technology" feature,
which IS easily illustrated using sculpture as an example. Public art has the charac-
tenstic of what economists call a "public good". A "private good," such as an apple,
typically gives satisfaction only to the person actually consuming (eating) it. In con-
trast, "many" consumers can get satisfaction or "utility" from whatever public
sculpture IS provided: one person "experiencing" or seeing it does not prevent
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other people from also experiencing it at the same time. That is, one aspect of a
public good is that it is not "used up" because one individual "consumes" it (this
"non-using-up" property is sometimes referred to as "nonexclusiveness in con-
sumption"). Another aspect is the inability to exclude consumers (thus, if the VS
is "nationally defended" from invasion, a particular V.S. citizen cannot be excluded
from being "nationally defended" from the same invasion).
Sculpture is typically not used up by being viewed, so it displays the public good
characteristic of "nonexclusiveness in consumption." However, the degree to
which consumers can be excluded from viewing sculpture depends on its condi-
tions of production and display. A large sculpture located in a public place with
guaranteed open access will not allow exclusion, but producing (locating) a sculp-
ture in a private, closed, fenced-in environment does permit exclusion. Thus, the
degree of "publicness" of some forms of art is controllable through the produc-
tion/display process.
Art asPublic "Bad". Another relevant characteristic of some art is that it can gener-
ate negative utility.This observation requires more extensive discussion. The possi-
bility of a public good generating negative utility for some of those experiencing it
IS a phenomenon whose applicability extends to goods far removed from art, and
whose economic implications have not to the best of our knowledge been ade-
quately studied. Examples outside the realm of art include national defence: some
citizens may actually be offended, and therefore have their utility lowered, by
expenditures on military provision.
An Illustration. To illustrate how these two special characteristics of art would inter-
act in a pressure group model to explain observed differences in public support for
the arts between the V.5. and Europe, it is useful to consider a specificcase. We use
as our example the particular case of public sculpture.
It has been documented for specificepisodes in the VS that the introduction of
particular pieces of public sculpture has produced disutility for some of the public
subjected to this sculpture. Stalker and Glymour (1982) cite and discuss numerous
examples, including the following:
In1977 Carl Andre, the well-known "minimal" artist executed a public sculpture
for the city of Hartford, Connecticut. (T)he Hartford Courantwas filled with
articles like these in the summer and fall of 1977:"Criticisms of Park Art Doesn't
Rock Sculptor"; Sculpture Foes Shaping Plans"; Rock Opponents Tighten
Stand." Taking note of this public opposition and joining it, the city fathers con-
sidered refusing payment but were advised by attorneys that the contract with
Andre was valid and binding. Works by Sugarman, Ginnevar, di Suvaro and
other sculptors have created even more intense controversy in other cities, not
simply because the public objected to paying for the works, hut because signifi-
cant segments did not want the objects publicly displayed in the settings in
which they had been, or were to he, thrust. (p.6)
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The particularly interesting example of Richard Serra's sculpture Tilted Arc is dis-
cussed at length by Glazer (1992). In 1981, Serra's sculpture, commissioned by the
General Services Administration, a branch of the US government, was placed in
the plaza at the JacobJavits Federal Building in New York City. Glazer describes the
building as "an anonymous and really ugly very large structure from the 1960'S" (p.
to ), one for which "(f)ew will be found to say a good word for." (p.rj). Glazer
quotes interviews with Serra that clearly imply that his aim ill producing public
sculpture is to work "in contradiction to the places and spaces in which it is creat-
ed" (quote from a Serra interview, P.13), to crit icize or subvert the architecture with
which it is juxtaposed. In the case of the TiltedArc, the sculp ture worsened the use-
fulness of the space in which it was placed for those who worked there :
But Serra was engaged in more than verbal or written criticism in an evanescent
newspaper: He was building something large and permanent, and a permanent
critique, particularly with its accompanying discomfort for all the people work-
ing in the building, is another matter. He is attacking the awful by increasing its
awfulness. To the misery of working in an ugly and poorly designed building, it
was Serra's thought to add additional misery in the form of sculpture that was
ugly to most people (including the art critic of the New York Times), that
obstructed the plaza, that offered no space to sit on, that blocked sun and view,
and made the plaza unusable even for those moments of freedom when the
weather permitted office workers to eat their lunch outside. (Glazer, 1992, p. 13)
Figure I shows the Tilted Arc, in the plaza in front of rhe javits building.
fig. T Richard Serra, Tilted Arc
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The work generated so much displeasure that "after nine years of troubled exis-
tence, Tilted Arc was demolished and the plaza restored. It now contains trees in
concrete planters, benches, and the non-functioning fountain." {p. 16). The sculp-
ture was removed only after considerable public debate, and litigation. "In typical
American fashion, the battle was fought not only in public but through the courts"
{p. IS}' In public hearings, a long list of distinguished representatives from the art
world spoke in favor of the sculpture. "Those speaking against could not have been
more different: judges, federal employees, union officials, area residents. The con-
frontation could fairlybe summed up as the world of art against the people." (p. IS-
16). Glazer surmises that "the opponents of Tilted Arc. simply wanted to enjoy
the sun in the plaza, to have a place to eat their lunch, and not to be assaulted by a
very large and ugly object whose purposes they could not divine," a work that the
New York Times called an "awkward, bullying piece that may conceivably be the
ugliest outdoor work of art in the city" (p.r'z).
Because the Serra example is so extreme, it raises the negative utility issue in a
particularly stark way. In this case, taxpayers were forced to pay for art that
arguably made some of them worse off. The direct public funding of this sculpture
virtually guaranteed that it would be much more of a public good than sculpture
funded either privately or through indirect public funding (tax expenditures); the
public funding was explicitly associated with the intention to place the sculpture in
a very public location where people would encounter and "experience" or "con-
sume" it, whether they wanted to or not. If the public appreciation of this kind of
"subversive" sculpture is limited, and dislike for it likely to be widespread, its public
provision is virtually guaranteed to generate negative utility among a significant
portion of the population forced to pay for it.
Senie (19923) has added an interesting interpretive twist to this idea that the
public is forced to confront sculpture put in public places rather than museums. She
argues that people confronted by public art will try to find a context in which to
interpret it. After indicating a number of such critical interpretive responses by "the
public,"6 she notes that:
What all these responses are telling us is that an understandable context is mis-
smg and without that another one will be found ... The "What is it?' question
must be answered. And if all we can come up with is "It's art," that's not
enough, unless it comes wirh a useful art context that will begin to make the
work meaningful to any viewer... What we cannot afford to do is dismiss public
responses or presume to know what the public wants. If we want to know the
answer to that vexing question, we have to ralk directly, at length, to the various
individuals who constitute or represent "the public" at any given time and
place_.. At issue is not just the future of public art but an understanding of art's
place in a democratic society. (pp. 243-24S)
Not all arguably high quality public sculpture in the U.S. generates such a public
outcry. Moreover, if appreciation of art requires exposure to it, advocates of public
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sculpture can argue that initial dislike may in some cases grow into longer-term
appreciation. An interesting counter-example to the Serra episode and those cited
in Stalker and Glymour (1982) involves Cl public sculpture in Grand Rapids, Michi-
gan. A TV program (mis)emitled "Arts in America : A Crisis of Public Support"
aired on Public Television in December 1994.7 It turned out to be a repon on a sym-
posium held in Grand Rapids, Michigan in honor of the zjth anniversary of a
Calder sculpture entitled La Grande vitesse in that city (see model in figure 2,
below). This was the first sculpture sponsored by the National Endowment for the
Arts' Art in Public Places program. The tone of the symposium was that the Calder
sculpture was a well-beloved fixture in Grand Rapids, and the city fathers had been
far-sighted to have commissioned and installed it in the first place. Some of the pre-
senters at the symposium also seemed to suggest that people grew to appreciate it
by repeatedly experiencing it. Senie and Webster note that "(s)urprisingly, even
though the art and the artist had nothing to do with their respective sites, the
Chicago Picasso and the Grand Rapids Calder eventually functioned effectively as
civic sculpture" (I992, p. xiv). Both seem to have taken on functions associated
with representing the city: the Chicago Picasso "may sport a Chicago Cubs ' base-
ball cap or a Bears headband" after a winning season (Senie, 1992<1, p. 239), while
the Grand Rapids Calder forms the basis for a logo that appears on the city's sta-
tionary and its taxicabs (Senie, 1992b, p. I03).s
Fig. 2 Alexander- Calder, La Crande Vi/esse (model)
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Returning to the Serra example, how, if at all, might this example be related tu dif-
ferent patterns of public support for art In the V.S. and III Europe? If a larger por-
tion of the V.S. population than the European population has a strong distaste for
modern sculpture (and modern art in general), then these tastes expressed politi-
cally are likely to result in less "modern art" public sculpture being provided and
financed directly by government. If another segment of the V.S. population does
not experience this negative utility from modern sculpture and actually likes it, they
may find it more productive to finance such additions to public culture through
tax-deductible contributions, since such sculpture commissioned by private non-
profits has a greater chance of being displayed III "less-public" locations.
One of the authors, in visiting Rotterdam, was struck by the much higher inci-
dence of (modern) public sculpture in Rotterdam than in American cities. This
observation is exactly consistent with the previous paragraph's prediction about
the frequency of public sculpture in the V.S. versus Europe.
WHAT Do WE LEARN FROM THE MODEL?
\X1hat is gained by viewing the question of public support for the arts through the
prism of the pressure group model? The reader must Judge for him/herself how
apt, appropriate and enlightening the list of factors identified is, and what possibly
important factors are missed by this approach, but we would hazard a guess that
readers from disciplines far removed from economics will find that they would not
have focussed on a number of the factors suggested by the model.
\X1hat can we as economists, following Klamer's lead in his Introductory essay,
say about the peculiarities of using an economic model of behavior to explain dif-
fering patterns of public support for the arts? Like all models, which intentionally
abstract from a complex reality, the pressure group model provides a powerful ana-
lytical spotlight which leads to a certain clarity of focus. But, the spotlight illumi-
nates some issues at the price of ignoring others.
Both the strengths and the weaknesses of the economists' approach are aptly
illustrated by a personal anecdote. When we began this paper, one of the staff in
our department office was working toward a degree III Museum Studies (she has
smce graduated, and IS working in museum administration). \X1hen we told her we
were writing a paper about the provision of public art, she was quite taken aback.
Her comment was, "how can you do that, when you have never studied art?" We
responded with a standard line: "economists routinely aualyze questions of how
societies make decisions about allocating limited resources among competing
wants and needs, and these analyses apply to any and all products and services,
from apples to education to health, and, yes, even to art." At one level, there is
nothing wrong with this response, and indeed, it illustrates the applicability of the
rational choice framework to a wide range of questions. We would also venture to
say, with Arjo Klamer, that this perspective "gets some things right't.s At another
level, however, there is some danger in assuming that the analytical methods of
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economics can be blithely applied to any activity, without first obtaining an in-
depth knowledge of the activity. Our ignorance of the arts may be such that our
attempt to model public support of the arts in a rational choice framework fails to
incorporate some crucial features of art as an activity; and as suggested by Klamer,
we may run the risk that "the insights gained are limited and do not seem to do jus-
tice to the phenomena srudied.?'? One possible way of overcoming this problem is
through the conversations that we hope this paper provokes with those who are
extremely knowledgeable about the art world.
A second observation is due to Hans Abbing, who brings unusual breadth of
knowledge and experience to the subject since he is both a practicing artist and an
economist. One reaction he had to the model was that it was ahisrorical, and this
might be a problem. In Europe, there is a long history of arts patronage by power-
fulinstitutions; some of this history may affect the propensity of current govern-
ments in Europe to subsidize the arts, and may calor the cirizenry's acceptance of
such practices. The possibility of an "independent" effectof this historical tradition
on the behavior of government is not a feature of our modelling framework. (See
Abbing 1992 for a related discussicn.)
Conclusion
This paper has been about what is sometimes called positiveeconomics: trying to
better explain an observed set of facts about the world. Wehave tried to show how
neoclassical economics can be used to elucidate observed patterns of state support
for the arts. We have not addressed questions of normativeeconomics: questions
about what role, if any, the state shouldplay in providing financial support for pub-
lic art/culture.
The reader must judge whether as Klamer argues," .the economists perspec-
tive is not very inspiring when applied to the world of the arts ... (because when)
VIewed through economists' glasses the cultural sector looks small and otherwise
similar to any other sector,"!' Our own response to Klamer's lament is twofold. On
the one hand, we believe that the rational choice framework of neoclassical eco-
nomics does offer a useful, coherent account of why people do what they do,
mcluding patterns of support for the arts. It can also be shown to help one think
about the proper range and scope of public support for the arts, though those nor-
mative issues have not been addressed in this paper. But, the model is perhaps most
useful in raising questions that are fundamentally noneconomic! For example, dif-
fering patterns of public support for the arts in Europe and the U.S. may be ratio-
nally linked to differing reactions to "highly visible" public art. This, however, begs
the question of where these differing reactions come from, and whether govern-
ment has any active role to play in somehow "molding tastes." Questions such as
these are part of a larger discourse about public policy and the arts, to which eco-
nomics can surely contribute, but as one of several different modes of analysis.
Dialogue
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Klamer: You allude to the normative consequences of your analysis. This makes me
curious. \Which economic rationale for public support would you consider most
convincing, if any?
Cordes: I'd answer such a question from a neoclassical perspective. See, one
strength of the neoclassical model is that it shows how various collective outcomes
can emerge out of the interplay of individual interests. This way of thinking is not
only useful for examining what role the state does play in supporting the arts, but
what role it shouldplay. But, because the individual is the basic unit of analysis, the
individual's normative judgement about his/her own well-being is taken to be the
basis for any normative judgement about what 1S "good" or "desirable" for society
as a whole. Thus, in neoclassical economics, the "public interest" cannot be defined
apart from, but instead, must be based on the well-being of the individuals who
make up that society.
On the one hand, putting the individual at cenrer stage m this way is analytical-
ly attractive, because when an economic rationale for public support for the arts can
be deduced, that rationale is based on satisfying individual wants. On the other
hand, because it is not possible within this individualistic framework to postulate
some sort of "collective" or "socieral" preference for public art and culture that is
separate from, and perhaps transcends what individual citizens want, it is difficult
to deduce such a very compelling rationale for direct or indirect government subsi-
dization of the arts.
Klamer: Harry Truman, a former President of yours, once asked for one-armed
economists, because all the economists he knew kept saying "on the one hand" and
"on the other." You live up to the image! But is this all there is to say as a neoclas-
sical economist?
Goldfarb: The reason for our difficulty is that, in normative economics, a case for
government activity rests on establishing a failure of the market to "efficiently" pro-
vide the good or service in quesion. It turns out to be very difficult to establish such
a "market failure" for the arts.
That is point one I want to make. There are three more. One of these is that
direct and indirect Federal government support have quite different characteristics.
As joe already pointed out, it is individuals whose views "count" in normative neo-
classical economics. Indirect support as through "tax expenditures" has the advan-
tage of letting individuals direct the federal subsidy to the art forrns and organisa-
tions they view as worthwhile.
\When it comes to direct federal support, the case for subsidizing "art creation"
seems stronger than the case for subsidizing performance or reproduction of art.
The reason is that creation can have important externatrlity Otpublic good features
that performance typically does not have. One can usually charge for performances
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but one cannot charge for many of the future uses of a music composition. 1 whis-
tle Mozan's Eine Kleine Nachtmusik, get considerable pleasure therefrom, and no
one charges me fur that. That extra utility for me is an externatilirv of Mozart's
having composed the piece. Such positive extematilitics can imply underproduc-
tion of composition.
This argument for subsidizing creation of art IS far from ironclad, though. A
major problem is that federal subsidization can lead to overproduction; the "cure"
can be worse than the underproduction "disease" it IS meant tu ameliorate. Two
very concrete instances are O'Hare's t983 analysis of subsidies to music composi-
tion showing that subsidized pieces are very unlikely to ever be heard, and this
overproduction problem gets worse with each successive generation of composers
[Michael O'Hare, "A Malthusian Nightmare for the Composer and His Audience,"
1Il Willi,lm Herndon and jamcs Shananan Economics of Cultural Decisions, Abr
Books, 1983, pp 114-121.] Thus citizens arc paymg for compositions they will never
benefit from. Another major question is whether the subsidizing authorities willin
fact choose artists worth subsidizing: will they in fact choose "future Mozarts"
rather than artists whose creations are not of lasting interest?
Finally, an argument can be made in favor of federal subsidization of the devel-
opment of "tastes for the arts," especially among youth. But this seems to be an
argument for subsidizing the education system {schools} to develop these tastes
among current students, not an argument for subsidizing the creation of art, or arts
performance organisations. However, arguments for subsidizing "taste change" do
not fit comfortably into a neoclassical economics framework which takes individual
tastes ,15 given and relatively stable. And quite apart from this "failure of a comfort-
able fit" there is the problem of who - what elite or other vanguard in a democra-
cy, with what moral authority ill that democracy -IS to decide that citizen's tastes
arc "deficient" and how they need to be fixed.
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Market Value and Artists' Earnings
RUTH TOWSE
If you think that Cordes and Goldfarb have an ewnomistic approach to the arts, read
thischapter. Ruth Towse, who teaches at the University ofExeterand edits theJournal
of Cultural Economics, insists on a/Jplying standard economic analysis. Here she
takes the valueapproach ofchapter I to task, simply by showing where the economic
approachtakes us in the analysisofartists'earnings. She hasdone alreadya lot on this
subjed like in her book Singers m the Marketplace (1993) but in this chapter she adds
a twist by introducing intellectual property rights into the analysis. Her objective is to
explore the consequences ofsucha move, At the end we will haueit out.
"THE LABOUR of opera singers and dancers is productive because it is val-
ued, because it has specific importance for various "economic projects"
The services of the opera singer are wealth. Economics deals with the pnc-
ing of these services, equally with the pricing of the services of a cook." (Lionel
Rohbins in An Essay on the Nature and Significance ofEconomic Science 2nd edition,
1935, pp 7 and 8, discussing Adam Smith on productive and unproductive Iabour.)
Adarn Smith regarded "some both of the gravest and most Important, and some
of the most frivolous professions: churchmen, lawyers, physicians, men of letters of
all kinds; players, buffoons, musicians, opera-singers, opera-dancers & c" - the
whole service sector, 111 fact - as unproductive labour. They are unproductive,
according to Smith, because they do nor add value to a "vendible commodity".
"Like the declamation of the actor, the harangue of the orator, or the rune of the
musroun, the work of all of them perishes in the very instant of its production" (all
quores from The Wealth of Nations (1937), p. 315). Smith's differentiation between
productive and unproductive labour led to a distinction, as in his paradox of value,
between price and value. It is the validity of this distinction between price and value
which Linnet Robbins in the opening citation challenged. Indeed, economics has
concerned itself with the determination of price, not of value, for well over the last
100 years.
Cultural economists arc now being urged by Klamer (1995) to mount a latter-
day counter-challenge to this position, based on the credo that the arts arc "too
precious" for their value to be determined 111 the marketplace. (This is, however, the
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complete opposite of Smith's view!). This huge value judgment about the merit of
the arts goes far beyond the merit of good argument - that consumers, left to
themselves, choose to buy less than is seemed socially desirable - a view which,
indeed, did preoccupy cultural economics briefly" Klamer apparently ignores or
repudiates the concern of the subject over the last 20 years with market failure, pre-
sumably because that merely deals with the failure of the market to set a price that
reflects resource costs. Instead we are urged to rethink Adam Smith's paradox of
value, without, of course, reverting to his view of performing artists as unproduc-
tive labour.
I reject this call because it implicitly accepts a non-market definition of what art
1S and who artists are. Not only does it deny that consumers can properly form
preferences about art, it also fails to think out the implications of how resources are
to be allocated to the arts. Without the market, the Judgment of what is art would
be made instead by artists and cultural theorists, thus opening the way for pater-
nalism and snobbery. Mosserto (1993) has shown the effects of this on the working
of arts markets. Once we reject consumer sovereignty, the door is open for special
pleading, for public subsidy to satisfy the experts' preference function with conse-
quent rent-seeking. These experts do not even feel obliged to justify their choices
by stating their policy objectives, nor to distribute public funds equitably (Towse,
1994a). I agree with Frey (1994) that what is art is a market outcome, and that the
economist's comparative advantage lies in recognizing that. r believe that we have
made considerable progress in cultural economics by so doing.
What lies beneath Klamer's view is the rejection of neoclassical economics. All
well and good - but let us not throw out the baby with the bath water! The neo-
classical paradigm is a highly successful one. Part of its success is that it has avoid-
ed breast-beating over "intrinsic" value by equating market price with value. That is
not always comfortable to live with when applied to lifeand death, love and art. But
even in these cases it has a certain predictive power, surely the chief rationale of
economic science. It has ignored moral and aesthetic issues except in so far as they
affect supply and demand behavior. It does not answer the question whether a price
is right or fair, only whether it is efficient, but it does show how people evaluate
opportunity costs.
Here, I argue that research based on neoclassical analysis of artists' labor mar-
kets has produced interesting msights, which can now be used as the basis for fur-
ther work. r believe that the way forward in this field is through a greater under-
standing of artists' property rights. Recognition of the role of copyright and related
rights leads us to see that artists face a problem of optimizing their earnings over
time. Because it is static, neoclassical analysis and, in particular, marginal produc-
tivity theory, fails to fully explain the artist's supply decision. Indeed, once we rec-
ognize that artists can capitalize the value of their services that necessitates a recon-
sideration of the question of how to define artistic services. I am not alone in
adopting this approach: Wijnberg (1994) has argued that failure to fully establish
artists' property rights may be regarded as a ground for state subsidy to the arts.
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In sections 11 and HI, I consider the neoclassical approach to artists' labor markets.
Section IV looks at Intellectual property rights in relation to artists. Section V
deals with the problems of defining artists' services and Section VI offers a brief
conclusion.
I Neo-classical Approach ofArtists' Labour Markets
Neoclassical analysis of artists' labor markets has proved fruitful, and has spawned
a whole mini-research programme of its own. During the last ten years, the mam
questions that have been addressed are whether the artists' labor markets work like
other labor markets, and whether artists earn as much as other workers of compa-
rable age and with comparable investment in human capital.
In order to address these questions, it first proved necessary to investigate the
workings of artists' labor markets in considerable detail, collecting data on earn-
mgs, hours of work, type of work (non-arts and arts work), training, working and
marketing practices, and so on, because in most countries such data could not be
gleaned from the official census or from labor force survey sources. Work by Filer
(1986) using US census data started the ball rolling by showing that "starving
artists" were a myth, that artists in fact did earn incomes comparable with those of
other professionals. Painstaking survey work by Wassall and Alper (1985, (992)
demonstrated that these results were biased by the implied "market test" built into
the census process: by excluding multiple-jab-holding artists who were working in
non-arts work In the census week (taxi-driving painters were treated as raxi-dri-
vcrs), some proportion of artists who were forced to do other work because of low
pay in the arts were excluded, biasing the data on earnings upwards in favor of
more successful artists. Surveys by Throsby and colleagues in Australia (Throsby,
1986; Throsby and Mills, 1989; Throsby and Thompson, 1994), by Mitchell and
Karttunen (1992), Karhunen (1994) and Heikinnen (1995) in Finland, and Towsc
(t 992,a) in the UK, have shown the extent to which multiple-job holding prevails in
artists' labor markets and the difficulties of defining artistic supply. These and other
surveys are summanzed by Towse (1995).
What emerges from this body of work is that most artists supply labor to the
arts and non-arts sectors (Throsby, J992), work longer than average hours, and
earn less in total (in arts and non-arts work) than other workers. They are often
self-employed, and if employed, employment IS casual and short-term. They have
typically undertaken longer education and trammg than other workers but their
earnlllgs from arts work do not rise with length of training, age or experience; this
suggests that human capital theory does not apply in arts labor markets but, on the
other hand, neither does the screemng hypothesis. One explanation for this is that
what is demanded IS talent, which is neither successfully created by the training
process nor assessed by formal paper qualifications of the type offered by institu-
tions of higher education {on this point see Towse and Throsby, 1994; Towse,
J99,'il A further finding is that artists' earnings are very variable and there is a sig-
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nificant element of risk attached to working in the arts (see Waits and McNertney,
1980; Menger, 1989;and Towsc, r992b). Neoclassical analysis of artists' labor mar-
kets has therefore stimulated a vast body of research, which has shown that they
conform in some respects to other types of labor markets but they also have distin-
guishing features which introduce complications m standard labor econorrucs.
II Problems forthe Neoclassical Approach
This research programme would not exist without the initial impetus of the neo-
classicalapproach. However, it has raised some difficult issues which that approach
cannot deal with. Two have been mentioned already: the problem of how to define
artists as members of the labor force and the economic role of artistic training. By
some criteria indeed, the two would be linked, as one way of defining artists IS
according to their professional qualifications. But there are many artists who are
self-taught or for whom formal training IS irrelevant (Towse, 1995). The problem
economists have to face is that we have no theoretical guide to occupational defin-
ition other than a crude market test. One way of avoiding the market test problem
is to accept people's self-definition as artists. These issues are tied up with the ques-
tions of oversupply and low earnings in artists' labor markets; if we accept people's
valuation of themselves as artists (and most researchers working in this field have
done so), we have to deal with a persistent disequilibrium situation m which mat-
kets do not clear.z.
For whatever reason, far more people aspire to becoming artists than the
market can bear. This fact can be squared with neoclassical economics by saying
that such people gain non-pecuniary or psychic benefits from being artists even
though their earnings are low or non-existent. People value seeing themselves and
being seen as artists. How much they do so - the "price" of being an artist - can
be measured by the earnmgs penalty they suffer in the market, i.e. the gap between
what they could earn in another career ceteris paribus (Whithers, 1985), This issue
IS complicated by multiple job-holding and the fact that many artists are self-
employed. Throsby (1992) found that artists supply hours of non-arts labor up to a
"subsistence" point that depends on the relative wage rates of arts to non-arts
work. That subsistence level of income is extraordinarily low. In Britain it IS below
the poverty line (Towse, 1995). Why artists should have to suffer for their art IS an
equity question that economists cannot easily discuss. But however uncomfortable
we may be with people choosing artistic poverty, it is surely preferable to respect
free entry into artistic occupations than to put in place some kind of academy that
designates who is and who is not an artist, which would undoubtedly act to
protect its members' earning power hy restricting entry. For that is the inevitable
alternative to a free market for artists.
A different type of problem for the neoclassical approach to artists' lubor mar-
kets is that many art organisations are not profit-maxirnisers and therefore do not
necessarily have an incentive to minimize costs. This makes marginal productivity
wo Ruth 1bwse
theory more or less Irrelevant. Other standard problems artse if we wish to apply
marginal productivity theory to the demand for artists' services. In Towse (1992C) I
considered these problems in detail.
The chief objection to the neoclassical programme is not that it has failed to deal
with essential value but that it is static. It ignores, or cannot cope with, dynamic
effects and optimization over time. It fails to offer a theory of labor supply that rec-
ognizes that many workers, including artists, do not simply trade-off work for
leisure in a timeless world; besides gaining utility from work, they hold property
rights to future earnings which are obtained by present labor. Artists as holders of
intellectual property rights, in fact have to adopt a view on how to spend their earn-
ings over a time period whieh exceeds their own lifetime by 70 years (the duration
of copyrighr), or whether to capitalize their value by selling rights for a fixed sum. I
now turn to these questions.
T!I Intellectual Property Rights and Artists
For a market economy to function effectively, property rights must be established.
Without that there could be no basis for VIewing price as a measure of value. Copy-
right law IS the area of law most relevant to the intellectual property rights of
artists, though other law, such as that creating artists' resale rights (droit de suite)
and neigbboring rights also applies. There has been work by economists of the arts
on both these topics: Rottenberg (1975), Peacock (1979),O'Hare (1982), Filer (I984),
Moulin (1988, 1992) and Towsc (I994b, 1994C). A whole issue of the Journalo(Cul-
rural Economics was devoted to intellectual property rights in the arts, with papers
by Merges (1995), Deardorff (I995), Koboldt (1995), MacQueen and Peacock (1995),
Hutrer (1995) and Santaga (I99S).
Economists writing on artists' resale fights all agree that they reduce the price of
paintings because the market discounts the future payments due to the artist and
her heirs. The analysis of copyright IS more complex, however. Recent changes
have been made in Europe by the EC Directives which harmonize the duration and
coverage of copyright, and statuary performers' rights have been introduced into all
European Union countries. Harmonization is proving far from harmonious ltl the
UK, though, because of disputes between all the artists' associations and the Gov-
ailment over how the directives should be Implemented. The problem is how the
doctrine of "equitable remuneration" is to be implemented and what mechanisms
are to be put into place to collect artists' shares of the newly created rights.
Copyright law establishes the right to equitable remuneration hut essentially it is
left to the market to decide what this is.fr does so regardless of artistic merit; copy-
right covers all material created by authors who have invested effort in creating it.
The compiler of a telephone directory is accorded the same protection as a poet or
prima donna. During the two hundred or so years since the introduction of copy-
right law in the UK (in 1710), the different industries of rhe cultural sector - pub-
lishing, music, film, TV, etc. - have evolved various means of collecting and dis-
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tributing royalties and other payments for the use of intellectual property. Chief
among these are the collection societies which are collectives of artists andlor firms
In the relevant industries. It is no surprise to economists that what actually deter-
mines how much artists receive is based on their relative market power, tempered
by the transactions costs of monitoring and collecting due payments) Though the
purpose of the changes to Copyright Law is to alter the balance of power, the mar-
ket adapts to the changes when determining payments.
This point takes us right back to the opening discussion in this chapter. How are
we to decide who gets what without a market process? Here we have the case of a
new intervention in the market, which IS justified on economic grounds because it
establishes the rights of suppliers and hence is an incentive to supply. But "suppli-
ers" are highly complex combinations of artistic factors of production and technol-
ogy.Just think of an everyday product, a CD of orchestral music, and identify all the
elements of supply which are bundled together. Take only one of all the items - the
orchestra. Who owns the copyright depends on the legal status of the orchestra,
whether it is a co-operative or an employer. Are players entitled to royalties indi-
vidually? Are use rights, e.g. in film or TV (and do you mean cable, satellite or ter-
restrial TV?), to be bought-out or not? How long is the CD to be in print and what
about re-issues? r could list a hundred further questions on Just this topic before
even getting to digitalization, internet distribution and all the other technological
developments that are revolutionizing the record industry. Into this highly complex
market are introduced new rights for performers, the value of which must be some-
how calculated and a means of collecting payments established. Whatever institu-
tional mechanism is established for collection of royalties will interact with market
forces. At the end of the day, however, performers could be no better off because
the market may simply discount future payments, as with artists' resele tights, or
move production out of the European Union to avoid paying for use rights (GATT
now includes intellectual property rights but not performers' rights). It is too early
yet to see what the results will be.
Transaction costs also come into the story because monitoring the use of intel-
lectual property rights and collecting royalties is complex and expensive too. Who
should bear the cost? Again, take the case of a CD. Many organizations may be
licensed to use it - film, TV, radio ere. as discussed earlier - but also pubs, clubs,
sports halls, cafes, hotels, shopping malls, telephone companies, lifts, ere. Obvious-
ly, a market response is blanket licensing and buy-cuts because otherwise the costs
of monitoring and collection would swallow up the royalties. Record companies
themselves are often in the best position to do the monitoring but they do not have
the incentive to act on behalf of artists nor in the interests of artists. Asymmetric
information problems pervade these transactions. Indeed, one would say that they
so alter the market that prices are utterly distorted (Towse, 1994a). In practice, it is
mostly the collection societies who do the monitoring and so a significant part of
the cost is borne by the artists themselves (Towse, I994C).
The discussion in this section was intended to provoke interest in rather than
offer solutions to these problems. Those who repudiate the workings of markets
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would do well to consider the massive complexity with which market processes
deal. I emphasize processes because the market institutionalizes the learning
process and adaptive behavior that are clearly necessary for implementing artists'
property nghts. It seems to me inconceivable that institutional arrangements could
replace the market in this area; surely, regulating the market is the way to maxnruzc
the value of payment to artists. Given the ongoing interaction between the law and
market forces, regulation is, however, highly complex and expensive.
lV The Supply ofArtists' Services
Returning now to the points raised at the end of section I, let us think again about
the nature of artists' services and how they should be priced.
It has become a convention of the literature of artists' labor markets referred to
earlier to distinguish between creative artists (including, for convenience, craftspeo-
plc) and performing artists. There are good reasons for this: creative artists - writ-
ers, visual artists, composers, choreographers, film-makers ere. - generally speak-
mg produce something tangible which is then sold (it could, of course, be a
commissioned work). They must invest time and other resources into the creation
of this work wen in advance of its completion, acting more or less as entrepreneurs.
Performing artists - mUSICianS, actors, dancers, etc. - are mostly employed by an
organization, and their services are the actual Iahor of giving the performance. It is
the performing artists' services which in Smithian terms are unproductive because
they are not a "vendible commodity".
All sorts of problems in fact disturb this convement distinction. How should we
value creative artists' time - is it the pnce at which they sell their output divided by
the hours spent in creating it (with due account taken of capital and material out-
lays)? If so, how do we value items such asJohn Cage's "4.33", a work which mere-
ly instructs the musicians to sit In silence on the stage for that number of minutes?
That sort of labor-rhcorv-of-value-approach falls duwn because hours of labor time
arc a poor measure of human capital or innate talent. The performing arts' side has
its own complications too. Many performers are in fact self-employed, working on
short-term contracts (so they are perpetually looking for work) or even promote
themselves. Given that casual working IS built into the labor market for artists
(more so in the US and UK, perhaps, than in other parts of Europe), should audi-
tioning, networking, keeping fit, practising and unpaid rehearsing be counted as
part of the artists' labor supply? They <Ire obviously part of "investment" 111 <In artis-
tic venture on a par with that of creative artists.
But bringing into the picture the fact that the means of reproducing live perfor-
mance are widespread, and that many performing artists may in fact never work
"live" introduces another dimension. If we imagine for a moment that an artist has
a fixed stock of skill and energy to devote to liveperformance, which she can either
run down quickly while young or spread over a lifetime, it is clear that this is a proh-
lem of optimization over time. Because experience usually Improves performance,
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that could alter the pattern of supply of services by altering the stock. Many other
things could do so too - age, health, luck. But now introduce the possibility of
using that same stock of skill and energy to make records or films, etc., which will
produce copyrighted royalty payments over 70 years. What the performing artist
must do is to Juggle all these possibilities, each of which will in all probability have
a risky outcome. Nor is it only performing artists who have to make these choices
over time; so do visual artists who wish to hold on to their early work either for
their own enjoyment or for sale at a later date (Singer, I98r).
Enough has been said to make it clear that economists working on artists' labor
markets must start to model these problems. It has been a hard slog to collect the
basic facts from which so much has been learned about how artists' markets work.
The next stop is to begin to take account of artists' supply decisions in a dynamic
context.
v Concluding Remarks
Whenever one delves into how markets work, their complexity is astonishing. Mar-
kets are one of the greatest social institutions human beings have created. r hope
this paper has conveyed a flavor of the myriad transactions dealt with by artists'
labor markets.e
Markets do not always work efficiently because of information problems,
unequal balance of market power, social prejudice, non-homogeneity and the like.
They rarely work equitably. It is right to ask whether market prices are fair. But it
equally behooves us as economists to recognize the superior power of the market
system as an allocative device. The trick is to regulate markets so that they are fair
and efficient. Part of that process is recognizing not only how market incentives
work but also how market forces adapt to regulatory measures which seek to alter
them. Public choice economists have shown us that the regulatory process itself
may be subject to market incentives and reflect economic and political power trade-
offs. This is a question to which economists of the arts have devoted little attention,
apart from Frey and Pommerehne (1989). It seems to me that there is a very rich
vein to be mined here for those who reject neoclassical economics and wish to
adopt a wider view of political economy. It is counter-productive to deny that art is
an economic good or service like any other. An economist's time is more valuably
employed in understanding how markets adapt to, and may be steered by, regula-
tions which aim to achieve fair prices.
Dialogue
Klamer: I am sorry that you dismiss my plea to reconsider the value off hand. I
admit though that there is merit to the strategy you follow. Surely, if we want the
economics profession to take notice, your strategy will have the best chance. I only
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wonder whether it will be as successful to draw anyone else into our conversation.
At any rate, 1 benefited greatly from your survey of the neoclassical approach of
artists' labor markets. The problems are significant. Youmention assessing the eco-
nomic role of artistic training, identifying the artists in the labor force, and the stat-
IC character of the economic analysis. My inclination might have been to find in
these shortcomings (and the many others I can think of, such as the assumption of
given preferences) a reason to choose another approach, like the one that I favor.
But you go nght ahead and introduce an interesting twist to the standard story by
bringing in property rights. That move makes sense in view of the fact that well-
defined property rights can generate earmngs m the future.
As you point out, all this is just a starting signal for more work to do. Fine, I
should not judge your intention at the outset. We'll have to see what the inclusion
of property nghts can do to our understanding of artistic earnings. But does the
same not apply to the approach that I champion? Yourcomments in the beginning
suggest that we do not stand to benefit from what each of us intends to do.
7{)wse: My strategy IS not so cynical as you suppose! It is based on the successful
development over the last 30 years of the field of cultural economics. That has
proved to be a pretty successful research programme, i.e. it has "solved" some
problems and thrown up new ones. I have to say that I find little indication in your
essay that you have considered that development. You say you expect a great deal
from your approach: no doubt! But surely a conversation (rather than a soliloquy)
would start by addressing the achievements and shortcomings of past work. What
do you add to precious debates? Your "problem" has been looked at before - see,
for example, page one, chapter one of Frey and Pommerehne's book Muses and
Markets. I agree with you that it is interesting that not all exchanges are organized
using the price mechanism. However, most transactions in the arts, heritage and
cultural industries have actual or shadow prices, whether they are publicly or pri-
vately supplied. It would be helpful if you could give examples of cultural goods or
services that arenot traded. Or are you saying that theyshould not be? That artists
should not have to "prostitute" themselves on the market where price becomes a
measure of value?
Where I believe there is also confusion, is in your sleight-of-hand interchange of
the words art (or the arts) and culture. Culture, in (he anthropological sense, is cer-
tainly a public good (or bad, depending all your background!). You can neither buy
it nor sell it to slough it off. But don't be misled by the "culture" in cultural eco-
nomics! That IS not what it is about. Is that what you want to do - put the culture
into cultural economics? Or treat art as religion.
Klamer: I exploit the dual meanings of the concept of culture on purpose because I
think that culture and art are interconnected in significant ways. You are right that
I want to get the subject of culture in its anthropological meaning on the agenda of
economists. And yes, that could mean that art is as religion.
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1 am after a change in perspective. 'Where you see implicit measures in so-called
shadow prices I see processes by which people negotiate on the relevant cultural,
aesthetic and moral values. To bring that out, an anthropological approach may
serve me better than the standard economic approach. But please, don't tell me
what so many economists do and that is that by doing this I'll loose my union card.
'Where those values matter to economic processes and outcomes, economists had
better pay them attention. That they do not and r, along with a few others, intend
to change that. Because that was my objective, I was unable to do justice to the pre-
vious achievements in cultural economics.
Towse: An academic "union card" IS obtained by reading and commenting on the
work of others. Without that discipline we reinvent the wheel every 20 years. That
is what I think you are doing. 'What you say you are doing is to revolutionize cul-
tural economics. Great! Take heart from this quote from Robert Louis Stevenson
(rhe Master of Ballentrae):
"Let any man speak long enough he will get believers."
But r think revolutions start from the inside, from the limitations of past thinking:
your revolution is engineered from the outside. You risk not being taken seriously.
However, is your mission not, ill fact, to change the whole canon of economics?
And you have chosen cultural economics as a vehicle for that? We should be flat-
tered!
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Big City, Great Art
A Myth about Art Production
GERARD DE VRIES
Next, it is a philosopher's turn. Gerardde Vries, who chairs the Department ofPhilus-
ophy and is Dean of the Netherlands Graduate School of Science, Technology and
Modern Culture at the University of Limhurg in Maastricht, considers the conditions
most suitable fur the pnsduaion of the a115. Conventional wisdom holds that art
thriveshest in greatcities, the obvious argument being that artistsbenefit from work-
ing in theproximity ofotherartists. De Vries refrains from the typicaleconomicanaly-
sis that we have seen in the previoustwo chapters. Nevertheless his interestin the con-
ditions ofproduction is economic in nature and that earns him a spot in this part of
the book.
De Vries has written books on the philosophy of science, socialstudies of science
and technologyand on ethics. His currentresearch interestis politicalphilosophy in a
technical culture.
I N HIS inaugurallecture "The Valueof Culture", Arjo Klamer presents a concep-tual problem for economists and policy-makers with a professionalinterest inthe arts (see chapter 1). Conceding that economists have much to say about the
prices of the products of art, Klamer argues that the activities and experiences that
are involved escape from the vocabulary economists routinely use. Economic con-
cepts such as "price" are just not fit for the kind of activity art happens to be. Art
has value, but as activity and expenence it is literally priceless.' Those who confine
their language to the standard economic vocabulary will be barred from the experi-
ence of art and from art as activity.
Klumer's argument shows that where economics, policy, and the arts meet, lan-
guage matters. In this paper, r will discuss another example that reaches the same
conclusion. My approach will be quite limited. r will discuss a widely held idea
about the place where art prospers, viz. the idea that art, and particularly modern
art, IS at home in cities. rwill argue that this idea IS a modern myth that only lives
on because it is deeply embedded m the language of the social sciences that IS used
when policies for the arts are discussed. rwill also argue that this myth distorts our
view on what goes on in contemporary art. To develop ideas and a language more
appropriate for the arts, policy-makers and economists should turn to, eh ... ,
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the arts. There are a few novels they should read before the next policy group
meeting.
Where is art produced? - the question is of obvious interest to economists and pol-
icy-makers. If one wants to promote and subsidize the arts, the least one should
know is an address to which the money should be sent. The conventional wisdom
suggests a straightforward answer: cities, and especially big cities, provide the true
breeding ground for modern arts. "The city and only the city has produced the
characteristic phenomena of art-history," sociologist Max Weber concluded in
1923. (Weber 1923, p. 272) "All advanced culture is city-culture," Swiss historian
Alexander Riistow echoed in 1946, having conducted an extensive survey of the
history of cultures. (cited in Swaan 1991, p. 27) It is a fact thar nowadays hardly
needs further confirmation: few will dispute that modern art is that art which is
produced, appreciated, exhibited and sold III New York, Paris and London. The
proposition is contested only by stubborn provincial politicians, who would like ro
see a share of the national resources for the arts flowing to the regions.
There is, however, a problem, and a single glance at our bookshelves throws ir
into sharp relief. It is indisputable that a lot of serious literature has been written by
authors who livein big cities. However, as it happens this also holds true for small-
er places. Life in a big city is certainly not a necessary condition for the creation of
serious literary work. janc Austen wrote Mansfield Park in Chawrcn, Hampshire;
Goethe lived in Weimar, a provincial town of (at that time) 6000 inhabitants;
Hauberr did most of his work outside Pans. Our century has produced so many
more examples. Brecht wrote important plays while in exile in the Danish country-
side, Thomas Bernard lived in rural Austria, not in Vienna, while John Berger lives
in a village in France, and Garcia Marquez travels back and forth between South
American countries and the Caribbean Islands. Similar examples can be drawn
from the worlds of music and the visual arts.
The same holds true when we turn our attention to other areas where creative
talents are involved, for example science and technology. Traditional centres of
intellectual life such as Harvard, the universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Louvain,
Ooningen and Leiden, were established in sleepy little towns. And although there
IS little doubt that the metropolitan areas of London, Pans, Berlin, New York and
Tokyo are important milieus for technological innovation, it is also clear thar much
of today's technology emerges in places that used to be deep in agricultural torpor:
Silicon Valley, Bavana, the French Midi, the new industrial centres in South-East
Asia. (Castells 1994) In this respect, there is in fact nothing new under the sun.
Athens, the cradle of Western civilisation,counted at its apex 200,000 inhabitants,
slaves included. That is roughly the number of inhabitants of a present-day provin-
cial town, and hardly the amount one associates with a metropolitan society.
Still, many artists and intellectuals live in cities. This is not surprising. Given rhe
huge numbers of people livingin cities, there should be quite a few artists among so
many people. It may also be observed that several important traditions in the arts
have been closely related to metropolitan life - a number of twentieth century
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avant garde movements in literature and the visual arts, for example. The city has
provided new themes for the arts, and, as frving Howe observed, it has suggested
new scenes and a range of new characters for novelists - e.g. the clerk, the Jew, the
cultivated woman, the underground mall. Moreover, the city has also provided new
vocabularies for art, from "the street argot of a Celine to the ironic urbanities of the
early Auden, from the coarse eloquence of Balzac's Parisians to the mixture of racy
street-jewisbness and intellectual extravaganza of Bellow." (Howe 1973) However,
from these facts alone, one cannot conclude that the production of art flourishes
exclustuelv or even especially in metropolitan areas. That streetwise modern litera-
ture requires knowledge of city-life does not imply that the writer has to live or
work in a hig city. One does not expect writers of science fiction to live on Venus,
nor authors of historical novels to live in the past.
A writer needs a pen, a typewriter, paper; a painter brushes and canvas; a pho-
tographer a camera, a darkroom, chemicals. But a city? What for? To get ideas? An
innovative artist is supposed to develop his own. To meet editors and gallery-own-
ers? We have telephones and faxes, and trams and planes are available for our trans-
port. To meet critics? Most artists are not particularly fond of critics and, anyhow,
the mail delivers newspapers, letters, magazines and critical journals also in the
country. If cities provide artists with some artistic aphrodisiac it surely must be
something quite elusive.
The idea that the city provides the unique breeding ground for art and culture is
not a historical fact, but a myth that has been with us now for more than a century.
If stated as a scientific hypothesis, it is hard to conceive a test. "Art" is a complex
phenomenon. Its production requires the interplay of numerous actors: artists,
agencies and galleries, critics, theatres, studios and museums, journals, publishers,
printers, bronze foundries, and so on. The question where art IS produced may
depend all the technology or craft involved, and may even be a completely mean-
ingless one. Consider photographic art. Where should we locate the production of
this art? Some photography IS made in a studio, processed in a darkroom annexed
to the studio, and shown and sold III the gallery next door. But where did Ansel
Adams make his pictures? In Yosemite and Yellowstone Park, or in his darkroom in
metropolitan San Francisco? Or should we perhaps locate the production of his art
- as those who favor reception-theories argue - in the magazmes that distributed
his photos, or in the museums that made them famous? In order to decide where
the pictures emerged should we perhaps take a less narrow view of their "context"
and also consider the milieus and traditions which led Adams to take Ius camera
out to record American landscapes? If so, we will have to take into consideration a
lot of urban-culture in tracing the ideas about nature and rural life which influenced
artists like Adams. (Schama 1995) But we will also come across rural culture and
Involvement with nature, and it is hard, if not Impossible, to disentangle the various
components involved.
Unlike the production of caudybars and the growth of potatoes, art often
negates our usual geometry. It emerges in a different topology. The production of
art involves complex networks of activities. Only in selected cases does it make
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sense to locate these networks at a specific point on a geographical map - for
example a map of a metropolitan area. If art is what matters, a town is a "big city"
when it produces art which is cited, which becomes part of networks extended in
time and space. Plato's Athens is a "big city", not because of the fact that at its apex
it contained as many people as a contemporary provincial town, but because it pro-
duced a volume of writing which can be found, more than two thousand years
later, in almost every single library in the world. Where art is concerned, a town is
a "big city" if it produces great art.
Of course, we should not conclude now that the countryside, rather than the
city, favors the production of art. If anything follows from scattered examples like
those above, it is that our vocabulary for dealing with questions like: "where is art
produced" needs to be refined before we can expect answers which make sense.
The Origin ofthe Myth
One reason for the persistence of the notion that city life is a prerequisite for artis-
tic innovation stems from the principle that power generates myths.
The power of cities ranges far beyond their peripheries. Wealth flows to big
cities; they are the seats of administrations. These factors in themselves are suffi-
cient for the generation of persistent myths. People with power consider them-
selves to be better, smarter, and more beautiful than others. Strangely enough, the
powerless tend to agree. They consider themselves to be inferior. Consequently,
the idea that cities and their inhabitants have special qualities is certainly not held
only by blaseurbanites. One also finds it in the countryside. In fact, it has incited
quite a few artists to leave their families and villages for the city, hoping that by
doing so their art would become better, smarter, more beautiful. As a result of their
migration, capital cities come to have extensive populations of second-rate writers,
painters and composers.
Cities have been bestowed with special powers from the earliest times on.
According to the religions and world views of the past, cities are not just settle-
ments, arbitrarily established at a certain place and in a given fonn. Their locations
and shape were thought to reflect the structure of the universe. Cities were believed
to refer to exrra-rerrcstrial reality, to have astral or divine prototypes, to descend
from heaven, or ro be related to the underworld. This holds good for Babylon, and
for the royal cities of India. We also find the idea expressed in Plato's Phaedrus and
in the idea ofJerusaIem as expressed by the prophets (Barasch 1973).
Being enlightened people, of course, we do not allow ourselves to become
bewitched hy mythical delusions. Today, the connection between "city" and "art"-
the latter being our version of the divine or the underworld - is expressed by other
means. Contemporary ideas about the special qualities of city-life and its favourable
function for art are often based on arguments like these:
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"For his art an artist needs to be released from daily wornes. Art requires the
availability of money and division of labour. In modern times, the city provides
these resources, as palaces did in the past."
"Through their concentration of talents big cities provide the right conditions
for competition and hence for innovation - exactly what we need for the devel-
opment of the arts."
Instead of a religious vocabulary, we use the terminology of the social sciences.
However, neither argument is convincing. The fact that modern sponsors of the
arts are to be found for the most part in big cities hardly implies that the spon-
sored artist needs to work and live there too. We are rightly grateful that Van
Gogh could stay in Provence while his Paris-based brother paid his hills. Sponsors
of wildlife projects do not expect animals to be transferred to the city-zoo either.
With regard to the second argumelll, if one accepts that the city provides the fight
place for the arts simply because the arts are located in the city, one should also
accept the argument that once farmers are prepared to leave the countryside for
the city, the city is also the right place for agricultural innovation. I cannot envis-
age many who would go for that line of reasoning. The problem with the above
two arguments is clear: they are not related to content, to what makes an activity
the production of "art".
A much more interesting argument therefore IS one which spells out the artistic
stimulus the city is supposed to provide for the artist:
"The big, modern city stands for a specific mindset. The anonymity that comes
with citylife has individualism as a positive side. The city provides the milieu
required for experimentation with thoughts and life forms; it thus provides nich-
es for the growth of novel ideas that express the modern condition. These ideas
are typical for modern art."
Although limited to the relationship between the city and modern art, this argu-
ment is more sophisticated than the former two, because it relates a specific idea
about the nature of the modern city, i.e. the mindset of its citizens, to the content
and values typical of contemporary art. This argument, which is founded on a spe-
cific sociological idea of modernity, deserves more scrutiny.
For the sociologists who set the tone at the beginning of this century -
Durkhcim, Weber, Simmel, the Chicago School -, the city provided the paradigms
of industrial society and the modern individual. For these scholars, the city was the
focal point for the special modes of experiencing which are the basis for their views
on modernity.
A city requires a person to enter into anonymous relations with complete
strangers. City-dwellers do not constitute a community, but a crowd. As Simmel
observed, before public city transport became fully established people were never
put 111 the position of having to stare at one another for minutes or even hours on
end without exchanging a word. To survive in a city one cannot appeal for sympa-
thy. Relations in cities are functional, and mediated by money. The citizen is sup-
posed to be able to play several anonymous roles simultaneously - as buyer or sell-
er, as employer or employee, as passenger on a bus or a subway. Success in a big
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city requires punctuality, alertness and speed; one quickly has to draw the attention
of potential customers - otherwise they will already have passed by. From these
conditions, Simmel argued, a special mentality emerges. (Simmel 1993 (1903)) The
modern city dweller is an intellectualistic, egoistic, reserved, and calculating indi-
vidual. Hence, what characterises a modern city is, on the one hand, a chaotic web
of relations, objectified by the money economy, and, on the other, a particularly
nervous state of mind which one needs in order to participate in these relation-
ships. "Stadluft macht (rei" ("city-air makes free"), an expression formerly related to
the fact that serfs who exchanged the countryside for the city were set free after a
year, acquired a psychological interpretation: to live in a city gives the feeling of
freedom; free-thinkers live in a city. Add to this perspective the view of the artistic
genius that has been with us since Romanticism - the idea that hyperindividuality is
a prerequisite for serious art (Wittkower r973) - and the conclusion becomes
straightforward: "the big city provides the breeding ground for art."
Why did the classical sociologists stress these particular aspects of city life? Why
did they emphasise the individuality and the nervousness of city life, rather than its
waterworks and sewerage systems, the availability of electricity, r.e. the new tech-
nological infrastructure that also came with the rise of modernity?
Although there are differences between the pioneers of sociology, there is a
straightforward answer to this question. Their approach enabled them to put mod-
ern social lifein a developmental perspective, i.e. to characterise the city - their par-
adigm of modernity - in terms of what it no longer was, viz. a village. In this
respect, the views of the sociologists echo the concerns of many nineteenth and
some eighteenth century writers and poets, including Baudelaire and Balzac, Dos-
toevsky and Dickens. (Berman 1988)
This tradition of social thought conceived social life in a village to unfold within
a well-determined framework. The argument rests on a simple analogy. The social
space of a village is conceived to be surveyable, as its geometry. A village is situated
in its environment: a few houses further on, the village ends and the countryside
begins. Provided one chooses a suitable viewpoint, a village can be seen at one sin-
gle glance. Time provides a stable, common framework: dinner at SIX, bedtime at
ten-thirty. Social roles are clearly distributed: everybody knows the schoolmaster;
with or without his uniform, the police constable has authority. The meaning of life
is regularly confirmed in shared rituals. Pre-modern village-life is regulated,
Durkheim emphasised, by a conscience commun in which everything has its estab-
lished and known place, by "mechanical solidarity"." Because of this common
framework of understanding, everybody in a community is familiar with the mean-
ings of actions and words exchanged.
In contrast, III the modern city, according to the classical sociologists, this
shared framework of meanings, time, space and identities confirmed in regular rit-
uals, has disappeared. City lifeis fragmentary: people are involved in complex, clut-
tered webs of interaction. Their actions are regulated by function, rather than
shared meanings. Money mediates between individuals. The original sense of com-
munity is absent. In a city, it IS "every man for himself".
Gerardde Vries
Village versus city, Gemeinschaftversus Gesellschaft. Introduced in 1887by Tonnies,
modern SOCiety is characterised through this conceptual dichotomy by what has
disappeared - the framework of shared ideas, sentiments, norms and values which
In the past gave meaning to human interaction. Like many of his conremporanes,
Tormies perceived industrialisation as a major threat to society. "What will bind
people together when the established framework of meamngs has become erod-
ed?" he asked. What future, except anarchy and nihilism, exists for a society of iso-
lated individuals? Is not the effect of industrialisation that "all that is solid melts
into air?"
For Simmel, Weber and Durkheim, writing a generation later than Tunnies,
citylife had more appeal. They cherished the Individuality they thought would arise
from modern life. But they too saw themselves confronted with Tonnies's ques-
tion: how do people In modern societies co-ordinate their actions? What has
replaced the framework that has disappeared in the transition from Gemeinschaftto
Gescllschaft? How is continuity of social life assured in societies that have been the
subject of the radical social changes that came with industrialisation and the
money-economy?
Functional relations, Durkheim and Simmel replied, but also a new framework,
a new conscience collective, anew, "organic", type of solidarity. As Durkheim
argued III De la Division du Travail Social, functional relations in themselves are not
enough. The very fact that buyer and seller have a functional relationship does not
yet explain that both know the meaning of their actions and that both are bound by
a contract. Meaningful co-ordination of action, Durkheim argued (echoing Kant),
requires a set of representations collectives, a transcendental framework, a social
space, in which co-ordinated action can take place. Therefore, industrialisation and
the rise of the money economy wilt not dissolve society. Instead, the rransforma-
tion of society will give rise to a new framework. But in contrast to pre-modern vil-
lage life, the framework of industrial society does not manifest itself in shared ritu-
als. It IS hidden for the city-dwellers themselves. To see the framework we have to
go beyond the surface of common sense knowledge. To see the deep-structure of
modern, industrial society, scientific inquiry, i.e. the new sociology, is necessary.
With the right scientific means, Durkheim claimed, we can perceive a framework of
values and norms behind the multitude of social forms and actions in modern social
life that IS characteristic of Gesellschaft: instrumental, calculating rationality, ego-
ccnmsm, individuality - the representations ccllectiues of modern socrery, the spe-
cific mental state that was supposed to be characteristic for modern cirylife.
From the outset, the city was presented as a transformed village. The landscape
of modern society was painted on a canvas which depicted pre-modern village life
first. That IS the reason why these SOCiologists stressed the symbolic framework
wluch allegedly gives meatllng to action - the special mentality of modern life, the
nature of interactions that take place in cities.
Later sociologists and anthropologists have criticised the distinction between
Cemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. The "sense of community" of pro-modern villages
turned cut to be a romantic illusion, nut unlike Rousseau's idealised natural sav-
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ages. III modern villages, teenagers look at MTV, the old rituals are performed for
tourists, and the church that used to he the focal point of communal life IS now
deserted; present-day farmers do their accounting on computers and are respected
customers of multinational banks. In contrast, many cities turn out to be conglom-
erates of villages, the result of concentrations of poverty and wealth, and of ethnic
backgrounds. The telephone directory of every big city m the world lists an
immense number of clubs and associations where people can conveniently come
together to meet their like-minded fellows.
In our occabuiary. however, the distinction between Gemeinscha(t and
Gesellschaft liveson. The city continues to be depicted in terms of its contrast to the
village and the countryside. And although the city is much more appreciated nowa-
days than a century ago, we continue to interpret citylife in terms derived from this
nineteenth century distinction. We continue to think that the special flavour of a
city rests in its providing a framework, a mindser, a mentality. The sociological
legacy seduces us to think - or rather; feel- that a big city induces something spe-
cial in its inhabitants. Hidden behind the vocabulary is a train of thought which has
emerged from classical sociology - the idea that the metropolitan money-economy
produces objectification of SOCIal relationships; that urban existence requires a dis-
tance between individuals, that it produces barriers between people; that metropol-
itan life thus gives rise to individuality. "Big cities provide the breeding ground for
art." This prevailing popular thought expresses not only a nineteenth century
romantic view on the arts which focusses on the artist as genius, but also a view of
urban life which depicts cities as transformed villages, dating from the same period.
The City in Modem Art
Ironically, within the arts, these nineteenth century ideas about "the city" and "the
countryside", that seep through via the sociological vocabulary, were abandoned
long ago.
Consider, for example, James joyce's UJysses. (loyce 1968 (org. 1922)) This
novel, published twenty years after Durkheim's De la Division du Travail Social and
Simmel's essays on the metropolis, can be read as a literary expression of the
modern city.
'What binds the characters in this novel IS not a hidden transcendental frame-
work, but heterogeneous, everyday business: thoughts, activities, a coach that will
bring its passengers to a funeral, the table at a pub, a suggestion made in a letter,
the bed of a shared lover. In the course of the novel, the accumulation of conringenr
elements - accidental meetings, streams of thoughts, conversations, a quarrel, a
bout of hard drinking, in short a kaleidoscope of events - produces the picture of
just a day in the life of Dublin, te june, 1904. We can trace the wanderings of Bloom
and Stephen Dedalus on the city map of Dublin. The main characters move on
clearly named streets. But although this may mterest the tourist and the literary his-
tonan, for the novel as such, it is of no importance. Dublin does not provide a given
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framework. Instead, the city acquires its shape in the course of the rambles of the
main characters of the novel.
Bloom, Mully and Srephen Dedalus do not operate within a given social frame-
work. The topology of the space in which they move evolves with their actions and
thoughts. Distance, for example, gets its meaning only III this process. Molly,
Bloom's wife, is III geometrical terms never far removed from Bloom. However,
Bloom knows that she will meet her impresario at four o'clock, and knows also
that he should not come home early and that this night he will have to lie between
sheets crumpled by his wife's infidelity, For Bloom, Molly IS on a different planet
this day. In Ulysses, "distance" is something that has to he travelled - by walking,
stumbling, riding on an electric tram or m a coach, or bridged III thought. "Time" is
also constituted through everyday activities, objects, and relations. "Time" IS
defined by the availability of clocks and church-bells, by a stenographer typing "16
June, 1904", by an appointment at an hour following a funeral. "History" manifests
itself through a letter referring tu pronnses ur through remarks about, or memories
of, a painful past. Newspapers specify local and world events. "Simultaneity" is not
an absolute, but a relational concept. Although Ulysses is set in 1904, Joyce writes
in a post-Einsteinian mood.
Joyce draws a picture of a city, not of a transformed village. He guides us
through a network, a maze that is constituted by the existence of the mnm charac-
ters. The most striking literary aspect of the novel is the way different styles are
used for different sections of this network. Joyce depicts the city with its own topol-
ogy, without any suggestion of a unity or framework lurking in the background. In
contrast to the classical sociologists who supposed that social action necessarily
required a given framework of shared meanings, joycc does not assume the cxts-
rence of a social ether. That is the importance of his book for the sociologist, who-
like Durkheim - thought that social bond without a pre-existing transcendental
framework of representations collectives was inconceivable.
Ulysses shows the multiplicity of the world. jcyce looks neither for an essence
nor for a transcendental framework. If he had known the work, he probably could
have found himself in agreement with what Wittgenstein wrote m November 1930
III the preface to his Philoeopbisde Bemerkungen: "This book is written for such
men as are in symphathy with its spirit. This spirit is different from the one which
informs the vast stream of European and American civilization III which all of us
stand. This spirit expresses itself in an onward movement, in building ever larger
and more complicated structures; the other in striving after clarity and perspicuity
III no matter what structure. The first tries to grasp the world by way of its periph-
ery ~ in its variety; the second at its centre - 111 its essence. And so the first adds one
construction to another, moving on and up, as it were, from one stage to the next,
while the other remains where it is and what it tries to grasp is always the same."
(Wittgenstein 1970)
An important second shift III outlook emerges from this change in spirit. The
established sociological tradition started from the (hcrmeneutic, "lcgocentnc")
premise that conversation, meaningful interaction, IS the paradigm of social life.->
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This is the reason why sociologists around 1900 wondered how social life could
continue when the established framework had disappeared. The basic metaphor of
Joyce and Wittgenstein IS not conversation, but text, language. Language does not
constitute a unity, it is rather an amalgam of pieces. Language is like an old city,
Wittgenstein was to write, "a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new
houses, and of houses with additions from various periods, and this surrounded by
a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses."
(Wittgenstein 1969, § 18) Joyce uses the same image, but m reversed order. For
Joyce, the city is like a text that gradually takes shape, in which old fragments can
be found, bits and pieces are crossing and overlapping each other, and where the
holes in the street are as meaningful as the places that are well-paved. Together
with the farewell to essentialism, the basic metaphor for conceptualising the world
has changed. Hermeneutics has given way to structuralism and semiotics.
Villages have a centre and a well-defined borderline; they can be viewed from
one singular point. Wittgenstein and joyce realized that this does not hold for the
city, just as it does not hold for language either. There is neither a pre-existing
framework, nor a core. All that exists are contingent connections, made and
unmade while going along. Wittgenstelll's and joyce's work provide us with a
vocabulary suited for modern society, not one rooted in pre-modern village life.
Their work explores m literary and philosophical language a world view with mul-
tiplicity, contingency and fragmentation as its predominant features.
The Myth ofthe City and Its Policy Implications for Contemporary Art
As soon as the economics of, and policies for, the arts are discussed, however, we
tend to forget that we have read joyce and Wittgenstelll. All traces of the vocabu-
lary and perspectives which are characteristic for twentieth century thought are
lost. We fall back on nineteenth century perspectives, and enter into debates about
the question whether the city provides the right "breeding ground" for art. Slipping
back into the sphere of village life and agnculture, the development of the arts is
conceived as if the growing of potatoes is at stake.
The train of thought which begins on a nineteenth century track by invoking
the contrast between city and village, and that continues by describing the city as a
transformed village, does not take us very far. The vocabulary confines the debate
about the arts to the sectors that for technical reasons are limited to a particular
geographical place: the theatre, big orchestra-music, rnuseological visual arts, i.e.
arts already available in Coerhe's Welmar. The policies which emerge from these
discussions follow our limitations. The municipal museum gets funds for a new
collection, a concert hall is built, plans for a new opera are developed. What is sub-
sidised are not the arts, but places where art-lovers can meet like-minded people to
exchange ideas in a civilised way. To stimulate the arts, the money goes to city
councils. In fact, what IS subsidised - as everybody may confirm who presents
himself at a vernissage or at the opening of the opera-season - are new forms of
village life.
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The nineteenth century vocabulary masks the fact that art emerges from networks
of activities, with natures and shapes that vary according to the art form, craft, pro-
duction and reproduction technologies involved. Arts which, because of their dif-
ferent technical structure, are not located in a well-defined geographical place,
remain invisible in policy discussions. Apart from literature - an art form wluch has
been capable of development independently of geographical location since the
invention of the printing press -, we may think about photography, film, television,
video art, various graphical arts and other art forms and styles, all related to new
forms of (re-lproduction. Also art criticism, a necessary ingredient of every modern
art form, IS usually kept outside considerations of policy. The conventional wisdom
of art-policy thinks of criticism (if it thinks of it at all) as a subject matter of conver-
sations and meetings, I.c. as a suitable topic for village gossip, instead of a matter of
texts, Journals, and intertextualiry, things which cannot easily be located on a
national map.
As soon as we jettison the nineteenth century legacy which has come to us
through SOCIology, however, the policy-landscape changes. The rank order of the
arts shifts, and cities acquire a new place in our views on art.
For example, what is the POlllt of a metropolitan theatre staging run-of-the-mill
plays for an audience which have been given free tickets hy their employer who
happens to sponsor the event, when they would have preferred tickets for a football
march> Of course, ill nineteenth century provincial towns the theatre was a meet-
ing place for many and - as Eckermann's conversations with Gnethe testify - dis-
cussions among the bourgeoisie about the play might continue for days. However,
as Gore Vidal rightly observed, in our age it is not the theatre but film which con-
stitutes the lingua franca: "it is a universal phenomenon that whether one is at Har-
vard or at Oxford or at the University of Bologna, after the dutiful striking of atti-
tudes on subjects of professional interest, like semiology, the Ice does not break
until someone mentions the movies." (Vidal 1992, p. 2) The availability of serious
film on video has only enhanced this effect.
The universal distribution of films and video, records, CDs and music cassettes,
has made the distinction between an art-policy for the city and for the countryside
obsolete. And this is true nut only in literature but also in the visual arts. Whether
you live III a city or III the country, your daughter will appreciate rock music and
video clips. In the near future, libraries and museums will probably evolve into vir-
tual reading rooms and galleries, with reading tables becoming display windows on
screens, and collections viewed on personal computers. (See Mitchell 1995,chpt. 4)
In this age, museums are no longer places suited for meeting more or less civilised
citizens - the successors of the village pump. Their function is to serve as deposito-
ries fur VIsual images that should be made available through various channels -
books primed with high quality techniques, slides, videos, and the worldwide web
- to viewers who may he located anywhere in the world. Because these Images will
be cited and used fur new art, museums have a role not only for passive art con-
sumption, but also for the production of art: they serve as junctions III extended
networks for future art production. Museums are bridgeheads for cultures which
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may discover that their work is conceived as being valuableenough to be conserved
for later generations. They are an "obligatory passage point" for the artist's work.
Like the scientist who has conducted experiments which are never cited, the artist
whose work does not become part of this unfolding network, has made his efforts
in vain. (SeeLatour 1987) The curator's task is to select works of art to be included
in the collection - a task closely related to art criticism -, and to help actual or
remote virtual visitors to arrange the available artworks into meaningful sequences.
In the past, this task required designing display space; in the future, when digital
images of works of art are availableon servers, this task may increasingly become a
matter of software choice.
No doubt, liveperformances and expositions showing original works of art will
remain important for those who - after having listened to a CD, or look at slides
and the near-perfect reproductions that modern reproduction technologies allow -
want to see or hear more details, or expenence the "aura" of the original. (Ben-
jamin 1955) However, in any serious contemporary discussion on liveperformances
and museum expositions, the availability of telecommunications and mass trans-
port must be emphasised. True art lovers have always been prepared to travel for
their addiction: to New York, Florence, Figueras, or Bayreuth. If necessary, they
will also find the route to more remote places. Provided it is connected to modern
means of traffic and electronic communication, a museum or concert hall can be
established almost anywhere.
Language matters ~ in the arts as well as in our debates about art-policy. Before
entering into these debates armed with concepts that have their roots in nineteenth
century thought, policy-makers should become informed by the language devel-
oped in modern art. Anyone who loves the arts, should be suspicious about econo-
mists and policymakers who do not have a few modern novels on their reading list.
Dialogue
Klamer: You do a nice job deconstructing the modern concept of the city showing
by way of jovce's Ulysses that a city is much more complex than we would dare to
think in our modernist mindset. Youquite appropriately problematise the notion of
space and location. The digital revolution IS already showing its effects in this
regard. Artists who show on the Web are not bound by location: their potential
community is anyone who is surfing on the Web.
Yet, I have my doubts. What to do about the magnetic forces that make cities
like New York,Paris, and, in the Netherlands, Amsterdam attractive to the commu-
nity of artists? An artist may be working in Iowa but he knows that if he wants his
work to be a subject in the conversation about the arts he has to spend time in New
York. Doesn't this mean that a city like New York plays a special role in the world
of the arts?
no Gerard de Vries
De Vries: I think that you mix up different matters here. The question to ask is why
would anybody working in Iowa want to go to New York? What can New York
provide that is not available in Iowa City? Whatever it is, it has to he, I guess, some-
thing that is not transportable, something that cannot be captured 10 a text or an
image. It may be all kinds of things, such as face to face contact. Also non-trans-
portable is the thrill that a city gives some people. Now, if you want to explain
what the importance of New York IS for artists, you have to spell out what 000-
transportable items are important to the production of art. So what are they?
Klarncr: First I'd want to note that the production of art Involves more than paint-
ing or composing or writing. The dealers and the critics are very much part of the
production process.
De Vries: Sure. That gets us to another possible role for the city in the production
of art and that is its role in the setting of standards. You want to be famous In NY;
fame in Iowa City countS for much less. Nevertheless, I think that that has more to
do with the politics of the art world, with the power in that world, than with the
content of art. There is no doubt that the price of art is set io New York rather than
in Iowa. Then again, as you said in your Inaugural [chapter r] there is a difference
between valuing art and putting a price tag on it.
The production of scientific knowledge provides a good analogy, as I have
already suggested in my essay. Lots of scientific research is done in isolated places.
For the necessary face to face contacts scientists go to conferences which may be
organised In large cities. Otherwise, cities arc not important for the production of
scientific knowledge. Something similar may be happening in the production of art.
Klamer: So part of your argument is that there are many dimensions to the produc-
tion of art, some of which may flourish in the city and others that have no need of
the city.
De Vries: Sure, art is a complex phenomenon. Also, some forms of arts, like theatre
and opera, may be ill much more need of a big city than other art forms. Van Gogh
was not much inspired by Paris.
Klamer: But his work is now shown and traded in big cities.
De Vries: Yeah, hut with the development of the new technology all this will be less
important. Just think of video art and world wide web.
Klanter: Am I nght to suspect a bias against big city life?
De Vries: I like to live in big cities. I actually began working on this topic with an eye
on the debates about cultural policy in the Netherlands. ] presented an earlier draft
to the Dutch Arts Council when there was a debate on the bias III the allocation of
government subsidies towards the big cities.
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Klamer: 50 this is basically an argument for a better spread of the subsidies.
De Vries: It may be. More important, however, is the intellectual argument. I take
sociologists to task, many of whom have simplistic conceptions of the city. I now
think that thinking about the relationship between art and the city will produce
both more interesting concepts of the city and of the phenomenon of the arts.
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The Value of Play
MICHAEL HUTTER"
Bring two worlds together, like the worlds of economics and art, and something new
will happen. Michael Hatter, professor ofeconomics at Witten Herdecke University in
Germany,provesthepoint with hisfollowingcontributionto our conversation. As his
recent presidency of the Association of Cultural Economics should indicate, he has
done a great dealofresearch on the economics of the arts. Not content with the stan-
dard economic framework, he brought in ideas from other fields like philosophy and
communication theory. The result ofhis creative research shows here in the{ann ofa
theory ofplay.
At the time he first presented his ideas to us they werepossiblytoo fresh or novel to
make much ora difference. We struggled with the consequences ofapplying his notion
ofplay. In the meantime he has {leshed out his ideas and now their importance for the
discussion is clear. His plays ofmeaning not only encourage us to see the differences
between practices in economics and the arts, but also compel us to investigate the ways
in which they can interact. In the next rounds ofthe discussion the notion ofplay has
to play an active role.
Introduction: In Search ofa Theory ofInterdependent Self-organisation
T H RO U GH many of the contributions to this volume runs the notion that"the art world" has an existence and development apart from economicaction. It is significant that the term used is art world, not art sector. A world
is something in itself, something with a self-generated border, while a sector IS a
part of some larger entity. Art does generate products that can be recorded just like
those of any other econormc sector. Still, many observers perceive art as a social
form that has its own way of organizing itself. Marketable products are seen as
spin-offs of that process, not as its cause, as III the case of conventional industries.
Economic science has been the first among the social sciences to make the con-
cept of self-organisation productive. The concept has been continuously altered
and improved. Now, it IS faced with the challenge to model the notion of different
social worlds, and their interdependence.
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To explain this, I will briefly outline the history of self-organisation in economics.
The history begins, by most accounts, with the "invisible hand", a concept that
migrated from astronomy to "moral science" in the late rgrh century. Its applica-
tion to the structure of prices and volumes exchanged made it possible to perceive
the economic world as a set of interacting, mutually stabilizing equilibria.
That world, however, is as stable and static as the world of galaxies and planets. By
the end of the rcrh century, much more dynamic versions were in use. One of them,
particularly favored in the German literature, was based on the notion of organism.
It saw the economy as part of a SOCial entity that changed and evolved according to
laws that were homologous to those of biological evolution. Ultimately, that devel-
opment failed.There was a basic contradiction in the assumption that the elements
of the "SOCial organism" are individuals - who are, of course, organisms in them-
selves (Hutter 1994).More successful were constructions that continued the notion
of "general equilibrium", but added a SOCIal mechanism for dealing with frequent
shocks and disequilibria. Even today, Walras' auctioneer or Edgeworrh's recontract-
ing appear in textbooks under the heading "the rules of the game".
Contemporary theory has refined these dynamic aspects even further. The "the-
ory of games" has provided a structure for analyzing interdependent decision
sequences, modelled after the sequences of moves in simple board games (Leonard
1995). More ambitious are approaches that try to analyze the emergence of "spon-
taneous order" in the world of prices.
In these approaches, the notion of self-organisation becomes explicit. The tools
to model path dependency, dissipative structures or "chaos", however, are bor-
rowed from physics or chemistry. In consequence, the tools are able to explain the
self-structuring of the existing elements of a world, but not the generation of new
elements.
The current discussion is confronted with the realization that the explanation of
SOCIal worlds involves self-reference. Not a distant natural world IS being described
but a world to which theory itself belongs. How does a theory function that applies
the notion of self-organization to itself?
The answer to this question contains the solution to the problem of modelling
distinct social worlds and their interdependence. The answer is logically complex
because self-reference leads to phenomena like infinite regress and paradox which
are conventionally avoided. At this point, the notion of "play" comes into play.I
Play captures the image of a closed social world. As we will see, play also serves to
analyze the logical structure of different forms of social self-organisation. At the
same time, the notion has an intuitive appeal. That appeal has been exploited all
along: auction rules, game moves and global players are just a few of the terms that
gain their rhetorical effect through the SOCIal experience of the audience, even if
they are undefinable in the terms of the theories which they accompany and sup-
port.
Sec. I outlines the logical properties of the concept and applies it to the econom-
IC world. The major advantage of the concept, however, lies in the ability to struc-
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rure and explain the interdependence of several plays. Therefore, sec. II exemplifies
that ability by modelling the interdependence between the economic world and the
art world. Sec. JII adds the (self-referential) dimension of the world of science.
I. Play: From Action to Event
t. THE CO~STITUTIVECRITERIA OF PLAY
When I presented an earlier version of this paper at the conference that led to this
volume, I began with the proposition: "Social scientists should take plays more
seriously". The idea was to note that play is considered the counterpart of being
serious, which throws a first light on the peculiar nature of play.
However, there was an unexpected reaction to my use of the plural "plays". I
was told that, in correct English, plays are always rheater plays. If a more general
meaning IS intended, the appropriate term is "play". Whereas German, French and
Italian permit the variable use of the plural (Spiele, jeux, giochl), English usage only
knows play as an attitude, as ltl "child's play", or in "playing music". Plays, instead,
are clearly and formally defined. Most of what would be subsumed under plays in
other languages, IS called "games". Games, however, are characterized by known
rules and specific outcomes. That makes it possible to distinguish, for instance,
between a soccer game, as a regulated event with beginning, end and outcome, and
soccer play, as it takes place within the game.
The notion of play is mentioned frequently by philosophers and social scientists,
but it rarely is discussed beyond its use as a suggestive metaphor". One of the first
to explore the phenomenon empirically as well as theoretically was johan Huizin-
ga, the eminent Dutch historian>. Homo ludens, first published in 1938, is an
impressive effort to gain understanding about play(s) by gathering all the available
historical and ethnological evidence. Based on this evidence, Huizinga suggests the
following criteria for play (1956;16-18):
t) play is un-necessary and thus free action
2) play is outside of ordinary life; it interferes with the immediate satisfaction of
needs and desires
3) play is closed and limited; it runs its course and has meaning in itselrt, it has a
repeatable temporal form, and it has strict rules for its material execution
4) play contains an element of tension and chance; there is something "at stake" for
the participants.S
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Obviously, these criteria apply to a much larger set of events than only theater
plays. In fact, everyday commentary on all sorts of social processes constantly uses
metaphors like "play", "player", "winning" and "losing".
In order to pursue the suggestion, we will have to solidify our theoretical foun-
dations. The ground work in that respect has been laid by Gregory Bareson, the
anthropologist, biologist, psychologist and philosopher. Bareson combines his
observations of primitive human as well as primate cultures with his knowledge of
logical structure. His Theory of Play and Fantasy, first published III 1955, recon-
structs the notion of play in terms of a theory of Logical Types, extracted from
Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica (1910).
The key issue is closure. What is it rhat gives one the feeling that one knows
what notes and sounds are playable in a blues tune, or that one knows who belongs
to a tennis club and who does not? Bateson's answer is: the events of a play carry
messages of different logical types.
The events of a play contain concrete messages. The messages incorporate the
rules according to which messages can be used in a specificplay.Bateson (1979:r28)
calls such messages "meta-messages''." In addition, every move in a communica-
tion play carries a message about itself, namely the message: "This is play". That
message has the expanded structure: "These actions III which we now engage do
not denote what those actions for which they stand would denote". The playful nip
denotes the bite but it does not denote what would be denoted by the bite" (Bate-
son 1972:18o}.7 This type of message is paradoxical: something is, and it is not.
Such were the statements that Russell wanted to exclude from logical discourse.
But such is the double-meaning of childrens' play, of drama, of a court ritual (be it
feudal or legal), or of the exchange of money tokens. The implicit statements of
attribution or "coding" are capable of closing a discourse, of referring to its border,
beyond which there is no meaning to the moves of that particular play. Bareson
calls this level "context" or "frame" (1972:186). He emphasizes that the frame is a
premise for action, and that its determination IS, in most plays, an Implicitoutcome
of combinations of explicit rules.S
There are a number of differences between Bareson's and Huizinga's criteria.
According to Huizinga, something must be at stake to create the necessary attrac-
tion to participants, while Bareson does not stress this point. Huizinga emphasizes
the freedom of non-ordinary action. Bateson emphasizes the structure established
through the meta-communication of rules. Both authors emphasize the self-created
meamng within a bordered sequence of play.Bateson is more detailed on this pomt.
He is able to differentiate between mere-messages (rules) and context (closure) and
is thus able to explain the construction of closure in logical, not just in ethymolog-
ical terms.
The discussion leaves us with three basic criteria for a definition of play:
(I) Closure, perceived as "self-meaning"
MichaelHutter
(2) Contingency, within the boundaries of rules
(3) Chance, linked to the contribution of participants.
The discussion also clarifies the nature of the elements of plays: plays do not con-
sist of particular individuals, but of events of communication. A move m a play, or
a word in a language, is only recognizable if there is someone to understand and
thus to continue the use of the move or play.9 Plays consist of the sequence of such
events, be they small face-to-face encounters, or huge entertainment events in
which millions of persons feel part of a common process. Barcson observes: "In
ordinary parlance, "play" is not the name of an act or action; it is the name of a
frame of action" (l979:r54) - a mutual frame, the border of a particular social world
or social system. IO
Some of these issues are well known to econonusts. The status of institutions
and rules is the topic of a growmg literature, and the special character of rules is
well recognized by authors like Hayck, Coase or Williamson. Particularly those
authors who study the influence of rules have begun to realize the relevance of
"context". Douglass North (T981), for instance, has introduced the notion of "ide-
ology", and Oliver Williamson (1985) has ventured to suggest an "economics of
atmosphere". But it remains impossible to integrate such concepts mto theories
that are not built on self-reference. In order to be part of the theory, rules and con-
text must not be determined from outside, but must be generated by the elements
of the social world - or play - under consideration.
2. THE ECONOMY AS A "PLAY OF MEANING"
I will now make a first attempt to apply the suggested approach to the economy.
Does it make sense to reconstruct an economy <1S <1 play?
Three elementary types of plays or SOCial systems are generally distinguished
(Luhmann [977).
At one end of the scale are brief interactionplays. Examples are encounters on
the bus, at the play ground or at a business meeting. It is in such situations that wc
most easily apply the label "play" to signify that, despite its ephemeral nature, there
is a recognizable form, at least a beginning and an end, to the messages and actions
exchanged in the event.
Organizatiuns, the second elementary type, have set rules, and they have parti-
cipating individuals playing stable roles. j r In practice, all the conscious attempts to
acrivnate a sense of "corporate identity" or "corporate culture" try to draw the
employee into the position of the participant in a play - a play where something is
at stake for him, a play that leaves freedom for autonomous action and, finally, a
play that has meaning. n
Beyond organizations, wc know forms of social structure that are even less con-
crcte: religions, nation states, legal systems, art styles, sciences and economics ate
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examples. It may not seem immediately plausible to consider such structures -
economies being one of them - as another version of play.In the case of short-lived
interaction plays, we can watch while the play is fonnmg, we identify rather dearly
beginning and end. In the case of a legal system or an economy, however, we are
born into the playls). We learn the rules the way we learn language. Because of that
temporal extension, we have no sensation of beginning and end, of being able to
experience an outside to our way of acting out power, justice or scarcity. There is
nothing playful about being sentenced, going bankrupt or experiencing the failure
of a scientific experiment. Yet, the social process observed satisfies the criteria of
play: closure, contingency and chance. Because of their closure, everyone of these
plays has evolved its own notion of meanmg: the moves of the particular play - vot-
mg, or sentencing or paying - make sense only in the context of that play. There-
fore, I will call them Plays of Meaning.
The closure of economic plays is quite visual in the beginning. Early markets
began within demarcated spaces, separated from normal activity by boundary
stones.'! Today, we do not treat them as places for certain activities anymore, but
as a general concept. The closure of an economy is generated not through places or
rituals.w but through the use of a highly specific"play chip" which controls access
to the play, namely the use of money (Hutter 1994C). Money has meaning only
within the closed context of a specific "currency area". Even if a currency is used
worldwide, it can only be used m a clearly delineated subset of human interactions.
Depending on the currency and the financial system generating it, different aspects
of the world will be communicable as being "scarce". Scarcity is not a natural con-
dition. Scarcity becomes observable only in transactions, and there it is articulated
or communicated in terms of monetary evaluation.
Economies allow for a degree of contingency within the use of property and lia-
bility rules, the use of business practices or the operation of company stock and
currency exchanges. The contingency, in turn, permits evolutionary adaptation to
changing environments, and it permits the introduction of novelty.
The third criterion of play is also apparent: there is an obvious element of taking
chances m such money games. Whereas, m earlier times, one had to "take the gam-
ble" on a trade voyage, or on a mining project, today one can bet directly on a
change in value relations of monetary titles. "To play the game" is, in fact, the
implicit paradigm of those active in financial markets. The stakes attract a highly
trained, and highly status- and reward-oriented subset of the work force, from
young brokers ro senior central bankers. They are the ones who generate the medi-
um that reproduces the play. It is not their intention to do this. They react to
choices for action that are designed to assure the continuity of the economic play.
Again, I want to emphasize that the discussion of this paper does not deal with
orgamsations and interactions, but concentrates on the process of communication
on the level of Plays of Meaning. Clearly, the millions of organizations active III
economies play a decisive role which needs to be integrated if the theory is to be
applied to concrete phenomena. But that is a another item on the research agenda.
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The point made up to now is more basic. The basic units of reproduction, and thus
the sole agents of change, are not actors, equipped with perception, intention and
Judgment. The basic units are entities like the economic play. The play itself is the
object of self-maintenance. The traditional economic actors appear now as partici-
pants or players. Man is not interpreted anymore as the calculating homo occo-
nomicus, able to survive m the Jungle of life like Defoe's Robinson Crusoc. He or
she is Proust's and joyce's multi-faceted, multi-rational homo ludens instrumental in
continuing all the plays that make up our society.
l SCALES OF VALUE
The notion of value is central to social observations, and it has played a prommcnr
role in the history of economic thought. Using the proposed approach, one can sec
thnr we are faced with a problem of self-reference: the question is how a particular
Play of Meaning (or discourse, or social practice, etc.] finds its own rules of obser-
vation, its own priorities in describing the world. It IS symptomatic that the value
issue lost interest m economics at the point where the economic world was set
equal to the social world. If there is only one value scale, there is no need to discuss
the generation of alternative scales.
The theory of social play outlined above IS prepared to deal with different
"realms of meaning". It does not have to restrict the analysis to one value scale.
The basic structure of the problem is the following: how is a play able to observe
itself, given that plays respond only to their internal operations?'>
Plays consist of moves, the moves need rules, and rules need a context. The con-
text is the borderline or frame of the play, and yet an element of it. The context can
be alluded to in the play by referring to something called quality or value. In any
case, that value is not discussed (or "compromised") in the play. Yet, the play would
be non-existent without it. Values, then, are the medium in which plays observe
themselves."
To illustrate this very basic point, I use the formulations of authors who talk
about different scales of measurement - that of money and that of literary status.
Mirowski emphasizes the continuous reproduction of the value medium in the
world of economic transactions:
. " in a very narrowly defined sense, III a social theory of value money, is value;
but precisely because it IS socially constituted, its invariance is not guaranteed by
any "natural" ground, and must be continually maintained by further social
insrirurions, such as the development of double-entry accounting and financial
institutions such as banks" (1991:U).
Social value forms are constantly reproduced within the plays that use them. Con-
stant re-evaluation is, again, the main result of Barbara Hermstein Smith's observa-
tions on the Contingency o{Value tn the world of literature:
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"The endurance of a classical author such as Homer owes not to the alleged
transcultural or universal value of his works but, on the contrary, fa the conti-
nuity of their circulation III a particular culture. Repeatedly cited and recited,
translated, taught and imitated, and thoroughly enmeshed in the network of
intertextuality that continuously constitutes the high culture of the orthodoxly
educated population of the West. " (Smith 1988:52-53).
The value medium, then, is the construction of a particular social play. Whatever is
outside of the value scale of a particular Play of Meaning, like the economy, art or
science, is "beyond measure" because it cannot be observed III terms that make
sense in that specific play. Of course, there are always local value measures used
and reproduced in families and communities. But they do not make up for the gen-
erality of the value scales generated in the more abstract plays.
Due to their logical structure, it is impossible to conceive of a meta-play that
would permit a comparative observation of various value scales. But there is still a
way to observe their operation: one can observe the general process of construct-
ing ratios.tz Value ratios maintain the continuity of plays, particularly the large,
century-old Playsof Meaning that characterize our society. In order to say anything
more about these internal value ratios, we will have to use the same method: we
have to compare two distinct plays, and interpret the differencesobserved.
H. Valuers) in Economy and Art
1. THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF PLAYS
One particular value scale has emerged III the Economy. Economic value, expressed
in money payments, is a ratio of evaluations, hrought into equality by mutually
accepting the yardstick of money. Economic value is influenced by all participants,
but it is set by no-one - except the economic play nselt.'!
Economic value in this paper corresponds to exchange value, rather than to use
value.I9 Such a View of economic value impliesa departure from the approach com-
monly taken by economists. Usually, the social exchange value generated is inter-
preted as a reflection of the mental use values. In this paper, social value is inter-
preted as the prior event.2.0
The same world that is subject to economic valuations IS also subject to the
evaluations of other Plays of Meaning, for mstance, the play of Art. While quality
has been simplified to quantities of abstract "currencies" in the Economy, it has
been refined to subtle differences of sensual expression (visual, aural or linguistic)
in the ArtS.2I
The differences between the two evaluations are not only interesting in them-
selves. They serve a vital function. Differentiations introduced and valued in other
plays can be used in a play's self-reproduction. To put it into the form of a
hypothesis:
')0 MichaelHuuer
Plays ofMeaning, like Economy and Art, continue and maintain themselves by trans-
forming external values into internal values.
In this paper, I will limit myself to a few remarks on the mutual dependency of
these two plays. That dependency has the following logical structure:
As play A IS performed, play B constitutes the environment of play A. An effect of
the outside play B on the Inside play A can be constructed in two ways. In the first
version, B events are part of the general environment of A. Artistic performances,
for instance, are transformed mto references for new economic events. They are
used as a resource to reproduce the Income-expenditure cycle. Vice versa, econom-
ic events become a resource for literature or painting. In the more complex case, B
events are part of a separate play whose environment comingles with the environ-
ment of A. The events of B, In that case, are not themselves transformed. They
serve as a catalyst for reproduction. Such events are not referred to In A events, and
yet play A could not continue its reproduction without them. Artistic innovation,
for instance, constitutes the context or background for cconorruc communication.
Vice versa, artistic reproduction depends on the stability and continuity of its eco-
nomic context.
With this double distinction, we can now discuss four cases as indicated in the
matrix of fig.I.
SOURCE EVENTS RESOURCE EVENTS
ECONOMY
economy economy
,,'
'"
,
"" ""
economy economy
Hg.t: forms «[Relaticmships hcuocen Two Plays ofMeaning
2. THE VALUE OF ART TO THE ECONOMY
How is artistic value transformed mto economic value?
I begin with "resource events". Economic valuation often refers to natural things,
like bread, or cars, or houses. More and more, it refers to fiction - to stones, or
tunes, or Images. In artistic play, such fiction emerges constantly. The works of
imagination are built according to and evaluated by artistic quality standards. In
economic play, they appear as something that is different, difficult to do and, there-
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fore, amenable to being considered scarce. Thus, the fictional works, created m the
outside play of Art become source events for the Economy.
The implications of this argument are rather vast. A world that is inevitably run-
ning out of natural resources cannot maintain or even mcrcasc the volume of mate-
rial production at length. Creative work, however, provides an inexhaustible stream
of scarce items. The emphasis of economic evaluation is shifting from the transfor-
mation of wood and metal into payment, to the transformation of stories, tunes,
Images or performances into paymenr.P
In general, information goods are generated and distributed by global media
networks. One should expect, then, that the utilization of artistic value is also orga-
nized through such companies. As far as entertainment fiction - comics, pop music,
TV series - is concerned, such structures are easy to identify. In fact, the currently
ongoing rnaneuvres to gain market positions, like Disney Corporation's purchase
of American Broadcasting Corporation, illustrate the point.U
There are considerable exceptions to such easy cases of commercialization.
"Serious" art plays, I.e., plays that follow a more rigorous principle of self-evalua-
tion, seem to exist independently of those commercial organizations. This indepen-
dence probably reflects awareness of the conditions which a play needs to mamtam
its own vitality. We can refer back to the Huizinga-Bareson criteria for play: artistic
plays need closure; the sense of quality must be generated internally, and, because
of the sensual quality of the communication media, the number of participants
must be small. Artistic play needs the contingency of making free variations within
the "canon" of an art form, r.c., the conventions and rules that structure its events.
And, finally, artistic play needs participants who are willing to take chances. They
put their career at stake in making or developing specific artistic forms.
In fact, we do observe that agents and sponsors maintain their distance to artists
or artists' ensembles. Our explanation would be that only under such conditions
can successful artistic development be expected. In the case of financial success,
there are attempts tu determine more precisely the style and shape of the artistic
product. But even then, authors, orchestras or dance companies maintain a remark-
able degree of independence. There are, on the other hand, many examples of cases
where attempts to design artistic events according to economic values have failed.
Notwithstanding their basic organizational independence, all an forms are
transmitted or propagated through market channels. They have to conform to the
technological and financial constraints of these channels, and they have to produce
economic value for those who run the channels. In rhe case of theaters, museums
and orchestras financed by communities or federal governments, [he necessary
autonomy seems to be maintained despite the dependence on politically coded
plays. However, there is evidence that political support endangers and shapes artis-
tic activity. That general conclusion is reached by traditional analysis as well. But a
theory of play is able to specify the connections between political "source events"
and forms of artistic play (Hutter 1992a).
We now turn to the second category. Artistic source events refer to basic struc-
tures of social perception, including our perception of space and time, of self-
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expression and of common language. To give just two examples which I have doc-
umented elsewhere: The European concept of time changed in the rjth century
from a circular, repetitive pattern to a linear form under the influence of new, rbyrb-
mically organized musical pieces (Hurrer 1987). The concept of space changed III
the rjth century due to inventions In painting, particularly the invention of central
perspective (Hutrer 1992b). The change in the communication forms available
implied a change in context for the economy. It can be shown that the new spatial
conventions led to an increase In planning horizons, and to new instruments for
navigation, among other things. While the pervasive influence of another Play of
Meaning, namely Science, on the economy is well recognized, the influence of these
less visible effects of the art play on economic events has hardly been noticed.
). THE VALUE OF THE ECONOMY TO ART
How is the play of Art able to transform economic value into artistic value?
The economic "resource events" valued in artistic play are those of the "given
reality" to which an art form refers - an era's conditions of individual life, its forms
of production, its particular rationality. The dependence IS rarely as strong as III
Balzac's Comedie Humaine. But we can trace it in the visual arts as well as in musi-
cal rhearer. Contemporary art forms, like video clips or rap poetry play intensively
with the economic background of their own form.
We now turn to source events. The sources are economic transactions whose
value influences dimensions of the play of Art. Artistic evaluation takes place in
concrete artistic events - while reading a poem, while listening to a sonata, while
watching a dance performance. The players, be they individuals like authors and
dancers, or corporate entities like orchestras and publishing houses, depend on the
attribution of economic value in order to survive, physically and financially. The
Economy is, then, a reservoir from which art plays draw money income as a con-
text for the maintenance of the plays. Art participants treat income not as an objec-
tive but as a constraint. 'When revenue from non-art labor increases, they tend to
reduce the time spent in such activity (Throsby J994).
But the Economy is not simply a reservoir. It is itself a play, structured by
chances, contingency and closure. I will try to structure the further elaboration of
this point by using the three criteria stated above.
In order to bring artistic plays on the stage, economic chances have to be taken.
Publishers, film producers or art dealers take such chances. The skills involved are
those of the economic play, with all the finesse necessary for survival in competitive
markets. But they are also those of recognizing the difference and the artistic valid-
ity III a proposed manuscript, a film script or a painting.
The cconortuc play varies constantly because of the contingencies III playing
within the rules of the game. New product variations are tried out, successful prod-
ucts are introduced in new areas. The same process channels economic value mto
artistic activities. But more than that, it leads to new artistic forms with qualities
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that were not experienced in traditional forms. Rock music and comics series are
examples of such developments.
As mentioned above in discussing the reverse relationship, the closure, or self-
contained meaning, of the economic play inevitably leads to conflict. It is logically
impossible to recogmze economic value when making a change in harmonic scale
in a blues improvisation, or when mixing one's colors for a portrait. Because both
types of value are frequently reproduced in the same event, it becomes important to
indicate cleatly which play one intends to move in. The self-styling of artists and
the condescending attitude toward commercial activity serve an important function
in distinguishing artistic value against a specific background, namely economic
value. The strategy, however, only works for the artist. The gallery owner or liter-
ary agent must be able to have a more ambivalent approach. We find the strongest
conflicts of value in persons and organizations that want to maintain their partici-
pation - and thus their social existence - in both plays. To sustain the tension, a
considerable ability to tolerate ambiguity is demanded. That ambiguity, in turn, is a
central condition for evolutionary SOCial change.s-s
To conclude: Plays of Meaning have evolved as fonns of differentiation within
the general communication of a society. They are characterized by their different
value media. They mutually depend on the values generated by other Plays of
Meaning for the continuity of their own self-reproduction.
III. The Scientific Value ofPlay
What, then, is the value of introducing the notion of play into social science, espe-
cially into observations of the Economyzw
I will mention five arguments, each of which implies a somewhat different theo-
retical approach.
I) There are individuals and organisations who oprimize values measured by some-
thing different from money, for instance, something which they call themselves
"artistic quality". For a theory of [mono-lrarional choice, this is an anomaly. For a
theory of social play, it is easy to explain the co-existence of different modes of
rationality. One may study the pure case, where economic rationality is reduced to
a constraint, or the complex case where the values of the play outside of the one
just being played are used as value references (source events and resource events).
2) The use of the public good notion is an attempt to grasp the economic value of
that condition which, in the theory of social play, has been called closure. The
frame or context for the economic play, or for its various sub-plays, is, in a way, a
public good. But it is not a public good In the sense of a modest deviation, like
operating a SWimming pool or having access to fishing grounds. The experience of
closure, the performance of a value frame or context is public in the sense in which
a background is public to a figure: it defines its existence. Given that relationship,
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one can go on to explain prohibitions built into the rules of the econorruc or the
artistic play which serve to prevent the intended or unintended destruction of the
value frame in which the play in question operates.
3) An old tradition still expresses the economic process in terms of the production
of goods. That has the advantage of focusing on value generated for (monerary)
transactions, hut the premise of the approach is material transformation. The theo-
ry of social play, in contrast, focuses on the preparation, performance and repeti-
tion of events. It is no coincidence that this descnption IS SImilar to that usually
employed for transactions. The theory draws attention to the aspect that every
transaction is an event in one or more plays. It also draws attention to the perfor-
mance of event-generating industries, like telecommunication and entertainment.
The staging of an opera, be it al stagione or in repertory, becomes a paradigmatic
case for the new event-centered economy.
4) Contemporary theories of evolutionary economic change have experimented
with the notion of self-organizing or autopoietic systems. Self-organizing systems
are usually thought of in analogy to physical, anorganic systems. The concept of
auropoieric systems was imported from biology. There, the notion refers to the
ability of cells and higher organisms to reproduce themselves. Introducing the
theory of social play, the analogy can be extended. Biological systems accomplish
reproduction by differentiating between genotype and phenotype reproduction.
The reproduction of plays has much in common with the process of genetic repro-
duction: information is continuously copied and reproduced, closure and rules
insure the stability of the information complex, only a few variations are able to
survive m a given social context. Such variations operate, at first, in a state of
ambiguous interpretation, until they are selected as a recognizable alternative.
The relationship between the theory of play and the theory of individual choice
can be expressed in these terms: play theory deals with the process of genetic
change; it works with the assumption that the actions of phenotypes are the geno-
types' way of achieving reproduction.w Choice theory deals with the process of
phenomenal change; it works from the assumption that there is only one genotype
of communication. Since the relationship is, in fact, circular, both assumptions need
to he adjusted in order to reflect that condition.
However, we are not dealing with a symmetric case of cornplemenrariry, On
one hand, there is a theory with a solid tradition, empirical validation and wide dif-
fusion, based on the observation of visible actions. On the other hand, there IS a
rather embryomc theory with untested connotations and implications, based on
the observation of imputed observations.
5) The attitude toward public good type problems is still one that favors political
intervention. However, there is a widespread consensus that, particularly with
respect to the provision of cultural goods, we observe state failure as well as market
failure. Any conscious intervention or support, no matter how well-intended, has
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side effects and risks the destruction of the supported play's internal valuation
process. The theory of social play favors policy approaches imported from individ-
ual therapy and organization consultancy. The first tenet is the self-determined
nature of the "client system". In cases where the interference is permanent, the
interaction between the plays should be one of mutual valuation - on the level of
organizations as well as on the more abstract level of recognizing values of the
other Play of Meaning. All other interferences should be designed so as to make
themselves superfluous after a while.
Dialogue
Klamer: Your concept of play appears to be the most pertinent way to characterize
the various realms of practices that we have distinguished in our discussions. It
helps us to distinguish economy and art as different plays of meaning, yet, at the
same time, you provide us with a framework with which to investigate the ways
these two interact. At any rate, I found support in your discussion for my convic-
tion that a study of the world of the arts compels us, economists, to change our
strategy and look for an alternative framework. I see remarkable similiariries
between our approaches as you, like myself, show the differences between the
world of the economy and of the arts.
Huller: I agree. The scientific approach of standard economics uses a particular
analytical framework for all SOCIal phenomena. It undoubtedly gives you a coherent
way of looking at things but the coherence is in the economic nature of the phe-
nomena. But even without recognizing it you will presume one unique value scale;
that value scale may make perfect sense in the economic world but only limited
sense in the artistic world. The problem is rather how to deal with value scales that
diifer from one realm of discourse to another. That issue is unknown to economic
theory as we know it.
Klamer: On that point we agree.
Hutter: It's a bold statement to make, though. I have found that in order to account
for different value scales you need to turn to a more general social theory. That is
what I am trying to do here. With the four types of relationship that I indicate in
the matrix, I try to indicate possibilities for studying the interactions between the
economy and art as interactions between two different plays.
Klamer: As president of the association of cultural economics you have tried to get
this message across to an audience of economists. Does it work?
Hutter: I find that the juxtaposition of economy and art brings out the existence of
different scales in the most evident way. The continuous public disussion between
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those two worlds makes the dash in values obvious. That makes it hard for econo-
mists to ignore its existence. As a consequence you find a lot of research along
these lines in cultural economics. I list the major issues in the final section of my
paper; the most essential one is the quality issue because there is no way to explain
the fact that artists have their own quality. In cultural economics you find very
imaginative applications of traditional economic tools to these phenomena, but
you also find increased readiness to turn to alternative approaches because of the
scope of the problem.
Klamer: Do you see significant differences between our approaches?
Hutter: I find that your emphasis on communication and on value makes a very
strong common point. With my approach I immediately see for instance the differ-
ence between the communication of scientists on one side, and the communication
of the participants in the economy on the other side. That fits in with your rherori-
cal approach. I only feel that many of the strong inruirions of your approach, and
also much of the broad literature which you tap can be structured 1I1 a more sys-
tematic way by using my framework.
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The Artistic Conscience and the
Production of Value
HANS ABBING
Hans Abbing is one of those rare economists who combine an academic profession
with a successful career as an artist. During a little less than halfa year he teaches eco-
nomicsoftheartsat Erasmus University and doesresearch in the field ofcultural eco-
nomics and during the other half of the year he paints and makes photographs. Both
his economic work and his artistic work have drawn significant attention. In his eco-
nomics he starts from the standard analysis but mixes in concepts and arguments
which he borrows (rom sociologists, such as Pierre Bourdieu. He has always main-
tained that he keepsthe realmofhis art and that ofeconomicsstrictlyseparate. In the
(olluwing piece, however, he copes with the differences as he hasexperienced them in
hisown workinglife.
T H E HIGH value of art and culture is produced and continuously repro-duced.' The underlying forces in production, including its motivation, arethe same as In other spheres of production. But the means of production
differ. A peculiar artistic conscience emphasizes selflessness and compels the artist
to overlook the economic value of what he or she produces. On second thought,
however, we will show that the underlying forces are the same as elsewhere in eco-
nomics. On the other hand a similar mechanism of denial of economic value may
apply to much wider areas in economics.
An Example: The PeculiarExchange between the Artist and His Dealer
For the past few years rhave been fighting over money with my dealer. He owes me
money. His arrears extend to payments due over almost two years and that IS too
much - even in an area where everybody IS always short of money. My dealer is
short of money, of course, but I have found out that he owes me more than any of
his other artists. \Vby me? Maybe I was toO easy on him 111 the past. I did not put
up fights. $0 a year ago I changed my tactics and became tough. I remain polite, hut
every time I see him, I bring up the Issue of money. I write letters in which I threat-
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en to involve a collection agency. This new strategy makes a difference; but not in
the way it should. He is as much in debt to me as before but now he IS afraid of me.
He does not put up any new shows and leaves me out of his other activities as well.
What am I doing wrong? Is there something my colleagues do that I do not?
Meanwhile, I have found out that my colleagues and my dealer play a game that
I do not. As soon as my dealer has a little bit of money, he will pay the artist to
whom he can do the greatest favour with that amount. It might be the artist who
did not claim her lawful rights as I did, but instead came to him with a heartbreak-
IIlgstory about freezing III her studio, and about trying to stir the paint which was
thickening due to the cold, all because she did not have any money left for the heat-
mg. Or it might be the colleague who got hysterical and shouted awful insults at
my dealer after which they made up and became even better friends afterwards.
Now my dealer has paid him and so has shown his generosity, which IS even greater
because of the earlier insults.
The game, therefore, is about generosity. My dealer has to be able to play the
part of the generous man. It IS a role that history gave him: he has to be the meace-
nas. Never mind that the artist is actually sponsoring him with an interest-free loan.
The play places a taboo on making our relationship like a normal business relation-
ship. I do not play the game right because I do not give him the chance to play his
generous part.
Yet, my dealer's behavior in playing this game may be irrational. He stands to
lose one of his better selling artists. Changing his role could be more advantageous,
at least in the short run. But he seems to be stuck III this game of his and is proba-
bly too old to learn a new game. Anyway, the game he knows may be more prof-
itable in the long run.
I am as bad at changing my game. Apparently I have never been able to inter-
nalise the rules of his game. One reason might be that I started off as an economist
and only later on went to art-school. Whatever, the game is serious . -One has to
believe in its importance and its rewards. It has proven hard to play the game con-
sciously and deliberately, as I have tried. Only those who do not intend to play the
game, seem good at it. Unintentionality is typical for the habitus of the arts as
elswhere.> The artistic game calls for a particular set of beliefs and attitudes. I
myself may believe that my habitus is more advanced and less hypocritical than that
of my dealer. But if I am reasonable I may have to face the possibility that we expe-
rience a dash of incomparable mentalities which have their own rhetorics. We will
come back to this issue.
Giftsversus Exchange in the Arts
It should be noted that an element of patronage is not limited to the exchange
between artist and dealer. It is omnipresent in the arts. Almost any sale of art - by an
artist to a consumer or by a dealer to the director of a museum - is accompanied by
gifts or at least gestures which belong to the realm of favours and not the realm of
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exchange. One could state that transactions in the arts are supplemented by gifts -
the gift relationship supplementing the exchange relationship. But one could also
regard these dealings, including the gestures, as costs of transactions. There certain-
ly exists all intermediate zone III which the gift can be just as primary as the
exchange. However, money transactions, like the one between me and my dealer,
are inevitable and omnipresent in modern society, while the connected gift-rela-
tions could, technically, be done without. The issue here is how we conceive what
happens in the latter case. We are free to look at it either way. For the people
involvedthe perception of a gift as a gift is essential. But for the economist it may be
more useful to think in terms of transaction costs instead of supplementing gifts.
The transactions involved, and particularly the transactions which involve gifts
as additional costs, are idiosyncratic. For example, most transactions III the arts are
not anonymous. Consequently, the personal characteristics of the partner in trade
will matter. The nature of the trade and its costs will depend on them. This is most
of all true for the costs which we call gifts. The nature of the gifts that my dealer
will offer me, will depend on me and my personal circumstances. He could payoff
his debt to me when I run into unanticipated financial problems or he may offer to
transport my paintings when my car has broken down} In both cases he gets a
chance to be generous.
Idiosyncratic exchange is widespread in the arts. In order to trade with one
another the parties develop skills and social relations - cultural and social capital
we call those - which result in the creation of so-called transaction specific capital. 4
This capital functions exclusively or primarily within their mutual trade. For
instance, the gallery owner builds up a clientele which will lose almost all their
value when a particular artist leaves. Artists and their intermediates invest in each
other, most of all in each other's reputation. When one party breaks off the rela-
tion, it will have to incur considerable transaction costs in order to develop a new
relationship with another partner. The transaction-specific investments are costs as
well as gifts. They serve mutual interests. Although they are not specified in con-
tracts, they will be monitored. If one party is negligent, the other party will give
warning signals or gradually drop the, often implicit, contract.
Transaction-specific investments are costs of transactions and gifts at the same
time. Some form of return is anticipated. But nobody can be sure whether the
return will actually materialize and if so, in what form. The uncertainty of such
investments in the arts can be quite high. r may start to visit a certain gallery regu-
larly, III the hope that the owner willgradually recognize me, talk with me and even
start to like me. After a while I will volunteer compliments. I may take one of my
regular customers to his gallery, who may be tempted to a deal. All of this I do for
the off chance that when I am completely fed up with my own dealer, this gallery
owner may take me on. But I have no guarantees. Other one-way investments or
gifts in the arts are imbedded in an even more complicated structure of circum-
stances and relations than this one, involvingeven greater uncertainties.
I should add, however, that the uncertainty of the return does not necessarily
differentiate gifts from other forms of inverstments. The main difference is in the
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perceptions of the agents. Those who are into giving may not want ro perceive
what they do as making an investment. Economists, however, may very well under-
stand what they do in terms of investment. It is possible that the investor can only
properly invest if he sincerely believes in the gift-character of his investment. But
depending on the research question it is often preferable for the economist to rhink
in terms of investments.
Reward and Self-Reward in a Selfless Arts-Sector
With the commercial dimension III the arts veiled, rewards and interests directing
the artists' behaviour are often covered up and denied. The arts are supposed to be
selflessand selflessness does not accord with an awareness of interested behaviour.
But In the arts selflessness IS important exactly because it generates income.
The rewards in the arts are both monetary and non-monetary. Prestige and sta-
tus are the main components of the latter. Prestige generally coincides with finan-
cial income bur that is not always the case m the arts. Artists who have just left art
school have a relatively high prestige - be it temporarily. Yet at the same time they
hardly have any income.
The origin of the high prestige of artists dates from the Renaissance and the
emergence of the character of the individual. Before that people were submerged
in the collective with its dear standards of right and wrong. Now, in a process of
individualisation, people are required to be individuals, each with his own con-
science. Not unlike the loss of a parent, the loss of the collective must have been
painful in many ways. The compensation came In the form of pride about one's
independence.
Until the present day artists have symbolised this spirit of independence. Their
work is seen as authentic. If the director of Shell dies today, tomorrow somebody
else will have raken his place; he is replaceable. But if Karel Appel dies, no more
"appels" will be produced. Artists are the representative independent individuals of
our civilisation and thus they are the embodiment of the spirit of the Renaissance.
A deep underlying wish of our society to be independent, authentic and irreplace-
able is Involved. This is why we are more than happy to treat artists with special
regards. It also explains part of the high value of art and culture.
The idealising of individuality through public authenticity may also account for
the resistance towards making money and interests explicit in the arts. We want the
artist, our model-individual, to be a truly independent individual who furthermore
is selflessand cares only about the authenticity of his work and not about the finan-
cial rewards.
Opposite to this thinking the economic perspective encourages to think in
terms of interests and rewards. Yet even some colleagues in economics seem to
want to reserve at least a bit of the sacredness of the arts. In discussions they pre-
sent examples which demonstrate that self-interest cannot account for all behavior.
To account for the apparent sacrifices that artists make, the neoclassical economist
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may evoke the concept of self-reward: the artists reward themselves. This may be a
useful notion. But one should realize that self-reward can never be a category inde-
pendent of interest In general. As we shall see, it is always produced by a mentality
or conscience which was developed before and which serves the interests of the
individual artist or his group or both.
Exchange betweenthe Arlistand His Conscience
As my earlier example indicated, the typical artist works more with his conscience
than agents in other markets. Because artists are supposed to be autonomous,
beginning artists avoid commissions; they do not want to be dependent on the
demands of a principal. Therefore, they will first produce and afterwards try to sell
in the market. This IS what their artistic conscience tells them. They may consider
the rewards of the markets as pleasant, but they are unimportant. \X1hat matters IS
the reward of their own conscience: and that came in the form of the self-reward
we rncnnoncd before. Without knowing it this behavior may serve them wellin the
long run.
As an artist I have become quite aware of this mechanism, possibly stimulated
by my work as an economist. \X1hen I am drawing, I am all the time communicating
with an rmagutar)' artistic conscience. Ever so often it tells me to change my draw-
ing because it is developing in a way which 1S cheap, superficial, decorative or,
worst of all, "commercial". Another time it is too arty, conceptual or phoney. Fol-
lowing the directions of my artistic-conscience I execute a form of self-censorship.
The censorship does not seem to relate to any market perspective. In my case I
have personified my conscience; it often speaks to me through one or more per-
suns who look over my shoulder. Sometimes they have names like the names of
colleagues. From time to time they allow me to compromise. One person may
allow me to be slightly decorative in one drawing, while another gets his extreme
avant-garde way in another drawing. They argue with my short and long term mar-
ket mtcresrs in mind. But this is denied. As artists they have to pretend to he only
interested in art itself. (Some of my colleagues recogmze my account of the person-
ification of the conscience but do not have discussions and certainly do not admit
compromises. In my case it must be the dash between the habitus of the economist
and the habitus of the artist which leads to these weird imaginations.I
The artist wishes to believe that his conscience is his own. He invented it or
was born with it. If not, he would not be fully independent. But in reality we have
assimilated the rules, which govern interpersonal exchange in the art sector. We
want to ignore that, because for their proper functioning we have to believe them
to be personal.
The artistic conscience is reflected in the rules of the game that we came across
III the artist-dealer exchange. The conscience will even prescribe body postures and
accents in speech. Rhetorical codes are important as well. Prominent in this con-
science is the code to dcny the economic dimension of what artists do.
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In the case of the visual artist, the conscience also contains rules on formats, mate-
rials, subjects and above all on the grammar of the visual "language" used in visual
art.S Even implicit rules exist on the amount and nature of "grammatical" changes
which will be accepted by the art world. If they go beyond certain limits they will be
refused.
The actual practice of twentieth century visual art seems to contradict the self-
censorship on the basis of an artistic conscience. Many critics observe that alllimi-
rations in arts have disappeared. ''Anything goes" is the dogma. I doubt it. Similar
opinions have been proclaimed before. But then as now, even a relatively minor
"grammatical" change can hit hard. At its conception it hurts." It is like sitting too
close to the screen in the cinema. Up close everything appears to be scattered and
disconnected. Only from a distance or in hindsight do the continuity and the limit-
ed range of artistic innovation become clear. I would not be surprised if the future
will relativize the alleged artistic freedom of the present do's and dent's. As a visu-
al artist I am impressed by the dominant nature of the commands and bans and of
the pressure that the art world puts on me with its do's and dont's. I have internal-
ized these standards in my artistic conscience and replaced them by self-censorship.
Indirect Orientation on the Market Including GovernmentMarkets
When an artist deals with his conscience, he indirectly deals with the market. His
own market experiences, and more so, those of his teachers and the teachers of his
teachers have crept into his conscience. One's conscience offers an indirect and
veiled way to direct one's production decisions towards long term market demand.
In the short run a more conscious and direct orientation may be effective, but that
might violate the ban on money-orientation. In the long run the artist stands to
gain most from high esteemed autonomy and selflessness. This esteem generates
money as well as prestige.
At times the market will change relatively rapidly, making the market experi-
ences of established teachers obsolete. After criticism and rebellion art schools will
replace them by younger teachers. The replacement will of course be motivated in
artistic terms.
In contrast to most other artists, teachers tend to be quite successful. In a coun-
try like the Netherlands they are effectivein commercial interactions with local and
central government as well as with government-financed institutions. Apart from
the subsidies, the Dutch government completely dominates the demand side of the
visual arts market." \Vhen we include subsidies the domination is even stronger.
These subsidies, incidentally can be treated as gifts from a selfless government, but
it is more fruitful to look at subsidies from the point of view of exchange. A market
for subsidies can be said to exist. Artists offer certain performances in exchange for
subsidies, but they will never say they do so. Accordingly, governments get some-
thing in return for their subsidies.
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At this stage I may just as well admit that most ofren Mr. Fuchs, the director of the
Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam, is looking over my shoulder. It is the most presti-
gious museum of modern art In the Netherlands and it is government funded.
Every now and then I replace him by a member of the committee of the Ponds vour
de Beeldende Kunst, which decides on the most prestigious government grant, the
werkbeurs. \Vhether I am aware of it or not, I orient myself to the market demand
of the central government. I am fully aware of the fact that this demand differs from
the demand of the local government and from that of the public and of business.
While being completely honest to my artistic conscience, I nevertheless seem to
have learned my lesson well, because last year I received one of these much coveted
grants. It rurns out that III spite of its official proclamations the central government
is not neutral or selfless as it prefers certain art and certain styles above others.f
Would it not have been more rational if I had Imagined representatives of the
local government as my censors? Many more artists receive a basic Income from
the local government than from the centra! government. (Among other channels
they receive substantial lending rights from so called 'artotheken' - artlibraries,
which are typically Durch.) \Vhen we consider prestige, the uncertainties involved
in the focus on the central government are much greater, but so are the rewards. It
turns out that the central government is able to give prestige, much more so than
the local government. That could render my behavior rational. The situation is dif-
ferent when it comes to money income exclusively. To earn an income, young
artists do better focussing on the local governments. Their teachers, however, con-
vey to them the message, implicitly or explicitly that they should focus on the cen-
tral government. This focus leads them into a trap as the demand of central gov-
ernment of only for a very small group. Accordingly, many artists do not learn the
codes which are necessary for carering to other parts of the market. frustrated,
they leave the market - often after a long time of trying in vain to find a demand for
their art. In no other profession are people so persevenng. This must be due to the
magic of the arts. Possibly the many failures and drop-outs serve the art communi-
ty well because they confirm the magic. The earnings and prestige of the successful
part of the profession rely on this magIC and so depend on the many failures. The
failures eo-produce the high value of art and culture.
The Subordination ofthe Interests ofIndividual Artists
to Those ofthe Profess/on
In view of this possibility, that the many failures of individual artists serve the group
interest, it IS more than likely that group interests sneak into the habitus or, more
specifically, into the artistic-conscience. The purpose of the artistic conscience is
the coordination of individual actions 1Il order to attain collective goals, even when
the short term interests of the individual conflict with those collective goals. The
concept of the habitus offers a solution to the free-rider problem which economists
have not even started to acknowledge. In many cases outside force is not called for,
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because the force has already been Internalized. External force is replaced by inter-
nal self-censorship.
In the case of the arts the rules of the game serve the purpose of tuning and,
when necessary, subordinating the short term Interests of separate artists to the
long term interest of the profession. Maybe the significance of failures for the pro-
fession in producing the high value of art is questionable. But the long term market
interest of the group in providing a product of high standards is clear.Many rules In
the artistic conscience are in some way or another related to this aim.
The interest involved in keeping the group of relatively successful and better
rewarded artists ~ the profession in a narrow sense - small, is also evident. In, for
instance, the medical professions the same interest is at work. In the arts keeping
the group small is only more difficult. The medical profession controls the educa-
tion and so controls entry to the profession. Since the days of the French
"Academic Royale" such control over the entry m the arts is impossible. Even if
artists tried, the gains would be offset by the losses due to the damage done to the
magic of the arts. Overt monopolisation of entry does not accord with the idea of
artistic autonomy. And the latter idea is profitable, as we have seen.
At the same time the importance of limiting the ranks of money making is more
urgent than in any other profession. The same magic which prohibits monopolisa-
tion, continuously produces an abundance of new artists. Together they supply
much more than the demand side can absorb. Without some control the pressure
on the incomes of the earning ranks would become unbearable. Therefore, an
implicit contract provides an informal monopolisation. The artistic conscience
develops a sense about who is a true artist and who is not. The artistic conscience
then draws a line between those who are accepted and those who are excluded.
My colleagues and I are forever discussing the degree to which we and more dis-
tant colleagues stay true to the artistic conscience. Often we will blame someone
for violating the rules ignoring the possibility that his rules may be right in a 'lower'
echelon of the art world. It may be a reason to ban him, in thought at least. We do
our best to articulate our grievances as much as possible in artistic terms. (1 person-
ally hope that my inability to play ill terms of gifts will not lead to my full exclusion
from the profession, but r am sure that it hinders my career. A degree of exclusion
is certainly present}
Informal monopolisation and exclusion work better when the criteria for exclu-
sion are so complicated that strict application is impossible. When one tries to pin
down the criteria, the monopolizing party can honestly deny their existence. More-
over, it can point to important exceptions: artists who got through even though
they did not fit the obvious criteria. The complicated criteria therefore call for a
complicated conscience. Because a complicated conscience can never be learned
from a textbook, young artists need colleagues and teechers.s The better art
schools will recruit their teachers from the ranks of relativelysuccessful artists with
the result that their students are able to learn the rules a lirtle better. This process of
indirect co-opration as a form of informal monopolisation goes on which is highly
efficient.
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A Veiled Economy; The Economists' Habitus versus the Artists' Habitus
The picture which emerges is one of a veiled economy. Contrary to appearances
the arts sector is no less inrerest and reward oriented than any other sector of activ-
ity. \Xfhether actual exchange is concerned or decisions regarding production or
investment, the underlying mreresrs must be covered up and denied. But I should
stress that this mechanism does not operate exclusively III the arts. Other sectors
know it as well. It is a difference of degree. The arts are extreme in this regard.
We should take care not to fall into the trap of value Judgements. Seen from the
outside, the arts appear to be "hypocritical" In their denial of interests. If one values
a degree of selflessness, as I do, any fake selflessness feels wrong. Bur the very fact
that the necessity to deny interests is a part of the arts habitus which cannot be
freely dismissed, invalidates any Judgement.
There is something to be gained by the application of a different rhetoric, as I
am doing here, even though it hurts. I have to admit that there is a bit of a teaser
in me who likes to provoke by unmasking false pretences. Words which are new
to a habitus will hurt, just like good new art will hurt.'? Rhetorical economists
stress the many misunderstandings different rhetorics produce. Yet the clash of
different rbetorics often has a "progressive" side to it, which is probably underex-
posed III rhetoncal economics. Fundamental change or "progress" will almost
always be accompanied by a clash in rhetorics - rhetorics being an important part
of the habitus.
Instead of "condemning" the arts one could take an opposite and relativistic
stand. If one habitus is superimposed on another, as is done in this paper, anom-
alies are hound to arise. As the habitus of the economist or the scientist is probably
Just as "fucked up" or interest bound as the arts habitus, true conclusions can never
be drawn. I do not agree. There will be some misunderstanding, bur because of it
there will also be the generation of knowledge. More so if the scientist is prepared
to be reflexive about his own interest-bound position in his own field. !I After all,
we are looking at phenomena which often exceed the limits of separate fields. For
instance, there is also a tendency 111 economics to veilor deny economics, although
to a lesser degree.'> This points in the direction of the presence of mechanisms
(laws?) which go beyond the habitus.
A Peculiarand Anachronistic Arts Sector
An anachromstic picture of the arts emerges. Uncertainties turn out to be typical
for the arts. High profits are reserved for a very small group of artists and their
intermediaries. These are based on the unpaid labour of a large group who arc des-
tined to become failures. It sounds like the exploitation in early capitalism.u
The atmosphere around exchange and trade makes one think of even earlier
times. In exchange the personality of the other partner matters. Exchange is highly
idiosyncratic. Moreover, almost all exchange, between artist and dealer, between
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dealer and customer, is moulded into a form uf patronage. as In the feudal times.
Outdated as the economy of the arts may be, it does not imply irrationality.
The arts would be irrational if its participants would be better off if they became
less 'hypocritical'. Their 'hypocritical' behavior earns them money and esteem.
Accordingly, this peculiar economy is consistent with the interests of the artists
themselves.
There may be another lesson as well. Although the phenomenon of partly non-
monetary exchange is likelyto be more widely spread and visible in the arts than it
IS elsewhere, it most likely exrsrs in other sectors of economic activity as well. I am
sure that a veiled economy is omnipresent, whether we like it or not. In that case
our "modern" economy would not be that modern after all.
Implicitly we have been dealing extensively with 'the value of culture'. In the
production and reproduction of value the habitus with its artistic conscience plays
a donunant role. Market success is still the main Indicator of value. But this
indicator is veiled. Ever so often interests assure forms of generosity. Investments
become gifts.
Dialogue
Klamer: Hans, r am very grateful to your for having written this down. It is a won-
derful piece of anthropological research. Drawing on your own expencnces you
show us how intricate the so-called commercial transactions in the world of arts
are. Hutter's notion of the play comes immediately to mind. You have heen quite
critical of attempts to bring culture into the study of the economics of the arts,
especially of my attempt to conceptualise art as something different, with values
that are beyond measure and therefore do not lend themselves quite well to com-
mercial transactions. In this regard you do help me though by showing how differ-
ent the world of art production is compared to, say, the world of car production.
Abbing: I don't think I can help you. 011 the contrary. I will not deny that different
practices exist m different areas of production. The underlying principles, however,
are the same. All apparent selfless behavior can be explained by interest, or, as m
the case of the artistic conscience, by long term group interests.
Klamer: That may be so. The fact remains that we have to account for the differ-
ences. We may want to understand why in friendship and in religion, bur to some
extent also the arts, we avoid measurement and monetary exchange.
Abbing: It is certainly true that not all things can be measured in terms of money.
There IS a lot of uncertainty involved, in the arts maybe more so than in other areas.
Bur there is uncertainty elsewhere as well. Think of the car manufacturer you men-
tioned who may have to decide on a new trade mark. Nobody can tell what the
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returns will be if you choose one over the other. The difference, however, may he
dramatic. The difficulry of measurement is certainly not limited to the arts.
Another pomt is that in the arts as elsewhere interest cannot always be deter-
mined only from the individual perspective. The mdividual may very well have
assimilated group interest in his conscience and allow that conscience to overrule
his own interest. That IS how apparently selfless hchavior can be explained.
Klamer: Bur that may also explain why we, in so many cases, get around the cash
transaction.
Abbing: I fully agree. The cash aspect is only a limited aspect. The question IS
whether you stay with thinking 10 terms of interest or introduce metaphysics.
Klamer: I'd prefer to think of values.
Abbing: Values are part of the habitus. They serve interests. I'd prefer to use my
social science as much as possible, as long as I can make sense with it.
Klamer: By the way, did you let your dealer read this?
Abbing: No, he would feel very hurt.
PART THREE
On Culture
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Political Culture and the Economic
Value of Citizenship
A French-Dutch Comparison in the Nineteenth Century
FRANCES GOUDA
As should be dear by now, culture does not play a role in standard economic dis-
course. The values that groups ofpeople may share are not a discriminating factor in
economic models. Scholars who operate outside economics often respond in dismay
to the blindness ofeconomics to everything cultural. I tend to agree and would argue
that economists have sufficient reason to take culture seriously in their research.
Dutchness may very well matter for the way the Dutch economy functions in com-
parison to, say, the American or the Indonesian economies. So I have invited scholars
from three different disciplines, history, political science and economics, to try their
skills in an exploration ofthe relationship between economics and culture. The first is
Prances Gouda, a historian who has recently published on the culture of Dutch cola-
nionalism and the cultural contrasts in the welfare systems ofFranceand the Nether"
lands in the nineteenth century'. She has been a fellow ofthe Woodrow Wilson censer
and, most recently a Fulbright scholar. Presently she is a researchassociate professor at
George Washington University.
One aspect that has pmticularly intrigued me in her work is, apart from her inter-
est in the value of culture, her attention to the rhetorical practices that support and
infonn any particular arrangement. After all, it was through interest in rhetoric that I
came to the subject of the value of culture. Here Gouda compares and contrasts the
rhetorical practices that frame Dutch and French attitudes towards poverty in the
nineteenth century.
T H IS STORY is about two different cultural constructions of the economicvalue of citizenship in an era that constituted the melancholy afterglow ofthe French Revolution's Intellectual fireworks. The ideal of the French revo-
lutionaries was to entrench an entirely new model of civicequality. They hoped for
the birth of a modern political culture that would embrace a set of economic, social,
and political entitlements to be shared equitably by each and every citizen, paid for
by collectively home obligations. But the Protean visions of the makers of the Rev-
olution, which they marched across the borders of the French nation and tried to
impose upon a variety of neighboring European countries such as the Netherlands,
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produced a different cultural understanding of the economic value of citizenship
during the nineteenth century.
Whether grounded in the primordial intuitions or revolutionary passions of a
particular collectivity of people, national culture tends to acquire its real signifi-
cance In the humdrum realities of daily life. In most societies, the mundane rourines
of day-to-day existence sanction the meaning of culture and institutionalize the
economic worth of citizenship. However, well-to-do citizens' social power and
their ability to pay substantial taxes granted them rights, such as a more com-
manding voice in the body politic, that were superior to their downtrodden com-
patriots, despite the putative equality of all (male) citizens in a brave new post-Rev-
ulutionary world.
But if we view the nation as a "structured moral community," then national cit-
izenship should also incorporate a component of mutual empathy, or the forms of
"fellow-feeling" that Adam Smith In his Theory of Moral Sentiments claimed all
human beings naturally harbor for each other. Adam Smith, in fact, was keenly
aware that the human capacity for compassion was imbricated In almost all politi-
cal cultures, even if such altruistic sentiments tended to fall outside the orbit of clas-
sic economic stimuli alone. Adam Smith, in other words, did not dismiss culture
and human empathy as merely trivial matters that belonged to the realm of fairy
tales or utopian dreams. Instead, he implied that econonuc development, the con-
stantly changing configuration of national identity, and the "history of notion-for-
mation" collectively played a role in defining and entrenching the economic worth
of citizenship within most national communities.'
Accordingly, In this essay I explore the ways in which "the structured moral
communities" of France and the Netherlands attached a differenteconomic value to
the rights and burdens of citizenship. I do so by comparing Dutch and French
rhetoric of poverty and social welfare during the decades following the French Rev-
olution. Distributing charity to fellow-citizens entailed a set of judgments about the
socio-economic significance of poor citizens, who were deemed either worthy or
unworthy of the financial goodwill of their wealthier compatriots. Implicit in the
rhetorical legacy of the French Revolution was the aspiration that penniless labor-
ing men in either industry or agnculture presumably shared the same economic
rights that more affluent citizens enjoyed. However, social supenors inflicted an
array of legal regulations and moral injunctions upon their less fortunate fellow cit-
izens, which marked and restrained the arduous lives of poor folk. Contemporary
bourgeois judgment tended to restrain the behavior of peasants and the working
c1ass(es). They were relegated to the rustic periphery or the murky underbelly of
civil society, ostracized by "a moral condemnation" which isolated the poor and
transformed them into the dangerous classes, a designation they routinely appro-
priated for themselves." While III theory human dignity and social belonging con-
stituted the umversal attributes of citizenship and manhood 111 the post-revolution-
ary universe, in reality humble peasants and laborers (and women, who were
technically excluded from citizenship) were often relegared to a shadowy world
that did not exhibit either economic merit or social honor.
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But patterns of causality also flowed the other way. The consequences or side
effects of poverty - which induced the poor either to try to find more work and
earn higher wages or prompted them to beg, steal, or riot - molded the elites' atti-
tudes, too, and shaped their ideological predispositions. The conduct of needy peo-
ple who were the objects of bureaucrats' and politicians' concerns, those whom
they tried "to persuade, subdue, cajole, or repress," also affected policy strategies,
either positively or negatively) How politicians talked about the economic value of
citizenship and the moral imperatives of the community in which they lived, or how
intellectuals agreed upon the ground rules for the discussion about indigent fellow
citizens, defined, to a great extent, the content of the debate.
The EconomicValue ofCitizenship in Rhetorical Constructions
Throughout history, most societies have confronted enormous differences between
citizens who are rich and those who are poor. In the modern era, these issues are at
the heart of social and economic history. We now recognize, for example, that the
economic and social conditions of any nation determined, to a great extent, which
citizens were indigent and how poor he or she may have been. Employment oppor-
tunities, wage rates, and the price of food, rents, and fuel exerted an indelible
Impact on the extent of suffering; the same holds true for environmental factors
such as climate or the incidence of epidemics. Individual biography and blind fate
also determined the level of poverty particular groups of citizens experienced, irre-
spective of their formal status in the body politic. Illness, the particular phase in the
life cycle, and illiteracy each played its part, too. The distinctive ways in which rich
inhabitants, through taxes or private donations, helped to alleviate the plight of
their poverty-stricken fellow citizens influenced not only the degree of poverty hut
also the economic and social structure of their society, at least on the margin.
Besides, the chronological "age" of cultural patterns of poor relief also matrered.e
For the purpose of this essay I wish to identify four salient if separate issues that
infused the discourses about poverty and poor relief in both countries. Even if these
questions constituted points of serious disagreement in borh France and the
Netherlands in the immediate post-Revolutionary era, some or all of these "helping
conundrums" inflected the rhetoric of intellectuals, politicians, and bureaucrats in
the Netherlands and France.I The first issue that informed the rhetoric about the
economic value of citizenship was that of equalization, or the idea that poor relief
represented a form of mutual insurance or an institutional shield that mediated
between individual and collective misfortune. Examples of collective bad luck in
nineteenth-century Europe abounded, They constituted such phenomena as a dis-
mal harvest to a particular year in a specific region of a nation due to flood or
drought. Another example was a disruption of the market environment or a down-
turn in the commercial fortunes of a specific sector of society as a result of interna-
tional economic pressures or war and foreign occupation.
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Individual adversity might include the unlucky circumstances faced by widows and
orphans upon the death of their spouses or parents. People born with physical
handicaps confronted desperately unfortunate circumstances through no fault of
their own. In all of these instances, poor relief, as part of an Implicit mutual insur-
ance arrangement concluded before the fateful event, channeled resources from
one sector or region of society to another, or from one group of relatively affluent
citizens to another less well-endowed segment of the population. Inherent III this
arrangement was the understanding that at some later stage, rnore comfortable
members of society might themselves become the unlucky ones, thus reversing the
roles of henefactor and pauper. In this rhetorical construction, all forms of poor
relief contain an element of mutual insurance. 6
A second issue that imbued many proposed remedies to poverty and inequality
was a recognition that giving charity entailed certain socialliabilities or moral haz-
ards. Both pclicymakers and intellectuals believed that poor relief could function as
a disincentive to industriousness and law-abiding, ethical behavior. Most societies,
today or ill the past, prefer not to nurture impoverished people whose suffering
only stems from personal laziness or character flaws. Accordingly, in nineteenth
century Holland and France public officials and private donors tried to separate the
wheat from the chaff and wished to assist only those who were down-and-out
through no fault of their own - pauvres honteux or, as the Dutch called them, the
(atsuenlijke annen: the appropriately shamefaced, respectable, and deserving poor.
Social commentators feared that unless poor relief was confined only to genuine
socio-economic victims, it would encourage nothing but sloth and drunkenness in
its recipients and would produce a parasitic reliance on the benevolence of more
prosperous fellow citizens or the redistriburive capacities of an overly intrusive
state. These concerns were hardly unique to the post-French Revolutionary era.
Such apprehensions have been the cornerstone of social welfare policies from
Augustus's Rome to Mayor Rudolph Ciuhani's New York City or neo-conservanvc
politicians in contemporary Europe, who have always posed the same question:
how can we separate the truly unlucky citizen from welfare cheats and free riders?
A third element informing the discourses about the economic value of citizen-
ship was the notion of pacification, or the perception of poor relief as a means of
suppressing petty thievery and insurrection or preventing social disorder. The
working class personified a potential danger both to the social elites or even modest
but self-supporting folks, because impovenshed workers could band together and
use their collective strength to commandeer the possessions, threaten the profits,
and sabotage the psychological equanimity of society's wealthier citizens. In this
construction, charity functioned as a manipulative hand, disguised as an empathetic
gesture which the rich extended to the poor. It fostered the notion that poor relief
comprised little more than a few crumbs thrown to needy workers to ensure that
their residual discontent did not spill over into an open revolt against the status quo.
A fourth consideration could be labeled the profitability principle, which
entailed a perception of poor relief ;IS a way to assure that a sufficient number of
able-bodied citizens could produce a steady economic output. A concern with the
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profitability of charitable practices focused on the need to cultivate the health and
vigor of workers in order to maximize profits and safeguard the income of the well-
to-do. Poor relief, especially temporary assistance, often served the interests of the
rich even when they had no specificreason to fear social chaos or political rebellion.
Most elites understood that widespread mortality among workers might eventual-
ly cause wages to rise and thus reduce profits. They also grasped that undernour-
ished children grew into adults who would probably become unproductive workers
and feeble soldiers. Similarly, landlords knew that peasants lacking physical stami-
na might be unable to pay rent. In other words, elites understood the benefits of
supporting destitute workers in extreme need, even if some prosperous citizens
may have tried to avoid bearing the financial burden of assisting the poor out of fear
of creating an indolent work force.
The anxieties about pounng charitable resources down the drain was another
aspect of concerns with profitability: naive philanthropists or misguided public offi-
cials might sustain shiftless, if sly, poor folks who were beyond the pale as potential
workers. Thus, in considering the profitability principle, a free rider problem arose
once again, not only among the beneficiaries of charity but also among benefactors.
Some rich but devious citizens could easily manipulate others into shouldering the
financial burden of charity while getting off scot free themselves. To avoid an
unequal distribution of the charitable obligations toward fellow citizens who were
impoverished, state authorities, at the local and national level,often wished to "col-
lectivize" poor relief by Imposing taxes or poor rates rather than rely on private
charity or voluntary donations. \Vhile charity was a quintessential form of altruistic
behavior, in the words of Abram de Swaan, it was also an indivisible good that
bestowed free benefits even upon those who did not personally contribute: it was
"a form of action that profited not only rhe receivers, bur also the collectivity of
possessors as a whole."? Thus, public officials' desire to convert poor relief into a
universal responsibility, borne across the board by citizens who were rich enough
to pay taxes, was a rhetorical theme that reverberated throughout the nineteenth
century, only to be officiallyacknowledged in the twentieth century.
French and Dutch Discourses about Value and Membership In the Nation
All of these topics surfaced in the written oratory of policymakers in both the
Netherlands and France, albeit in different ways. Despite their undeniable differ-
ences in historical legacy, economic structure, political style, and above all, geo-
graphic size, both countries confronted a common problem during the decades fol-
lowing the French Revolution: a levelof poverty that seemed deep-seated and more
oppressive than it had ever been before. In either country, public agencies and pn-
vate charities tried to alleviate the distress of poverty-stricken people through a
variety of social welfare measures intended to aid the sick, sustain the elderly and
the disabled, or support temporarily unemployed workers.
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The rhetoric of rich citizens' charitable duties towards their needy fellow citizens,
whether conducted in Dutch or French, touched upon all the pressing issues that
confronted the modern world III the aftermath of the French Revolution. An
anguished public debate about the Social Question in both countries tried to steer
a middle passage between the legitimate human suffering of the "deserving poor"
and a genuine fear of the revolutionary propensity of the working class. While
acknowledging the traditional Christian injunction TO be charitable toward fellow
citizens who were less fortunate because "the meek shall inherit the earth" public
officials negotiated, as best as they could, their compassion for the poor vis-a-vis
the state's need to monitor and contain them - what the French called the enclo-
sure of the poor (l'enfermement des pauvresl.
Some recurrent questions troubled most people who thought and wrote about
the Social Question, regardless of their ideological stance: did the unprecedented
visibility of poverty during the first half of the nineteenth century signify a radical
departure from the situation prior to the Revolution? Did the material suffering
they witnessed in the post-Napoleonic era represent a genuine increase in the
absolute number of poor citizens? Were the concentration of a growmg number of
people in urban centers, or changes in the social and economic organization of
modern society, responsible for the conspicuous new problem of indigence? If so,
did the perceptible growth in poverty constitute the tangible evidence of the kind of
proletarian emiscration KarlMarx and other utopian socialists in France had begun
to prophesy in the 1840S? From all these ruminarions emerged a corollary question
conccrnmg the formulation of policy: How could the French and Dutch govern-
ments implement social policies that would ensure a reasonable matenal existence
for a greater number of citizens without producing an intolerable drain 011 the
nation's treasury - and, perhaps more importantly, without creating a madding
crowd of loiterers, wastrels, and parasites?
In a French imagination, being poor often served as merely a pretext for revolt-
ing agamsr the existing political order. In a panoply of poignant incidents described
in colorful detail m the records of the Ministry of Justice ill Paris, humble women
and children of the most downtrodden classes of French society were presumably
incited to riot hy shady characters. Judicial officials perceived the mothers' ardent
desire to feed and nurture their children at any social cost as being grist for the mill
of "outside" political agitators who manipulated gullible souls to serve their ulteri-
or purposes. Many a Prefect of Police in rural France transcribed hungry women's
attack on grain merchants in the local market place, expressing their outrage at arti-
ficially high prices of grain, into an episode that was essentially political in nature
and thus might threaten the sovereignty of the state.8
The irony in nineteenth-century France,however, was that the urban scene over-
shadowed the rural landscape, even if the proportion of French citizens who lived in
cities rather than the countryside was relatively minor. Nonetheless, urban rather
than rural concerns modulated the discourses about the economic burden of pm'er-
ry. A "new and sadly energetic name" for poverty (pauperisme) entered public dis-
cussions after 1815, which conjured up a very specificfear of social disorder, even an-
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archy, rather than the idea of relative deprivation." In the mind's eye of political
elites In Paris, Lyon, and a handful of other cities, the new word paupensme no
longer signified a poignant human condition that engendered fellow feeling on the
part of society's more affluent members. Instead, the recurrent use of the word pau-
perism in the French narrative about desperate fellowcitizens depicted them as a so-
cial plague, as if they embodied a contagious disease that was in the process of un-
dermining the health and vigor of the body politic. This social illness, in turn, epito-
mized a quintessential characteristic of the "modern" nineteenth-century world. ro
Even though quietly suffering proletaires deschamps constituted the lion's share
of poor citizens In France, it was the specter of urban pauperism that defined public
debates. The menacing crowds of rowdy industrial workers conjured up a social
universe dominated by overcrowded cities that were dependent on factory produc-
tion and inundated with unruly laborers forever threatening to overthrow the status
quo. One of the more exaggerated estimates of the total number of paupers in the
French nation reached the excessive number of six million, while another sensa-
tionalist calculation of the size of the beggar population alone went as high as four
million.JI These inflated numbers, unrelated to any statistics compiled in more reli-
able sources, registered the consternation and fright of bourgeois France. A verita-
ble, deep-seated "neurosis," afflicted middle class observers, who indulged In a
prurient obsession with pauperized men and women and the interlocking "criminal
underworld.">
The word pauperism stressed the "exotic" otherness of the poor who seemed to
inhabit the opposite extreme of the social abyss. Poverty in a genteel and compre-
hensible version might be something that happened to a hard-drinking cousin or a
distant uncle who was addicted to gambling. The many embarrassing "poor rela-
tions" populating the pages of Honore de Balzac's Comedie humaine provide vivid
testimony to such bourgeois fears and fantasies. These disgraced relatives might fall
on hard times, forcing them to drop out of fashionable social circles as a result.
'Whether or not such a downward slide from middle-class propnety was a tempo-
rary or permanent one, it was a descent into poverty with which the average bour-
geois person could empathize. But French notables could not conceive of pau-
pensm as having anything to do with their own tasteful lives. The concept
pauperisme dissociated being poor from the kind of personal misconduct or finan-
cial miscalculation that was familiar and understandable. Instead, many respectable
observers converted pauperism into a horror story about terrifying, alien creatures
who lived beyond the horizon of bourgeois sensibilities. In the process, these desti-
tute masses were reimagined as a herd of frightening beasts who resembled
humans but were, in fact, a different species that had gotren stuck at a lower level
on the evolutionary scale.
The label pauperism both articulated and emblematized a curious paradox in
nineteenth-century French society. In the political vocabulary of policymakers in
Paris in the aftermath of the French Revolution, being miserable and hungry
entailed a moral flaw or a personal failure to exercise one's rights as a fully entitled
citoyen. The Revolution's Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, after all,
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had bestowed upon every Frenchman, regardless of birth or social position, equali-
ty of rights and the liberty to compete as an alleged equal in the political and eco-
nomic marketplace. However, the Revolution's political ideals, whether liberte,
egalite, or [raternite: proved scant consolation to indigent working men and all
women - since women were formally excluded from full-fledged citizenship - forc-
ing them to try to survive by any means possible.
The Revolution had bequeathed a dubious legacy upon the nineteenth century:
the abolition of the paternalistic protection of the poor, so crucial to their survival
during times of dearth prior to 1789, was presumably offset by the greater eco-
nomic and political freedoms granted to all men as individual citizens. But even if
poor folk in France had never received much from the Catholic or voluntary poor
relief of the ancien regime, in the nineteenth century they encountered a closure of
soup kitchens, confronted the state's attempt to manipulate the charitable lnbors of
the Catholic Church, and heard nothing from the central government in Paris but
idealistic slogans that proved to be hollow promises. I}
A new word such as pauperismc symbolized not only the ambivalence of French
policymakers toward their miserable compatriots but revealed, too, the contradic-
tions inherent in nineteenth-century political doctrine. Held personally responsible
for their indigence due to individual moral defects, the overwhelming presence of
indigent citizens in French secrecy nonetheless represented an unsettling social
problem that required the government's watchful eye. Despite the Chapelicr law's
abrogation of all guilds and rrade corporations - and the Revolution's eventual
embrace of non-interference in social life and its celebration uf unregulated eco-
nomic competition - public officials in the decades after 18rS confronted a menac-
ing crowd of miserable workers who required political surveillance and careful con-
trol. As Fugenc Buret, the caustic editor of the progressive Courrier Francais,
argued III 1839: "the word pauperism originates in England, but it does not signify
anything more than rruserv; it is only a more generalized state of affairs. Misery
applies to individuals rather than to classes. It makes us think of private suffering,
while the word pauperism embraces <111 the phenomena of poverty: this English
word reveals to us the sense of poverty as a massive SOCial scourge, of public I111S-
ery."'4 In sum, the term paupensm elicited an aura of covert danger that surround-
ed the material suffering of indigent workers on a large scale. It was a word that
underscored the equivocal attitudes of bourgeois France towards the nation's hun-
gry and poor.
III the setting of the distinct political culture of the French capital, the Prefect of
Policein Paris, Louis Debellcymc, addressed these issues directly in I!128 when try-
ing to raise funds for a more effective prosecution of beggary and vagabondage in
the city. The Moniteur reprinted rhe text of his proposal on November 27, Ilh8,
whIch unveiled a poignant picture of the contradictory reality of desperately poor
citizens living amidst the affluence of others:
Memlidte (beggary) has reared its ugly head in Paris and her neighhoring com-
munities with all that IS hideous and distressing. Beggars pursue passersby III the
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streets and they harass them in the portals of churches; they hold merchants ran-
som and they display a painful spectacle of infirmities, both real and feigned.
Everywhere they present a shocking picture of abject misery amidst wealth and
abundance, of drunkenness and idleness amidst active industry in the most per-
fect civilization. Because the law prohibits beggary, it is incumbent upon human-
ity to provide shelter for those who have to reduce themselves to begging only
because they are deprived of material resources. It is exactly those shelters that
we are lacking. A task so noble is worthy of the attention of the residents of Paris
and its surrounding areas, and this appeal to the time-proven habits of generosi-
ty of our citizens IS made with the confidence that it will not be in vain.o
The police chief's proposal was a remarkable document. It portrayed m graphic
detail the prevailing French ambivalence about pauperism and physical want, which
often implied spiritual weakness as well. By appealing directly to the potential
social danger that hordes of deceitful beggars in the city embodied, Dcbeileyme
tried to galvanize the Parisian bourgeoisie into action by digging deep into their
pockets m order to raise money for necessary shelters. But by shelters he meant
lockups and jails, which would enable the police to incarcerate vagrants and
remove them from the pristine urban stage of bourgeois civility. Middle-class resi-
dents of Paris should not only acknowledge their personal duty as citizens bur also
recognize their own self-interest: they ought to provide the funds necessary to
enforce the laws. Bourgeois Pansians, who presumably had achieved their exalted
station in life because they personified "active industry in the most perfect civiliza-
tion," should protect their civil domain from the presence of hideous vagabonds.
Leaving aside, of course, whether affluent Parisians had simply been born into
prominent families and had inherited their money and social positions or whether
they had truly earned it, Prefect of Police Debelleyme stroked their vanity while
nurturing their fears of urban chaos. The vagrants were dishonest creatures, he
announced, since many of them feigned their physical handicaps and ailments.
They accosted honorable Parisians in the streets: on Sundays (hey even heckled
faithful Catholics upon entering church for mass. But Debellevme's invocation of
the ethos of libertc and individual responsibility went both ways. A lack of material
resources forced these sleazy vagrants to lower themselves to their wretched sta-
tion in society. He hinted at the possibility that the beggars were given no option
other than to be the annoying creatures they had become.
Although he conceded the possibility that society's material inequality was
implicated in the problem of vagrancy, Debelleyme undoubtedly remembered the
political legacy of the Revolution, which had stipulated that no citizen, whether
rich or poor, should be given special treatment. Socialcircumstances may have con-
tributed to the Parisian vagrants' descent into their ghastly existence, but the moral
responsibility to emerge from their horrible lives was their own. If the wealthy citi-
zens of Paris fulfilled their political duties to society and kept their part of the bar-
gain by paymg taxes and their dues to the city, then the Prefecture of Police would
do its part, which was to act on behalf of society and reduce the number of beggars
by simply locking them up.
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Debelleyme painted a picture of poverty that was particularly shocking because of
the glaring contrasts between abject misery and Parisian ostentation. It was a por-
trait of intense social contrasts and economic tensions, and he invoked a series of
cliches about ragged beggars as truculent, forever ready to undermine the SOCIal
peace. But his startling portrayal aligned the solution to pauperism in the city
straightforwardly with the incarceration of large numbers of Impoverished beggars
and a more efficient structure of social surveillance. The enclosure of the poor
would enable Parisian notables to live their elegant lives In peace without being
challenged, on a daily basis, by threatening "others" who should be contained on
the opposite side of a fundamental social divide.
Debelleyme's shrill voice, however, was not an uncontested one. In the course
of the next two decades, a flourishing coteric of French utopian socialists began to
construct an eloquent and powerful counter discourse, especially during the 1840S.
The rhetoric of critics on the left divorced poverty from personal failure or charac-
ter deficiencies and placed the burden of guilt squarely on the shoulders of French
society's inequitable distribution of income and its unjust class structure. Not only
Karl Marx lived a shifty life in Paris for part of the 1840S, constantly harassed by the
Parisian police; he shared the oppositional political stage with a retinue of native-
born utopian socialists. French social commentators on the political left collective-
ly showered the nation with a deluge of innovative ideas and applied a distinctly
"marxist" analysis before Marx. I6 But the French state, or more pertinently, Prefect
of Police Debelleyme and his subordinates and successors, forcefully suppressed the
idealistic authors of such subversive social critiques. This alternative vision of social
Justice and a plea for a more equitable distribution of the benefits of French citizen-
ship was officially ignored by bureaucrats and policymakers in Pans.
In striking contrast, the Dutch political economist Simon Visscnng provided a
profoundly different reading only a few decades later:
With the expansion of wealth, prosperity, and civility in a society, the social dis-
tinctions between those who benefit and those who suffer as a result of eco-
nomic development become more palpable. In previous centuries, everyone was
equally rich, or rather, equally poor. As times went on, a few rich people were
capable of enjoying the fruits of the earth while the majority of the population
was still caught in the chains of poverty. This group of poor people tends to
acquire visibility as the gap between rich and poor grows wider and, in this way,
a heterogeneous sector of society receives a single descriptive name: paupers.
The more attention the poor receive, the more Vivid the contrast between rich
and poor becomes, and when public compassion and generosity expand, the
greater the worries about the consequences of the stark distinctions between
rich and poor will be.'?
To Vissering, who was a political liberal and a vocal advocate of capitalism "before
its final triumph," poverty under its ominous new designation, pauperism, was a
creation of modern industrial society. He raised the Issue of public perception and
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the labeling of social groups. He noted that when societies became preoccupied
with the question of poverty, the allegedly "objective" research of contemporaries
caused both the material conditions and the moral temperament of the poor to
lapse in the popular Imagination. In a certain way Vissering identified what was
called the Hawthome effect in the sociological literature of the 1950S. The tenden-
tious facts uncovered by the first generation of positivist social scientists, Vissering
argued, who collected data after visiting working-class slums in Paris, Lille, Ams-
terdam, or Middelburg, helped to mvenr a new mealllng of poverty.III "Pauperisme
distinguishes itself from poverty only insofar as human suffering is viewed in con-
nection with the afflictions and injustices of society at large," three Dutch authors
wrote in 1852, thereby constructing their uniquely Dutch vision of the relative
dimensions implicit in the new concept of pauperism.'?
In the Netherlands officialsemployed an idiom and concocted a narrative about
poor fellow citizens that differed from the cultural vocabulary used by colleagues in
France. Dutch elites often used the phrase behoeftigen - needy citizens - which
acknowledged individual misery without immediately assigning moral guilt or
attributing personal failure. The word behoeftig imbricated poor people's matenal
wants with the collective resources of Dutch society and embedded the poor in the
community as a whole. Both wealth and poverty issued from the cumulative capac-
ity of all members of society to generate, "through their collective labor power, a
surplus above and beyond the requirements of subsistence;" it was the "internal
distribution of this surplus," johannes van den Bosch insisted ill 1818, that deter-
mined the relative affluence and deprivation of each member of Dutch socieey.w
Some citizens, however, simply could not find work, however eagerly they tried,
and thus their distressing need also affected others who were gainfully employed.
Yearning for work, food, and shelter, or wishing for human affection and physical
warmth, intimated a direct relationship with those who were well-to-do. Even self-
satisfied and comfortable Dutch burghers, after all, could remember, or at least
fathom, being cold and lonely. Prosperous people could also recall or identify with
the experience of longing for material security and a full stomach. The simple term
behoeftig thus substantiated the "common bond" between those who suffered and
those who might help; it symbolized a culturally constructed discourse through
which the causal linkages between a social "evil," a needy "victim," and an empa-
thetic "benefactor" were fashioned."
Another term that surfaced routinely was the neutral Dutch word armenwezen
or armwezen, meaning the condition of being poor or the existential world of
poverty, which agam emphasized the ecumenical cxpenence of human suffcnng
and linked it to both individual and collective hardship without necessarily ascrib-
ing blame. Armenwezen sounded a bit like handelswezen or bankwezen, which
referred to trading conditions and the commercial arena or the sedate world of
banking. It tended to remove the stigma from being poor by modifying it into an
ordinary circumstance, less loaded with haunting social meanings. The bland word
armenwezen seemed to suggest that poverty was a particularly unfortunate station
in lifeallotted to hapless people, often through little fault of their own.
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Officials and intellectuals in the Netherlands appropriated the French slogan
paupcrismc into Dutch, too, but they used it less often than their neighbors to the
south. They invoked the word pauperism when they wished tu emphasize the
social responsibilities and financial burdens associated with the presence of enor-
mous numbers of poor people In their midst. A lively theoretical debate ensued
among liberal economists, for example, about the inefficiency, misguided econom-
ic logic, and wastefulness of "pauper factories" that tried to link poor relief to the
inculcation of an appropriate work ethic and greater industrial skills. The issue of
profitability, in other words, loomed large 111 their imaginations. Dutchmen also
used the term pauperism as a figure of speech denoting the degradations and
inequities inherent III the modern world - not as a succinct metaphor for the fear of
social revolution. But the more frequently used phrases were "needy" and the "con-
dition of being poor," which did not inspire the same kind of anxiety about politi-
cal chaos and lurking dangers as it did in France. Instead, it was a story that focused
primarily on the manner in which poor citizens could be supported without dis-
turbing or VIOlating the organic unity of Dutch society and, above all, without
depleting its collective resources.
The discourses about poor people In the Netherlands reflected the myths about
the social harmony of the golden age of the Dutch Republic, which lingered on 1Il
the nineteenth century. In 1820, a Dutchman argued that "under the laws of our
ancestors we not only made wealth, but wealth so widely distributed that it could
really be called prosperiry.v->The Implication of this statement is simple: genuine
prosperity could flourish only when the affluence of some was shared with others
who were less fortunate. This emblematic narrative about Dutch history, which
originated in the early modern period, was deeply ingrained in the popular imagi-
nation and political culture of the nation. It informed the combative and presum-
ably "modern" debates about private charity versus public welfare during the first
half of the nineteenth century. It IS a narrative that still serves as one of the guiding
principles of the contemporary Dutch welfare stare.so
Indeed, the social architecture of nineteenth-century Dutch society revealed few,
if any, grandiose funerary statues or ostentatious monuments. Instead, the most
precious architectural artifacts of the social geography of the Dutch nation existed
on a less opulent, and a more intimate, scale. They consisted of unpretentious patri-
cian houses with elegantly gabled roofs or of unadorned churches, which had been
stripped of their most brazen religious iconography. But it was literally and figura-
tively III the municipal nooks and crannies, in between those hallmark monuments
of Dutch culture, where one could supposedly find the true source of Dutch glory
and national dignity: in the many hofjes (a court with small houses for the clderly)
and outdoor relief agencies that dotted the social landscape of Dutch towns and
cities. Amidst the urban hustle and bustle, in between the understated solidity of a
burgher's residence and the ubiquitous presence of the House of God, one could
find the physical evidence of a solidly constructed bureaucratic structure of "effi-
cient poor relief" that had evolved, over time, into a mechanism of social patronage
for the elite as well as a "crucial strategy of survival for the poor," as Marco van
Leeuwen recently characterized it.2.4
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Obviously one of the key factors in Van Lecuwen's formulation is the notion of
evolution over time. Nineteenth-century notables in the city of Amsterdam or elires
in other Dutch towns did not construct an ornate and complex administrative edi-
fice of poor relief in a hasty and slap-dash fashion - or as a kind of preempnve strike
- in the face of what appeared to be unprecedented levels of human suffering in the
the post-French Revolution era. Nor did nineteenth-century municipal councillors
or church officials renovate the administrative monuments of public or private
charity because they were suddenly imbued with a new and agitated awareness of
the blatant discrepancy between rich and poor.
The novel preoccupation with Issues of social inequality in European history has
often been identified as a quintessential nineteenth-century phenomenon, and thus,
as a radically "modern" sensibility. In the Kingdom of the Netherlands, however,
the preoccupation with poverty was not necessarily a typically modern fixation;
rather, poor-relief practices in the nineteenth century continued to be molded by
the mrncate, if deeply rooted, social architecture which the Republic had bestowed
upon the modern era. Although not without political conflict, the practice of
soothing the plight of poverty-stricken compatriots - of helping a little here and
there, as long as the recipients were regarded as worthy, of assisting fellow citizens
who were permanently frail and infirm, or of aiding others who were temporarily
unemployed and therefore needy only in the short run - was embedded in the insti-
tutionallegacy of the seventeenth-century Republic.
As a matter of fact, the clamorous political discourses about the relative merits
of pnvate and religious charity versus secular public welfare, especially during the
years between 1800 and 1854,were grounded in a rhetorical tradition that had been
self-consciously fashioned during rhe gilded era of the Dutch Republic. Thus myths
about the Republic both animated and forged the modern idiom of personal enti-
tlements or civic responsibilities. In fact, nineteenth-century politicians and social
critics walked an intellectual tightrope between poignant memories of an intrepid
and proud Republican past, on the one hand, and visions of the newfangled eco-
nomic requirements of the nineteenth-century world, on the other. The latter
entailed a particular understanding of the distinct nature of "modernity," which
prompted other European countries to take cautious and gradual steps toward a
conception of social welfare as an exclusively public, and collective responsibility. In
the Dutch case, however, the journey resembled, ironically, a Catholic procession,
as if it was necessary in 1854 to take several steps back in order to find refuge, once
again, III the realm of ptlvare charity and Christian philanthropy.
Conclusion
On the whole, the two contrasting narratives about the meaning of poverty and the
cconorruc benefits and burdens of membership in the nation, one written in French
and the other in Dutch, generated a profoundly different political resonance. In the
cultural grammar of nineteenth-century France, discussions about the triangular
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relationship between ccononuc value, culture, and citizenship often expressed
themselves in a trigonometry of poverty, prosecution, and pacification. Concerns
with social equality rather than with pacification informed Dutch rhetoric about
social welfare. While some contemporary observers may have evaluated the role of
religious philanthropy differently, most nineteenth-century participants in the dis-
courses about the economic value of cultural citizenship embraced a diffuse con-
sensus about the economic value of Dutch citizenship.
Dialogue
Klarner: Reading your analysis of rhetorical practices in the Netherlands and France
I am struck by the attention to source and detail. There is even more of that III the
original version which I asked you to shorten because of space considerations. The
economists and political scientists must seem cavalier to you in the way they deal
with historical realities.
Gouda: Yes, in general that's the case. Economists, sociologists and political scion-
tists, however, ask questions about history that are inspired by a set of theoretical
issues. The past functions as a kind of experimental laboratory - or what the
French call champs d'expenence - that allows "hard core" social scientists to track
and analyze the differential refraction of certain social forces or general patterns of
behavior in particular cultural environments. Historians, in contrast, tend to pursue
questions that do operate at the same lofty theoretical level. Often their primary
concern is to answer an array of specific questions about a clearly defined empirical
reality. \Vhile theoretical insighrs influence the ways in which historians approach
their research agendas, on the whole they try to refer as much as possible to the
available evidence in primary and secondary sources. Historians, one could say,
approach theory as if it were underwear: most of us think we should have it but it
should not really show!
Klamer: Well, concerning the hidden piece of clothing in your article, I see clear
support for the perspective that I presented in chapter L French culture generated
values that are distinct from the values that Dutch culture fostered with as the result
dramatically different programs for the poor. Culture obviously matters. The ques-
tion remains how these values come about. Do you have any idea?
Gouda: That is a big question, impossible to answer in one paragraph. Values are
intricately related to political cultures which, in turn, were linked to historical pat-
terns of political centralization, economic development, and an array of other fac-
tors such as a nation's geographic size or levels of literacy and urbanization. But 111
light of my answer to your previous question, it might help to listen to a few his-
torical sources. In r838, for instance, the prominent Frenchman Alphonse de
Lamartine held forth in the Chamber of Deputies in Paris that "Nothing great,
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nothing monumental has ever been done in France except by the state. How
could it be otherwise, since the government is the nation in action?" A few years
later, in 1844, the more important Dutch politician Johan Rudolf Tborbecke pro-
duced a radically different vision of the state: "The purpose of the state IS to
Imagine a grand national community, jointly ordered by its members. The state
wants to be in a complete sense what municipal and provincial governments must
be to a more limited extent, that is, communal self-government, resting on its
members' shared capacity to rule." If, as Lamartine noted, the state was viewed as
the fulcrum of the French nation, then ideas about the value of citizenship were dis-
scnunated by the center to the periphery. InHolland, in contrast, the ideal of auton-
omy at the grassroots level inflected human attitudes towards the suffering of fel-
low citizens in their daily existence and these values ascended from the local
community to the center. I guess we could say that it was difficult for a well-fed
bureaucrat in Pans, who rarely encountered a poor person in his daily routine, to
foster values of compassion, whereas Dutch municipal authorities and local philan-
thropists were constantly engaged in maintaining social harmony by soothing the
plight of the poor while reassuring the rich.
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Where Gouda explores the past for the roil' ofculture (see previous chapter), De Reus
focuses on contemporary society and in the particular the value that national identity
has. De BeusiscurrentlyProfessor ofSocial Philosophyand Ethicsat the University of
Craningen. Before that he was at the department of economics of the University of
Amsterdam where he worked on and published in welfare economics and rational
choice theory ofpolitics. In 1993 he visited Harvardwhere he worked with Amartya
Sen. He was the main author of the election program of the Dutch social democratic
party in 1994.
For the average person, the limits of his culture are, if not quite the limits of the
world, at any rate the limits of his employability, social acceptability, dignity, effec-
tive participation and citizenship.e
Emest Gellner
Introduction
T H E STARTrNG POINT of this essay is my impression that the standard eco-nomic approach to national identity is a mess. It wobbles between theassumption of irrelevance of nationhood to rational hehavior of firms, fam-
ilies and governments and implicit nationalism (national income, national competi-
tiveness, and so on); between reduction of national identification to maximization
of wealth or welfare and non-economic explanation, and between seeing nations as
bearers of modernization and as primitive, anti-capitalist forces. I think that this
mess is unwarranted, smcc economic science in the sense of political economy con-
tains the intellectual credentials and advanced tools of analysis to endogenize
national identity and to enrich horh its own stock of knowledge and the insight of
the public. Hy "political economy" I do not mean specific schools (British classical
liberalism, German social eccuonucs, Austrian marginalisrn, American and neoclas-
sical institutionalisrn) but a style of economic science which places instrumental
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rationality within the bounds of morality, markets within the bounds of civil soci-
ety, and economic constitution- and policy-making within the bounds of history
and culture.
The area in which I myself try to clean up the mess is confined to what econo-
mists refer to as normative theory, welfare economics or economic philosophy. The
question of the value of national identity can be narrowed down to the question of
the Paretian efficiency of nationalist arrangements and measures, but I suggest to
try out a somewhat broader framework first. The overall value of national identity
needs to be examined in the following spirit. How should we as reasonable human
beings, that is, as representatives of the widest union possible, assess the continued
existence of our own nation (if any), of the nations of others, and of national divi-
sion in general-s
My answer is made up of four steps. First, nationhood is defined in the subjec-
tivisr tradition of Renan, Hayes, Kohn, Anderson, Gellner and Anthony Smith. A
nation is a people with a common self-image and purpose with respect to the moral
nature and institutional framework of their society which is both comprehensive
(modes of association in law, politics, economics, technology, arts, religion and
many other areas of social life) and bounded (safe boundaries). I define national
identity as a basic culture, a set of beliefs, desires and actions which, on the one
hand, is distinctive in the light of historical time and, on the other hand, constitutes
the basic structure of society, that is, "the way in which the major social institutions
distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages
from social cooperation't.e
Second, national identity is seen as an object of value for various sound reasons.
It promotes reconciliation of human beings with certain unavoidable limits to
human existence (the value of a sense of belonging, of feeling at home). It promotes
public space, thus givmg access to an open society which meets certain humanist
requirements (the value of fellow-feeling or sociability). It promotes active social
membership, marked by dignity and closely related qualities such as self-respect,
self-esteem and integrity (the value of dignity). And it promotes collective liberty, In
the sense of a context of cultural distinctiveness and social self-control which
ennches personal liberty for most citizens (the value of self-determination).
Third, national moral order is conceived as something relative. Is the flourishing
of human personality - through and towards love, security, freedom, matenal sat-
isfaction and self-realization - impossible without national identification? Is it our
natural duty to help our compatriots first? Is patriotism a "cardinal" virtue? Is there
a right to cultural and political self-determination? Is non-intervention in the
domestic affairs of other states the correct interpretation of the principle of good
neighborliness? Is the nation-state the best regime for realizing the humanist ideal
in an era of globalization? (Or is a more pluralist and federalist mode of governance
called for?) I will not discuss these kinds of questions in great detail. Instead, I will
focus on a more general issue which sheds light on the relativity of valuable nation-
hood. \Vhat is it in national identity that turns nations into open societies or into
tribes? I do not deny the meaning of the fact that nations engender their own legit-
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unnrc goals, rights and duties In the eyes of nationals Simply by virtue of their aS50-
ciational nature. But this internal justification must always be completed - and
often corrected - by external moral rcasomng, 111 particular by what Hume has
called the viewpoint of the "party of mankind" (external justification).5 The inter-
play between national identity and civil society is one of the crucial connections In
this ethical perspective.
Finally, Dutch identity is discussed as a case-study. Many scholars believe that
the Netherlands is a small and homogeneous country which is not troubled by
grave conflicts of identity. Some of these are American economists who arc trained
to believe that the Dutch internationalist outlook in economic and political affairs
(an old nation of merchants, a "natural" export share of more than fifty percent) is
not determined hy national identity but hy the sheer necessity to barter, truck and
exchange. I will argue, however, that the Netherlands today has to confront the
backlash to a post-sixties progressive basic culture, the mismatch between global-
izarion and individualization, and the price of loss of sovereignty in the European
Union. I oppose the view that the Netherlands looks the very picture of idyllic post-
nationalism. Even if there is such a thing as a small open economy with cosmopoli-
tan managers and workers (which is doubtful), the Netherlands does not exemplify
it. National identity matters, even if preachers of methodology and Ideology dictate
to us the mle to ignore it.
Economists and National Identity
Do we really live 111 an age of "sophisrers, economists and calculators", as Edmund
Burke prophesied in t790? Economists keep silent since they do not have a stan-
dard theory about the formation of preferences. But they do presume a connection
between stable positions within the economy (being property-owner, consumer,
and so on) and the goals of agents in these positions (maximizing rent, consump-
tive utility, and so on). One would expect, then, some focus upon the personal
identity of economic agents, and its collective and expressive aspects. As Sen, Sug-
den, Nozick and others have explained, identification not only influences the
agent's choice of strategies with regard to the solution of problems of coordination
and cooperation, it also influences the content of personal welfare and other per-
sonal goals. (,
Furthermore, Adam Smith himself understood the relevance to the continuity of
commercial society of conversation, fellow-feeling and national character. These
are cultural conditions to the growth of national wealth, on a par with structural
conditions, such as legal protection of property and contract, urban autonomy, and
a balance of power between classes and factions. I do not think that Smith was
always serious here, for mstancc in his side-note about the eminent "ignorance and
stupidity" concerning the public interest of the "Dutch vulgar" (in a passage on the
public costs of division of labor). But Smith's general approach clearly shows that
he did not sec national identity as merely a matter of folklore and feuilleron.
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The wisdom of Smith and David Hume, the first major writers on national identity
after Vico and Monresquieu, has been confirmed by contemporary experts. Schol-
ars like Deursch, Gellner and Tilly pay attention to tension and positive feedback
between the politics of national identity and the economics of development. It is
perhaps sufficient to quote Nairn here: "They showed C .) that nationalism was
inseparable from the deeper processes of industrialisation and socio-economic
modernity. Far from being an irrational obstacle to development, it was for most
societies the only feasible way rnto the development race - the only way in which
they could compete without being colonised or annihilated. If they turned to the
past (figuratively to 'the blood') in these modernisation struggles, it was essentially
III order to stay intact as they levered themselves into the future. Staying intact, or
obtaining a new degree of social and structural cohesion, was made necessary by
industrialisation - even (as in so many cases) by the distant hope, the advancing
shadow of industrialisation. And ethnos offered the only way of ensunng such
cohesion and common purpose. The strategy was high-risk, both because the
blood might take over and drown these societies, and because they might never
really catch up. However, that risk was unavoidable. It arose from the conditions of
generally and chronically uneven development - the only kind which capitalism
allows, and the kind which has finally,definitivelyestablished itself since 1989as the
sole matrix of further evolution"."
Nevertheless, there seems to be no focus whatsoever on national identity in
mainstream economics. The literature provides a shallow account of nationalism
as threat or reputation advantage in international bargaining, an ideology of rent-
seekers (protectionism) or a feature of businessmen that is as irrelevant to
decision-making as the calor of their eyes.8 Both Hayek's denial of the historical
link between classical liberalism and nationalism, and Tinbergen's rejection of
nationalism as an atavistic constraint to the realization of the optimal social-demo-
cratic regime illustrate the conventional wisdom. Of course, it is important to
examine the contribution of expected utility - what IS III it for me and my people?
- to the process of joining or leaving national communities and of incorporating
or excluding others. According to the rational-choice VIew, national identification
is driven by egoist concerns of certain classes of people (winning middle classes,
losing lower classes, opportunistic ruling classes), 10 particular by the desire for
positional goods (certificates, jobs) and material goods.v Yet this view has become
increasingly prolematic.
Expected utility maximization is parasitic upon some original and perpetual
acquisition of the skillsof agency (such as the abilities to imagine the future and to
calculate) and upon some similar formation of personality (the ability to distinguish
between myself, my people and third parties). From a methodological point of
view, it makes sense to recognize the reality and autonomy of nationalist consider-
ations (feelings, perceptions, attitudes, motives, desires) and nationalist institutions.
It is conceptually and empirically possible that national identity is an independent
power, irreducible to optimization (genetic, individual, collective), The alternative is
an outlandish view of personal and social ways of modern world-making. Main-
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stream conceptions such as Marxism, Public Choice and Rational Choice Theory
will remain distorted if they stick to reducing identity and culture to rational ego-
ism. They neglect the pursuit of communal goods (such as conviviality) and substi-
tutes for communal goods, the higher-order context of subject formation (individ-
ualization and socialization}, the public dimension of the provision of public goods
in the real world (in particular in democratic SOCieties) and the distinct Impact of
universalisr thought in the West (the idea of globalization of liberal law, free mar-
kets, representative democracies, civic associations and peacefully coexisting
nation-states). Consequently, their account in terms of mutual material advantage
cannot show why nationalist movements go beyond the class struggle, do not vary
with changing economic conditions and succeed both in advanced regions/periods
of prosperity and backward regions/periods of adversity. Even Celtner's sophisti-
cated modernization theory runs into problems here.'?
I am not suggesting that there is some standard theory of national identity wait-
ing in the wings to be brought into the general theory of human action. Any
account of national identity must come to terms with some major conundrums. By
way of moving from the critical part of my argument to the constructive part about
the value of national identity, I will attempt to darify one of these; the difference
between subjective appreciation of nationhood and of art.
Arguments about the value of nationhood m many ways fit mto a general dis-
cussion about the value of art. Both the politics of national identity and of the arts
are forms of representation, of securing the presence of someone or something
absent (compare Michelet's history of France and Monet's water lilies). Nation-
states protect certam arts, while artistic movements support certain nation-states.
There are renowned cases of the politicization of art by nationalist leadership along
with the aesrheticiznrion of politics by an artistic nvant-garde. fJ Many works of art
become part of national culture even if their creators never intended to express any
meaning outside the world of art (Mcner) or if they had politicalintentions related
to personal identity in the intimate sphere (Ingmar Bergman). There are also exam-
ples of the unintended artistic consequences of nationalist politics, such as the
flourishing condition of Dutch "netticheyt" painting (Dou, Frans van Miens) 111 the
aftermath of the revolt of the Low Countries against the Habsburg Spanish govern-
ment of Philip 11. 12
Post-modernists conclude that a nation is ultimately a text that must be read,
repeated and reassembled. But that is an overstatement, since the past is neither
entirely malleable nor reducible to language games. '3 In some respects the modes
of valuation of nationhood and art do differ.A lot of art is high culture. Both its ere-
anon and its enjoyment require special competence. Valuation of these arts is
marked by massive underestimation of its long-run benefits, relativism of stan-
dards, thc pursuit of distinction (snobbery) and the cash value of star artists on the
market. National identity is mostly low culture, although its initial invention is
oftcn the business of rising intellectual elites. Valuation of national traits and
accomplishments IS marked by massive overestimation of its long-run benefits,
absolutism, the pursuit of homogeneity (populism) and nationalist ideology and
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sentiment as a device for reducing taxation costs for thc rulers of the state. Talmon
even suggests a clash of the upper-class lovers of supra-national beauty and the
lower-class lovers of country: "Historical experience has also shown, however, that
III times of national oppression and social stress the true nature of a nation may be
defined in an emphatically popular spirit. The masses are made out to be the natur-
al repository and faithful guardian of the national values. Their pristine spontaneity
and immediacy, their remoteness from contact with the outer world, are held to
immunise them against the contagion of adulterating intluences to which the upper
classes are allegedly exposed through whonng after alien gods. The unpretentious
simplicity of the lower orders and their staunch loyalty to native traditions and
ancestral virtues are believed to foster uncompromising opposition to and msurrec-
tionary resolve against foreign invaders and masters. The effete and sophisticated
selfishness of the upper classes, on the other hand, easily tempts them into trea-
sonable collaboration with alien masters who enable them to preserve their wealth
and privileges." I4
Perhaps Talmon's assessment is uneven. There are cases, such as Prussia before
the First World War, when nationalism turns VIcious and appealing to the
respectable middle class (including respectable scholars like Max Weber).15 Talmon
focused on the relation between national identity and totalitarian revolution while
pushing the relation between national identity and democratic constitutionalism
into the background. More importantly, Talmon's Simple elite-mass scheme may
have become obsolete. Some argue that national cultures today are crumbling and
have become as fragmented, hybrid or short-lived (as far as hegemony is con-
cerned) as styles and fashions III the contemporary art gallery scene. There are no
more amorphous, insulated and fixed masses or "publics", passively waiting for the
one artistic or political substitute for God. According to Tully, "As a consequence
of the overlap, interaction and negotiation of cultures, the experience of cultural
difference is internal to culture." 16
Nevertheless, 'Ialmon's ominous words have to be taken senously. Homo
Nationalis is indeed less innocent and benign than Homo Ludens; even when he
moves III the disguise of Homo Economicus. I assume here that (i) national identity
will remain a rooted, attractive, overriding and normative way of life for most sin-
gle members of the foreseeable future world order, (ii) political action regarding
national identity can be justified in terms of humanistic thought about the good life
(in particular ethical individualism and liberal egalitarianism), and (iii) the nsk of
destructive ways of national identification can never be excluded on the basis of
twentieth-century experience with nationalist violence. So the most interesting
question goes something like this: How do we as reasonable humans assess our
own nation, other nations and national differences in general?
Josde Reus
Identity of What?
A nation is a people. A people is a large set of anonymous individuals (T) who think
and feel that they have important things in common and that they differ so much
from other groups, that they constitute a distinctive and self-contained society; (2.)
who share a certain way of life and attach public meaning to it to the point where it
turns into a self-enforcing culture; and (3) who see this society and culture as inter-
mingled with their conceptions of self, and appreciate their bounded opportunities
so strongly, that they pursue both protection by political means, 111 particular state
support, and political recognition by other peoples, if necessary by force.
Let me bncfly mspecr the main elements of this definition.'? The first element
points at national consciousness, ,1 classic example of inter.subjectivity or mutual
belief It is neither necessary nor sufficient for establishing the existence of a nation
that there are natural group features, such as proximity and ancestry. The Dutch
and the Flemish arc quite homogeneous 1Il certain respects, yet they do not form a
nation. The crucial point IS that individuals recognize each other as belonging to
their society. This view permits many different forms of nationhood, such as mono-
lithic and plural society. Yet it excludes certain types uf community, namely kin-
based communities (families, clans), ethnic communities, small-scale communities
(neighborhoods, life style enclaves), regional communities, specialization-based
communities (finns, professional associations) and sectional communities (dubs,
social movements like religious associations, trade unions and the new social move-
ments). These communities are not distinctive and self-contained, III the sense that
they do not constitute an encompassing culture with distinctive characteristics
(landscape, architecture, the arts, food, sports, ceremonies and holidays, and much
more). Global community does not count as a nation, since the world population is
not a group which differs from other populations 111 other worlds (external differ-
ence).IR It is rather a union of nations with different systems of coexistence, like the
imperialist system, the Westphalian system of 1648 and the United Nations system
of 1945 (internal difference). Of course, national consciousness implies that the
number of nations and the size of nationhood are variable. If ethnic or regional
communities Wish to create their own society, then the number of nations may
increase; if they Wish to integrate into the larger society, it may decrease. A nation
may contract (living in contemporary Manhattan as a national experience) or
expand (living on a future earth, surrounded by planets with identified populo-
tions). Both changes have a major impact on state institutions, such as the degree of
separation of powers, decentralization and assignment of group rights.'?
The second element focuses on publicity. Nations have public spheres. ThIS
public sphere contains open territory; shared historical heritage (including myths);
a common economy (with territorial mobility throughout); legal fights and duties
for all members; mass education; mass politics, and many other representative
institutions, practices, and decisions which make their culture self-enforcing. Self-
enforcing culture IS not perfect culture, whatever that may be (free from costs of
entry and exit? blissful?stationary? hegemonic? dosed? old?). It is creative III meet-
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ing manifold demands, durable and dynamic. Civic nations are marked by the sepa-
ration of public and private culture, and by permanent controversies and changes
regarding the boundaries between public and private.
The third element focuses all the loyalty of nationals. Members of a nation are
loyal to each other in concrete interactions and in the abstract following of rules.
They grow up in its pervasive context, thus internalizing its bounded rules, both
the formal ones (constitutional and legal rules) and the informal ones (socialnorms,
conventions, moral maxims). Membership itself is important for their self-identifi-
cation (and for the identification of others, namely compatriots, minorities in a grey
zone, and foreigners). Membership is primarily regarded as a matter of belonging,
not of achievement. Yet there are standards for love of country: soldiers who risk
their lives by saving civilians and employers who sacrifice opportunities for profits
by expanding domestic employment are more deserving than their collegues who
do not live up to such standards. Last but not least, members seek or prescrve an
independent state which protects them and their culture and which is conceived for
good reasons as their own arrangement, 111 both the instrumental and the expres-
sive sense. The nation-state is supposed to guarantee national identity and the
comparative advantages of national membership. Its logic will only be questioned
when and because national identity disappears or becomes less urgent, or the com-
pararivc advantages disappear, or other politics (say, a confederation of states)
become more capable or willing to protect the people. As Rousscau asked 111 1755,
"Do we wish men to be virtuous? Then let us begin by making them love their
country; but how can they love it, if their country be nothing mure to them than to
strangers, and afford them nothing but what it can refuse nobody?"lO These facts
of modern political life force the leaders of the state not only to cherish national
identity as a state-bearing force bur also to influence national identification itself
and to crush reluctant minds. This point (statecraft implies specificsoulcraft] IS self-
evident for the new classic theorists Anderson, Gellner, Smith, and Hobsbawn,
although it has been rather overworked by their epigones.>'
It may seem that the study of national identity is straightforward. The task
requires no more than to determine the nature and significance of national con-
sciousness, intra-national publicity and loyalty to the nation. But to show empiri-
cally that some feature is or is not part of national identity turns out to be complex
and contestable. It is one thing to say that the British are "various in tempera-
ment" (Hume), the Germans are "profound" (Kant}, the Italians are "cynical"
(Gioberri), the French are "vivacious" (Fouillee} or the Dutch are "middle-class"
(Huizinga).22. To clarify Renan's "daily plebiscite" (national identification) is quite
another. One must show how a certain mental variable emerges, changes and still
remams recognizable by users and observers as a distinctive national experience
and an authentic feature of a certain people. More than sixty years after Harold
Lasswcll's World Politics and PersonalInsecurity, there is still no theory of national
identity on a par with Freudian theory of family identity. There are many conun-
drums, such as the contribution of prosperity and backwardness, of habit and deci-
sion, of role and rationality, of conflict and competition across and within
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societies, of multiple kinds of collective identity (religion, class, sex, corporate
career), of Implicitness and idiosyncrasy in robust nationhood, of closure and glob-
alization, of change of character and crisis of identity, and of narrowing and
widening of horizons (expanding concentric circles, in which intimates arc always
closer than compatriots and compatnots are always closer than foreigners, or con-
dcnsing webs, 111 which foreigners are sometimes closer than compatriots and
compatriots are sometimes closer than intimates?)."}
For this reason, I will apply a less burdened concept, namely the notion of basic
culture. This is the part or aspect of national culture which determines the consti-
tution, wluch IS resilient, which lS conceived by many generations as a context that
either facilitates or restricts the formation and realization of their life plans, and
which IS the heart of great debates amongst national historians. Dutch basic culture
can be briefly defined as rhe combination of bourgeois citizenship ("burger-
Iijkheid"), business-like cooperation, oligarchic leadership and organization based
Oil consensus, rhe spirit of commerce, tolerance, and the pnvate domain {"gezd-
lighcid'', "huisclijkheid", "knushcid'T'-tln the final section 1will return to the topic
of Dutch culture.
Nation as Value Container
The number of nations has declined to L5.000, partly due to cruel international
warfare..!.5 The number of pure nation-states, where ethnonational and administra-
tive boundaries coincide without major frictions, IS much smaller still, namely 7
(Denmark, Iceland, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal).
These countries represent merely 4 percent of the world populanon.v'
Should we deplore this state of affairs? More generally, whar does our reflexive
equilibrium tell us here? Oughr we to maximize the number of nations [natiocen-
rric world, national identity as rotal commitment), to minimize its number (nation-
less world, national Identity as irrelevant commitment) or to Improve the way 111
which nations coexist, both within and across governmental and jurisdictional
boundaries? In this section and the next one 1 would like to defend the third
approach of globally embedded nationhood and national identity as partial com-
mitment.P l will leave aside the empirical defence, which basically predicts rhar the
nation-state will survive because of failures of the cosmopolitan alternative (its
instability, inefficiency or illegitimacy in .1 broad sense), so-called functional pre-
conditions of glohal modernization, or inertia and path-dependency in the develop-
ment of human communities.28 I will focus on an ethical defence. First I will discuss
the demands of ethical individualism and its implications for nation-building as a
process, the substantive positive values of national identity as outcome, and the
dual nature of national boundaries. Then (in the next section), J will discuss the
recurrent necessity for external justification of national morality.
Ethical individualism means that individuals matter in a moral perspective, that
all individuals matter, and that they matter equally. Ethical individualism empha-
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sizes the separateness and sovereignty of mature human beings. It is not an ethical
theory itself, like utilitarianism or liberalism, but a test that any plausible ethical
theory should pass. Of course, ethical individualism will permit many pleas for cos-
mopolitan social order (only authoritarian and imperialist ones will fail). Two other
results seem to be more surprising.w First, ethnonationalisr designs will fail. It is
wrong to exclude certain individuals and groups from nation-building by neglect-
ing their reasonable desires or needs for (nun)participation and by applying certain
exterior criteria (race, language), which do not match their interests, are imposed
upon them and turn them into enemies. Second, ethicalindividualism will Justify
the general freedum of individuals as (proro-lnarionals to affiliate or separate. But it
will stress the importance of certain constraints so that nation-building will by and
large realize the vital interests of all those people who are affected by it. These con-
straints will concern non-violence, consent and other principles which may guaran-
tee a dean path of nation-building; constitutional democracy and responsive gov-
ernment at the national level; openness of culture (including admission of certam
categories of migrants, such as political refugees), and permanent humanitarian
obligations.
This is not the place to spell out the consequences of ethical individualism (con-
stitutional right to secession, constitutional protection of minorities, and so on).
But two points can be made now. First, "there is a strong prima facie case on indi-
vidualist premisses for drawing state boundaries so that they correspond with
nationality't.a? Second, the demands of ethical individualism are significant.
According to one author, Southern Italy was Joined onto Northern Italy 111 186r "by
a process of royal conquest, its fragile commercial sector brutally merged with the
North's more flourishing economy, a uniform tax system and customs unions
Imposed on its vulnerable industries, and brigandage rooted out by a full-scale mil-
itary campaign")! Clearly, nineteenth-century civic nationalism in Italy failed the
test of ethical individualism. Perhaps Germany, since the reunification of 1989 will
pass it.
The outcome of national identification is not a side-issue. Most individuals in
modern societies with formalized identity markers (passports, credit cards) will
refer to nationhood when asked to reveal who they are. National identity has
become part of their personality, although some of its components do not sit well
with their well-considered convictions and some of the mechanisms of daily nation-
alization (like the selection of sport news by mass media) operate behind their
backs.s- In spite of (and sometimes owing to) growing recognition of the contin-
gent nature of nationhood, they regard being a "national" as an asset. Most of the
time they are deeply attached to their culture, although for many different reasons
and in many different tales. In the special case of hyphenated identity (such as
African-Americans and Turkish-Germans) this self-image is more complex hut also
more consCIOUS, and sometimes more intense. The following values of national
identity appear to be primary,u
National identity may give a sense of belonging, indeed of the safety of effortless
secure belonging (feeling oneself at home). A nation provides reconciliation of its
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members, both with other human beings and with the limits of human existence.
This value concerns things like the promise of redemption from personal oblivion
(albeit III the military cemetery), the hope of personal renewal through national
regeneration (pride in the past and hope for the future as compensation for the dim
and desperate present), and rescue from alienation, solitude, and complete anonym-
ity (altruism, care).
Economists are Justly criticized for not taking seriously the meaning of social
relations. In standard public goods theory, the citizens have given egoist prefer-
ences for a mixture of public goods, that is goods with the technical features of
non-excludability and jointness of production (such as clean air). But citizens are
also interested 111 essentially communal goods such as conviviality and good atmos-
phere. A party is convivial when people derive benefit from the active enjoyment of
one another's company, not when each of them experiences the pleasures of the
party as a purely personal enjoyment. This is not Just a matter of sympathetic iden-
tification with others. What I identify with IS not someone else's private enjoyment,
but with an enjoyment of theirs which in turn is partly constituted by a similar ref-
erence to the pleasures (SImilarly constituted) of myself and the others.34 The
account of the value of belonging points to these communal goods and their sub-
stitutes as being indispensable for the quality of people's lives. Rawls discusses a so-
called "private society", in which individuals assess social arrangements solely as a
means to their private alms. A society with a public sector crossmg the line of 50 or
60 percent still is a private society in terms of Hobbesian political economyw I
notice that a nation IS imagined as the opposite of pnvate society.
A second value of national identity is fellow-feeling or sociability. National
identity may create the public space which is needed for the development of civil
society. The communication between nationals, and the mutual trust and under-
standing, peaceful coordination and solidary cooperation engendered by commu-
nication, engender more possibilities to solve collective action problems (provision
of public goods), to carry out universalist schemes of SOCial Justice, and to practise
deliberative forms of democracy. It should be stressed that this connection, which
originated with].S. Mill's Representative Government (1860), is not conceptual but
historical. Modern scholarship takes great pains to explore the variation of nation-
al states (authoritarian or democratic, majorirarian or consccintional, and so on).
There may be cases of strong, united nations which turn out to be low-trust soci-
eties marked by failing or missing markets, democratic procedures and voluntary
associations (France during the hollow years of the Intcrbellum, France since 1958
(the fifth republic)) and cases of weak, divided nations which are flourishing CIvil
societies (Western Germany (945-1989).36
A third value involved III national identity IS dignity. The content of the national
idea has evolved ill a zigzag pattern. It referred successively to groups of foreigners,
to communities of students from certain reglOns, to ecclesiastical parties, to the
religious elite (representatives of cultural and political authority), to the population
at large, to a sovereign people, and, finally, to a unique sovereign people as bearer
of the nation-state. Greenfeld boldly concludes that "Nationality elevated every
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member of the community which it made sovereign. It guaranteed status. National
identity is, fundamentally, a matter of dignity. It gives people reasons to be
proud")? In this perspective, the value of national identity is closely connected to
equality of status and active membership, in particular to social participation as pre-
requisite to self-identity (self-esteem, self-respect, integrity, individuality) and to
personal liberty (voluntary choice, material freedom, autonomy). Kymlicka has
been arguing persuasively that support of societal culture in favor of national
majorities and intra-national minorities is consistent with the liberal commitment
to freedom. His conception has been nicely summarized: "One of the things that
makes autonomy such a crucial value is that it is a condition of our being able to
think out what the good life for us consists in. But this thinking can only be effec-
tive to the extent that we possess a vocabulary for it. By this is meant not just the
words but also the lively sense of what the different life-alternatives are which they
name. This vocabulary we inherit from our culture. Cultures are not closed worlds
and borrow a lot from each other. But successful borrowing requires a home cul-
ture in which new ideas are integrated, and without a functioning home culture
people are incapacitated. Now if liberalism involves treating people with equal
respect, and in particular attempting to ensure equality in autonomy, then a case
can be made for measures to protect and promote minority cultures that may be
under great pressure m the larger society",38
Of course, the dignity value of national membership is only safe if the main insti-
tutions of national society reinforce dignity. Dignity does not depend on personal
favors and occasional balances of power, but on social openness guaranteed by the
rule of law, VIgilant public debate, the plurality of associations, and social rights. As
the discussion among political theorists about "shared undersrandings'' has shown,
the understandings on which nations as communities of memory, personality and
place are based do not necessarily involve the sacredness of historical tradition (say
patnarchy or repressive tolerance) or the unarticulatibility of personal background
(say being Rhineland or Jewish). These understandings could be those beliefs that
we can reasonably and rationally endorse and consciously articulate as our guiding
principles. From the viewpoint of broad rationality, such beliefs may entail certain
innocent or benign myths and fictions. Furthermore, shared understandings may be
constantly renewed by being reaffirmed and acted from in the present. This pre-
emprs both break-down and rigidityw
The final value of national identity is self-determination. It is desirable that peo-
ple develop their own authentic culture, that they determine the destiny of their
own polity, and that they join this dual enterprise according to their own view of
the universal common good, by their own continuing learning and struggle, and at
their own expense. Certain conditions regarding honest and fair representation
(who are the real "we"?), the role of the democratic state, minimally favorable err-
cumstances for self-liberation and sovereignty, and global accountability and
responsibility (the duty not to harm other nations and nation less persons; the duty
to help tyrannized nations or vulnerable nationless persons) have to be fulfilled in
order to elevate the value of self-determination.
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In my account, national identity works like a value container analogous to the
nation-state as a "power container" (Oiddens' term). I did not argue that the
values of belunging, fellow-feeling, dignity and self-determination must be sup-
ported, nor that the world must he neatly divided into nations if we endorse these
values ("let thousand fortresses grow"'. But I do believe that these four values will
have some weight in the rnoral public philosophy of reasonable men and women,
that national identity is one way to make the least-cost creation of these values
more probable, and that we are still facing a shortage of credible options here. So I
am inclined to agree with Kymlicka and Gould that a nch and secure cultural and
democratic culture at the national level is necessary to human freedom. Cultural
membership is one of the pnmary social goods, the "things every rational man is
presumed to want".4°
This account of the value of national identity would be incomplete without an
argument about the dual role of boundaries." Conceptually. nation-building boils
down to the elimination of "internal" boundanes in society (say between nch and
poor or peasants and townsfolk) and the creation of "external" boundaries (say
between the reunited Germans and their nine neighbours). It can be shown that it
IS Impossible to attain a boundaryless social order which supplies mankind in an
organized and rule-bound way with the long list of entitlements, capacities and
commodities that [eft-communitanans (like social democrats) usually aspire to.
The order may degenerate and turn into a despotic superstate; it may introduce
administrative boundaries on a technical basis (like internalization of externalities)
which will he either artificial and ineffective or effective but inconsistent (return to
national differentiation by stealth), or it may reduce the list tu the demands of 11111l-
imal morality, such as world peace and basic human nghts. But the inevitability of
frontiers between nation-stares does not imply that national boundaries are entire-
ly and unquestionably justified. It can also be shown that perfect boundaries do not
exist. \Vell drawn Internal boundaries may be destroyed (the case of national
minorities, such as the QUCbCCOlS), badly drawn internal boundaries may persist
(the case of ethnic minorities, such as groups of immigrant workers). Bad external
boundaries may create trapped minorities (such as the Catholics of Northern Ire-
land) or stranded majorities (such as the Protestants of Northern Ireland). Good
external boundaries may permit accumulation of extreme and unfair inequalities to
the cost of those globally worse-of]' (doubly-excluded minorities, oppressed by
their own government and neglected by others). So while undifferentiated cos-
mopolitanism is utopian or dysropian, many cases of nation-based homogenization
are bound to be morally contested. I simply refer here to Dutch and Belgian pillar-
izarion after the collapse of nineteenth-century liberal leadership, and, elsewhere in
Europe, to "The difficulties of integrating the regional divisions of France and of
turning 'peasants into Frenchmen'; the problems posed by the centrifugal propen-
sities of 'invertebrate' Spain; the obstacles encountered in turning the inhabitants of
multiple cities and provinces into 'Iralians'; the forging of the individualized and
reluctant 'ornc towns' of Germany into one Reich: and the enduring divisions of
Britain between its Celtic fringe and 'Sassenach' core, and between its classes, divid-
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ed into 'two nations' ".42 I conclude that national membership is an element of the
good life, but that we also have to take mto account the transaction costs of its
institutionalization and the benefits of alternative post-nationalist designs.
Open Society or Tribe
In the last two sections I have defended an intermediate view. It may be helpful to
make this view more explicit now, in order to see whether it IS also possible to
defend an intermediate view with respect to the aggregation of values and disvalucs
of national identity and, ultimately, the nation as moral order in which the value of
national identity is realized. I will try to show that open societies (CIVIC nations) arc
more likely than tribes (closed nations) to maximize the net overall value of nation-
al identity and to realize the four values at the highest sustainable level.
As to the existence of nations, I have tried to navigate between "chameleonism"
(national identity is in the eyes of the beholder) and essentialism (national identity
IS natural and perennial).43 Although national identity flows from the attitudes of
imaginative and purposeful subjects both as "users and observers" (Searle's phrase),
it is not as completely arbitrary, flexible and liable to manipulation as the
chameleonist view would argue. There is something sticky to national identity as a
"common we-intention" based on shared language, residence and memories, and
to the centralized and sovereign nation-state as an 'institutional fact',44 But this
does not Imply, as the essentialist view would argue, that national identity is an
objective moral order. Like sclfhood, nationhood is the result of a never-ending
process of self-discovery and self-invention, engendered by Imperfect individuals
and groups against the backdrop of intersubjectivity (talk, display of authority and
- today - public opinion, mass media and intellectuals).
As to the value of national identity, I have tried to avoid two mistaken views,
namely the particulansr view that national identity IS the source of the whole moral
and ethical system and the universalist view that your national identity IS morally
irrelevant {since it IS as arbitrary as your genetic make-up and family back-
ground),45 Both views are unduly deterministic and Simplistic.
As to the nation as a moral order, I again reject certain views. It is trivial to
define national identity as something intrinsically bad, say as "a collection of people
who hate their neighbors and share a common illusion about their ethnic origin",
or to define it as something instrinsically good, say as "a democratic community of
free and equal citizens which legitimizes domestic integration and international
action by its state".4 6 These equations move too swiftly frum the "is" of shared
understandings to the "ought" of legitimate values, rules and virtues, They also
miss the basic point that national identity, for instance the customary Dutch pursuit
of accommodation between representatives of different minorities, enables and
constrains the kind of goals which reasonable people consider to be legitimate (tak-
ing everything into account),
,80 Josde Beus
I also reject the view that national Identity IS or should be a detailed, dosed and
hierarchical list of unambiguously defined traits. This mnnist view is often at odds
with historical situations, like the British one between 1707 and J837- In the words
of Colley: "Acknowledging that all sorts of men and women found good and pow-
erful reasons to identify themselves as Britons 1Il this period IS not, of course, to say
that (lUmen and women did so. Nor is it to say that those who supported the
nation against attacks from without gave uncritical support as well to the existing
order at home. Nor, emphatically, IS it the case that a growmg sense of Bririshness
after 1707 completely displaced and crowded out other loyalties."47 My argument
about the value of national Identity IS written 111 the spirit of CIVIC or republican
nationalism, dating back to an eighteenth-century tradition. Thinkers such as Mon-
rcsquieu, Paine and Kanr may still teach us how to oppose unreasonable forms of
polity (such as absolute monarchy and one-party democracy) and to welcome
nationalization as civilization of ethnic communities (including economic and tech-
nical development) and as progress towards a mixed cosmopolitan order.48 In this
liberal view national identity should be incomplete, that IS, vague, open-ended and
loosely structured, 111 order to allow for the plurality of personal and political con-
ceptions of national life. Surely there IS a gap between this ideal and ordinary
national identity as described by historians like Colley. But Miller is on the right
track when he observes that the identity of nations is more indeterminate (abstract,
amorphous, contested) than the identity of more immediate communities, such as
clans and ncighborhoods.e
Let us take a closer look at the nationalist moral order. Is national identification
required for the flourishing of human personality? Clearly not, since human beings
can satisfy their finest social needs at higher and lower levels of community. Fur-
thermore, national identification can easily become pathological (the frame of mind
of Balkan ethnic nationalists, Hum and Tutsi extremists, and the Irish Orange
Order come to mind here). Should we help our compatriots first? Yes, if special
relations turn the scale (say when I am the only person who can help you, the vic-
tim of a tram crash In China, since I speak both Dutch and Chinese). No, if other
moral considerations carry more weight (the Chinese next to you IS more serious-
ly hurt). Is patriotism a virtue? In many cases it is, but in some cases patriotic acts
are sinful (for example military service when your government IS fighting an unjust
war or oppresses you and your people at home). Horace's "Duke et decorum est
pro patria mori" explicitly refers to immature lads, who ought to expose them-
selves to discipline and danger, and excludes mature men, who are supposed to
find true greatness in quiet piety.50 Does the right to self-determination derive from
the values of national identity? Yes, but cultural sclf-dcrcnnination does not neces-
sarily imply state sovereignty, peoples have to compromise when other peoples
hold equivalent territorial claims (and settle for a pluralist nation-state) and, most
importantly, the right to self-determination is qualified (no minority decision, no
unilateral decision, no lIlVaSIOn of the basic rights of inhabitants of the country itself
or of surrounding countries, no abuse of rights as a way of economic or military
aggrcssicnj.v
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Is there a principle of non-intervention between nation-states, apart from the oblig-
ations which follow from international treaties? Yes, but there are circumstances in
which nations should help other nations (famines, catastrophes) and there are cir-
cumstances in which there is a duty to intervene (crimes against humanity abroad,
missing states (the hegemony of war lords)). Is the nation-state the best device to
realize the humanist ideal? Yes, if we take the record of democratic welfare states
seriously. No, if the present wave of globalization continues and millions of mem-
bers of different nations will be facing identical problems of collective action con-
cerning migration, pollution, crime control and stabilization of trade cycles. Glob-
alization of market exchange, communication, entertainment, medical risks and
corporate strategies (both public and pnvarc policies) will probably lead to the
renaissance of national idemity. Just like the earlier waves, the current "neoliberal"
wave of globalization is attended by a striking proliferation of sovereign states
(many of them starting democracies), nationalist movements, and public controvcr-
sies about saving narional citizenship. This proliferation effect has always been
overlooked or underrated by unilinear universalisr philosophers of history (Chris-
tians, Islamites, liberals, Marxists, adherents of modernization theory). But global-
ization does undermine the legitimacy of fully sovereign states. It promotes human
unity by blurring boundaries like the emergence of truly common war memories
has done {the unification effecr).P·
The crux of my negative answers to questions concerning nationalist moral
order is that a general, unqualified and absolute defence of national identity is non-
sense. Leading philosophers such as Maclnryre have tried to improve on the argu-
ment of the associational nature of national obligations. They argue that there is
something within national identity which Justifies nationalist moral order: the very
concept of membership or solidarity, the jointness of commitment, equality of con-
cern and respect as rhe best common interpretation of national bonds, or the fixed
link between certain given expressions of national identity and the person's mental
constitution and moral integrity.53 But this "internal" justification is insufficient. It
may legitimize particular national identities and particular valuations of the nation
which are excessively exclusive. Tribes or dosed nations may engender belonging,
fellow-feeling, dignity and self-determination. But so do the Mafia, the private com-
munity of the rich in Bear Creek and all nation-states which act as large-scale pri-
vate societies in the global commons. Any plausible justification of any specific
national identity should entail external points of view, in particular the point of
view of privacy of nationals and the point of view of humanity. There is simply no
magical tautology or iron law which establishes that nation-building improves the
quality of life of the millions of new insiders and outsiders whose interests arc
affected here. So the political and social philosopher has to examine the whole
chain of "national" home coming, creating of public space, assigning of dignity and
emancipation (processes, rerms, consequences)
Whether nationalization of the world means civilization and humanization of
the world, seems to depend on two factors. One IS the content of national identity,
or what Miller has called the specific "common ethos" of a narion.w The other fac-
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tor is the interplay between evolving national identity as cultural movement and
authoritative nationalism as political movemenr.z My positive answer to questions
about nationalist moral order points to the possibility of mutual feedback between
national identity and Civil society - or in purely normative terms the "decent soci-
ety", the "just society" or the "democratic society". The first may bring in some
extra-rational foundations of the second, while the second may bring in some ratio-
nal foundations of the first. The tie of nationality is a precondition for the emer-
gence of a diversity of civil societies. The world-wide joint venture between civic
nations IS a precondition for domestication of the kind of vicious nationalism which
seduces mankind to think with its blood and iron-ore.56
The Trials otPost-Nationaliem in the Netherlands
According to Glover, "It is onc sign of a civilized country if the national anthem is
heard with a mixture of mild embarrassment and jokiness, rather than with emo-
tion-choking seriousness." sz Unfortunarely, social scientists have to work with less
poetic indicators of post-nationalism, like the introduction of global social policies
for poor people 111 poor countries and the disappearance of national pride.58 Ther-
horn collected a lot of data to identify post-nationalism in Europe. He observes a
considerable decrease of national pride, a limited willingness to fight for one's own
country and a new commitment concerning peace, human rights, personal freedom
and the fight against poverty and pollution 111 the world: "There are behavioural as
well as attitudinal reasons for characterizing Western Europe as post-nationalist,
defining 'Western Europe' as Europe west of the Oder-Neisse and of the Adriatric.
Even if arguably not post-nationalist, however, in the late twentieth century this
area has become the least nationalist part of the world".59
In this context, the Netherlands is a test case for the resilience of national iden-
tity. In the peaceful and prosperous years between r945 and 1980 its self-Image used
to he self-evident, satisfied and relaxed, on the verge of post-national ethos. Today,
Dutch identity is mixed with a sense of vulnerability. The dream ranking of the
Netherlands as a dynamic welfare society, as a multicultural immigration country,
and as an equivalent member-state m a truly federal Europe, is a thing of the past.
At present, the Dutch do not know exactly what the terms of this ranking mean
and they question its feasibility or revise its desirability. Their self-doubt IS growing
because fortunate external conditions have come to an end {through the rise of
unemployment and poverty, and the growmg competitiveness of firms in Eastern
Europe) and the worsening of internal conditions (such as the laborious function-
ing of many government agencies). In terms of culture, Dutch basic culture shifted
from progressiveness to conservatism, the fashionable combination of globalization
and individualization turned out to be a problematic strategy of community sur-
vival, and the SOCial price to be paid for joining the post-Maastricht European
Union was higher than expected. Let me clarify these three developments.
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During the long 1960s Dutch basic culture was subject to a progressive revolution.
Citizenship meant "dispersal of knowledge, income and power" (a slogan of the
Dutch New Left). Cooperation meant expansion of the public sector, in particular
of encompassing provisions for social welfare, social security and well-being [edu-
cation, health care). Leadership meant that authorities behaved responsibly and
responsively, and that consensus had to be organized bottom-up (participation).
Trade meant that Dutch companies had to exploit their worldwide profit opportu-
nities within the bounds of just international order. Tolerance and privacy meant an
all-out combat agamst all forms of discrimination, a chance for people to experi-
ment with their lives, and special rights fat women, employees, migrants, students
and prisoners.
Today there is a growing concern about the shady sides of progressive culture
(the collapse of the faith in God and of the churches; the explosion of industrial dis-
ability benefits and drugs-based organized crime), which results in growing support
for conservative solutions (family values, workfare, law and order, Immigration
stop). New conservatism has to do both with equilibrium (it is feared that without
Christian, humanistic and national-bourgeois impulses the Netherlands will slip
into a vulgar-commercial monoculture) and learning behaviour (rational response
to economic insecurity, to increasing mobility in society and to overshooting per-
missiveness).
The second development is characteristic for a small open society, which - like
a small open economy - is influenced III many things by the outside world and
influences the outside world in few. How do rational inhabitants of a country cope
with the fact that it has no mote prospects of expansion and hegemony (the Gold-
en Age of the Dutch Republic will not repeat itself) and always runs the fisk of
retreat and extinction? One must choose between opening or closure of external
boundaries and between free or imposed internal boundaries. The Dutch strategy
of survival has always been scale enlargement (external openness) and circle reduc-
tion (internal closure). Hence, the mixture of colonial trade and small-town social
life (eighteenth century), of industrialization and pillarization along religious lines
(between 1880 and 1960) and of mdustriallife in an advanced service economy and
flourishing civicassociations between government and individual (since r94S).
The rationale of the strategy of scale enlargement and circle reduction IS both
appealing and vulnerable. The surplus of wealth, technology and assortment goes
in tandem with the loss of distinctiveness and the fear of the envy of strangers and
foreign powers. Such losses and feats can be counterbalanced by numerous domes-
tic "pigeonholes" (hokjes en schorjes), that is, categories and cleavages which satis-
fy the need for self-respect, roots and display of power. This peculiar strategy has
become a second nature to the Dutch. It is marked by complaisance of elitcs (which
want to he up-to-date and regard any next round of modernization as inevitable)
and agonizing reappraisal of the tensions and compromises that go with complai-
sance. Does the Netherlands matter to someone who does not live there? Do pro-
ducers of art and science create something which comes close to works of genius?
What about the pathology of looking up to great nations (Germany then, the US
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now), disdain of other small nations (Belgium, Denmark), and the lack of care for
Dutch traditions, mutual curiosity and open competition? Are the rounds of mod-
ernization (yesterday's social regulation, today's privatization) compatible?
The present answer to these difficult questions is the combination of globaliza-
tion and individualization. Globalization compels the Dutch to adapt their institu-
tions III order to compete and to keep in touch with the present world centers of
technology, science, management, entertainment, etc. Individualization results in a
growmg exit of discontented individuals from poorly performing institutions (float-
ing voters, job-changers, divorced couples). Together, these two trends generate
diffuse networks with flexible members. The real issue of identity here is the ero-
sion of overloaded institutions. Therefore, it is not surprising to learn that Dutch
public debate in the 1990S is concerned with the degree of corruption, self-purifica-
tion and innovation of all but the major institutions: markets, ministries, inner-
cities, families, corporations, schools, universities, small firms, farmers, peak-associ-
ations of labor and capital, political parries, public broadcasting, police force, and
railways (no exhaustiveness intended},
The third and final problem of Dutch identity relates to European integration. In
the old days of the European (Economic) Community, Europe functioned like an
umbrella. It protected the Dutch on rainy days, that is, in policy areas where the
national government did not have the capacity to protect its citizens (peaceful
cooperation between the great European powers, agriculture). It remained unused
on sunny days when its services were not needed: m policy areas where the Dutch
government was in control (taxation, social security). The European Union does
not seem to have the same use value, nor IS it better equipped than the pre-Maas-
tricht community to generate quasi-national European allegiance among the
Dutch. Both the political and business elites and the voters are hecoming more and
more concerned about the loss of diplomatic and voting powers 111 a union of more
than 15 member-states, the loss of grip in monetary and fiscal affairs, the weakness
of deviant policies (like the Dutch libertarian approach to drugs consumption), the
democratic deficit of Europe, and the lack of coordination and leadership at critical
junctures (intervention in Yugoslavian civic war, immigration planning, creation of
jobs, elimination of protectionist laws). For the first time since the Treaty of Rome
(1957), the Dutch are doubting the wisdom of sovereignty transfer. Their nation-
state became the bed of their ideal of rule of law, social protection and democracy.
Today they have to come to terms with [he likelihood that European integration
will weaken the Dutch nation-state without solid gains III terms of European effec-
tiveness and democratic accountability.
Dialogue
Klamer: Since your move to Cromngen you must have changed as the argument
that you present here IS quite different from what you did before. Even the mention-
ing of national Identity IS a taboo in academic circles, especially the more progres-
sive sections in which you move. What happened?
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De Reus: It started in those Harvard days when I was writing a book on equality
and the good life. Influenced by ArnarryaSen I tried to asked the standard question:
the equality of what? The things to share could be utility, capability, mcorne or
whatever. Economists know what efficiency IS but not what equity is, so that I tried
to son it out. After I finished the book I got an intellectual shock when I realised
that I had left out 50 percent of the Issue which is addressed by the question: equal-
ity between whom? In the real world your feelings and sense of solidarity and
membership determine your willingness to live in an egalitarian society. So how to
incorportate those?
There was a second discovery as well, the same you yourself made in your book
on the Dutch tribe of economists and that is that Dutch economists are very inter-
ested III the topic of equality whereas American economists are less so. So there is
something peculiar to the Dutch community of economists that causes this fasci-
nation. That attitude is reflected III the ongolllg Dutch debate on the welfare state.
Before I was only preoccupied with the problems that came up in this debate and
tried to think of solutions. Now I recognise that social security is much more than
a solution to a market problem and reflects a feature of Dutch national identity.
Groningen is the outcome of this process of discovery. I don't have to write in
the framework of analytical econormc theory and that gIvesme tremendous space.
Insofar as the suspicions of our colleagues are concerned, I find them especially
among economists, social scientists in general and philosophers, but not among
historians and anthropologists. Incidentally, economists are coming around to
recognise the role of culture. Just think of the work of Douglas North, lames
Buchanan and game theory. But their tendency IS to subsume the phenomenon of
culture in their rationality framework. I prefer to turn things around and possibly
sidestep the issue of rationality altogether. The particular form that rationality takes
may very well be influenced by national identity rather the other way around.
Klamer: We are talking while the Olympics are going on. I cannot help seeing con-
firmation of your argument in that event.
De Reus: In two ways. Quite III general, the Olympics create a nice belance between
national and cosmopolitan concerns. The underlying idea is that the world is a
peaceful place and that it is good to get together to play spons. On the other side
these athletes identify themselves first of all with the nations they represent. The
critics advocate canceling the Olympics because they only attract terrorism, stimu-
late chauvinistic feelings and have become too commercial. These arguments are
basically rubbish. These games are nice though partially corrupt mixtures of child-
ish nationalism and clever internationalism. Of course we do miss something like
Justicegames, peace-keeping forces in the Balkan or Western Africa.
The Games shows, incidentally, how strong the Dutch national identity is. Most
Dutch scholars, journalists and politicians will tell you that the Dutch are far from
nationalistic but watch how excited the Dutch get about their athletes. It is all
orange for their eyes although they will say this is simply because of the excellence
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of the performance. Because of this unease that Dutch scholars have towards the
issue of national identity, it is hard for them to look at Dutch identity with an open
mind.
Klamer: The problem is, as you have acknowledged, to know what that identity IS.
De Bcus: Yes. That is a very important Issue. Here I merely sort out a few relevant
notions and hyporbese. like that of basic culture. The essay is all about the Justifi-
cation of national identity, not explanation,
Klamer: What follows? Would you, for example, now write a different program for
the socialist democratic party?
De Beus: No and that is because the program that I wrote in 1994 was very much
informed by a concern with the Dutch identity and with citizenship. If you ask what
follows, I'd think In the first place of the presence of immigrants in Dutch society
and the European Unum. I know now better than before how to think about imrni-
grants in our society and about the road between Brussels and The Hague. Con-
cerning the immigrants, many politicians and scholars presumed that they should
stick to their own culture and they had every reason to think in that way because
they could not imagine that there is something of a Dutch identity that these immi-
grants could adopt. As I see it now, we should try to have integration of migrants 111
Dutch society and this integration should involve an exchange between their public
cultures and ours. In other words, they have to learn about Dutchness and have to
assimilate at least some of that to be able to function as citizens of this society.
As far as Europe is concerned, I am a European and am therefore committed to
the idea of a European Union. But now more than before I would stress the impor-
tance of the nation-states making up the EC. The European Union should do
everything it can to strengthen the nation states. We don't have a better democrat-
IC setting so it would be very dangerous to promote supranational networks.
National identities are too valuable to squander in this attempt to forge a umon.
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Missing Ethics in Economics
DEIRDRE MCCWSKEY
McCloskey (University of Iowa and Erasmus University) is not only known for her
work in economic history but also for her characterisation of economics as rhetoric.
She and 1 collaborated in various ways in developing the rhetorical perspective hut
our opinions have always diverged when it came to economics. She remained (innly
committed to the perspective of the Old Chicago School (pro-market. anti-govern-
ment, casuistic argumentation in the spirit of Annen Alchian, Ronald Coase and
Theodore Schultz) whileJ was flirting with sociological and aruhropoicgicai perspec-
tives in economics. In this essay she comes out as a cultural economist. While still
beingcommitted to Chicago principles sheargues in the grand oid tradition of eco-
nomics as a moral science.
!H AVE gradually come to understand that culture matters for economics and forthe economy. It was hard to learn, because I am a "neoclassical" economist,from the subschool of Chicago. Admitting culture Into econonucs has the prob-
lem of all revisions of an old way of thinking. Schopenhauer said, the new thought
"forces its way as an enemy into the previously closed system of our own convic-
tions, shatters the calm of mind we have attained through this system, demands
renewed efforts of us and declares OUt former efforts to have been in vain" (l8SI
[1970], number 19, p. 124). No wonder some of the most dogmatic scientists and
scholars are the most learned.
Come to think of it, the way we are taught economics is another of those cul-
rural facts that matter [Klamer 1983; van Dalen and Klamer 1996J. We neoclassicals
are taught early to sneer at sociologists and philosophers, anthropologists and Eng-
lish professors, who foolishly believe that culture matters. What the lesser hreeds
do not know are called within economics "separation theorems" or "neutrality
results." When a management consultant talks about the "culture" of IBM the neo-
classical economist sneers and says, "Don't you know that the market simply
bypasses allthat? IBM can have any old culture it wants, but the tastes of consumers
and the technology of computers will force IBM to behave the same way." When an
anthropologist finds it strange that economics does not acknowledge the symbolic
value of consumption the Chicago economists sneer and say, "De gustibus non dis-
putandum. Consumers can value beads or blankets any way they want, but when
,RB Dcrdre McCloskey
the relative price of a good rises you'll find less of it bought." Therefore, econo-
mists think they can have any opimon they want about the value of culture, but still
believe that the culture is separated from the economic bchavior.
I now believe they are wrong. I do not conclude that economic analysis IS use-
less. That is a 11011 sequitur much indulged in the century or so that intellectuals
have felt themselves excused from knowing any eCOllOlTIlCS beyond the first few
pages of The Communist Manifesto. "Economics is a partial view of humankind,"
they note. And then: "Therefore it has nothing valuable to say, and I am free to
offer amateur opmlons about the economy without having opened a book on eco-
uomics." It's like the parallel anti-humanist non sequitur, much indulged by econo-
mists over the same century: "Answers tu ethical questions often do not have the
demonstrative force of mathematics.Therefore ethics has nothing to say, and I can
feel free to adopt ethical opinions though ignorant of ethical reflection."
The reasons I offer for believing that the neoclassical and Chicago economists
are wrong arc internal to ccononucs as an intellecrual project, not missiles
launched at economics from the outside. I am still a neoclassical and even Chicago
School economist, and Wish their projects well. But I believe now that neglecting
the culture - for example, neglecting ethics - will make the economic analysis
wrong. By this I mean "wrong" in terms that economists themselves would recog-
nize as relevant. I believe now that an economics that wants to get the economy
right has to know about ethics. AmI an economy that wants to get its business
right has to practice ethics.
Bur reasons will not quite explain the story (they never do). As a Chicago econ-
omist sitting in the Social Science Building on 59th Street around 1975 I started to
worry about the "methodology" of the school, which even then seemed to me
primitive. I read some philosophy of science, especially Karl Popper, but didn't see
how it could help. Then in 1979 I read, on the advice of Wayne Booth 1Il English at
Chicago, some "rhetoric" and in a flash (it seemed to me) it was clear. Economics
had a "rhetoric," which is to say a mode of persuasion. But when you think about
it - and it took me years to figure this out - if economics (or physics or mathemat-
ics: it's not about "hardness") is rhetorical, then it's not so different from cultures of
discourse in other fields, such as literature or philosophy. Economics uses
metaphors. Economists call them "models." But then it dawned on me - slowly,
slowly - that economics also uses another figure of thought, stories. Economists
don't call their stones anything, because they are not used to thinking of stories as
part of thought. Only then did I start seeing what's wrong with an economics that
omits ethics. The ethical theories that most appealed to me were narrative - not
the Platonic or Kantian ethics of abstract rules but an Aristolean or a feminist ethics
of who you are, and what sort of virtues such a person might have.
After all, Adam Smith was a professor of moral philosophy, John Stuart Mill an
ethical and political philosopher. True, the worldly philosophers since then have
drifted away from ethics. Yet the subject of economics is ethical - the study of
human character and its virtues - which makes a claim to sidestepping ethics wor-
nsorne. We do not worry much if an astrophysicist refuses to think ethically. We
should worry if an economist does.
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It would be a strange economics, of course, that did not treat at least the pursuit of
happiness, and therefore the ethics of getting more. Economics has a branch called
"welfare economics" Into which ethical questions have been diverted since the
1920S. The graduate schools teach that the sole ethical judgment an economist
should make is the least controversial one; if every person is made better off by
some change (in such a case it is called "Pareto optimal"), the change should take
place. Even philosophers likeJohn Rawls have adopted the notion of Pareto opti-
mality, trying in the modern economist's manner to pull a decently detailed ethical
theory out of a hat. Welfare economics has shown recently some stirnngs of more
complex ethical life, as in the works of the economist and philosopher Amartya
Sen. But mainly welfare cccnorrucs is roth-century utilitarianism stuffed and
mounted and fitted with marble eyes.
The amorality of economic morality is best exemplified in a recent paper by
Daniel Hausman and Michael McPherson III the leading Journal of economics, the
Journal of Economic Literature. In a long piece the writers (one a philosopher, the
other an economist) do not get beyond scrutiny of the stuffed bird. No hint is given
In their paper that ethical theory has developed in the past thirty years beyond Kant
and especially beyond Bentham.
We can do better. The first point, a cheap one (we are dealing with economics,
remember), is that economists have ethics, perforce. The literary critic Wayne
Booth remarks III his book on the ethics of storytelling, The Company We Keep
(1988), that "even those who work hard to purge themselves of all but the most
abstract formal interests turn out to have an ethical program in mind" (p. 7). All
right, yes: ideology motivates economists, despite their protestations of ideological
innocence.
The bigger point, however, is not ideology and its mability to see itself. We
know that already. The bigger point is that economic stories, as Booth argues in
detail for the European novel, have an ethical burden. The word "ethical" comes
from the Greek for "character"; every act arising from character has an ethical
dimension. (The word "morality," incidentally, is from Latin mos, moris, "custom,"
and is notably more social, as one might expect from the custom-minded Romans;
in English of course the two words are synonyms, and will be used so here.) "We all
live a great proportion of our lives in a surrender to stories. Even the statisticians
and accountants must in fact conduct their daily business largely 1I1 stones: the
reports they give to superiors; the accounts they deliver to tax lawyers; the anec-
dotes and parables they hear. ." (p. 14, italics his). "All of us spontaneously make
narratives out of just about every bit of information that comes our way" (p. 162).
"It is impossible to shut our eyes and retreat to a story-free world" (p. 236). If we
enter into it we "embrace the patterns of desire of any narrative" [p. 28S)' A
stronger connection between economics and culture can hardly be made: stories
are the vocabulary for our cultures; stories instruct us in ethics; economics is ethi-
cal. Therefore, economics is suffused with culture, and neglecting the fact will
result 1I1 stones told unconsciously.
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Booth's central question about the corruptions of literature (p. r r]: "What kind of
company are we keeping as we read or listen?" As our mothers told us, keeping bad
company is bad for us. The levels at which we are asked to be a kind of person by
economic writing need to be distinguished.
Along with high-minded precepts about the production of SCience, the scientific
paper III economics as elsewhere encourages the low-minded notion that other eth-
ical questions art: "just matters of opinion." It is part of modernist talk on the radio,
as when a lawyer confronted with the immorality of a law practice based on stirring
up racial animosity (the example IS not hypothetical) replies by saying, "Well, that's
a value judgment." The scientific paper m econonucs treats ethical matters of
income distribution (say) as similarly unarguable, like one's preference for choco-
late Ice cream. The question that remains, of course, is, "How do we think about
our judgments, once we decide that our goal is to think about them and not simply
to assert them?" (Booth, p. 59). The values asserted by the scientific paper m eco-
normcs and elsewhere are certainly not all bad. But it IS worth remarking sharply
that they are not all good, either, even though Scientific.
The scientific paper in economics has an implied reader it shares with other self-
consciously scientific productions of the culture. The implied reader has some fea-
tures that are unattractive: he is cold-blooded, desiccated, uninvolved. The case of
Isaac Newton and his invention, the SCientific paper, IS the model (Bazerman, r9B8,
Chap. 4).
And as Booth says, "artists often imitate the roles they create. The writer is
moved, III reality, toward the virtues or vices imagined for the sake of the work
itself" (I" lO8). The same is true of academics, perhaps more so. Historians of the
medieval papacy or students of comparative politics adopt their subjects' methods,
at least in spirit. It is not irrelevant that Henry Kissingcr's first book was on Met-
rcrnich. Anthropologists have begun to wonder recently about the effects the peo-
ple they study have on them. The economist asks the reader to take on certain eth-
ical positions for the sake of the econornisric argument. Most of us don't like the
implied reader uf economic stories: "Am I willing to be the kind of person that this
story-teller is asking me to be?" (Booth, p. 33). Ahout the coldly calculating homo
economicus, no, say we, with 'rears. "A levelling, rancorous, rational sort of mind!
That never looked out of the eye of a saint/ Or out of a drunkard's eye."
And yet the rational calculation had better be done, by someone, or else we will
homb German civilians at night for no gain or choose manned space flight over
unmanned. The person you arc asked to be in a modern economic argument IS not
attractively romantic, no aristocratic hero, but IS a character that society cannot do
without. He is usefully realistic "bout constraints and choices, though a trifle unrc-
Ilcctivc. In other words, on utilitarian grounds (there it is again) the economist is
necessary. In policy questions the ethical position that economics recommends IS
that of the social engineer, who provides plans indifferently for full employment or
extermination camps. The social engineer will protest that he would have nothing
to do with extermination camps. But then he must ask where he draws the line, an
ethical deliberation that economists are reluctant to undertake.
Missing Ethics in Economics
The levelling, rancorous, rational sort of mind in modern economics can be justified
more deeply. It is in fact a part - only a part, though often claimed to be the whole-
of the ethic of the modern bourgeoisie. The most important point to be made about
crhics 111 economics, and the main point I wish to make here, is that economics is part
uf the ethical theory of bourgeois life. The "part" IS the problem. Modern economics
has forgotten its orgins in ethical reflection about commercial societies, and therefore
has substituted a levelling, rancorous, rational sort of mind for the much fuller reflec-
tion by the inventors of economics, the men of the Scottish Enlightenment.
We have two ways of talking about the virtues, and seem stuck on them. One is
patrician, what John Casey calls "pagan" virtues. The classical four are those of
Odysseus: prudence, temperance, justice, and courage. The aristocrat is honorable,
great hearted in hospitality, quick to anger. "You wine sack, with a dog's eyes, with
a deer's heart," says Achilles - exhibiting more courage than prudence, temper-
ance, or justice - "Never/ once have you taken courage in your heart to ann with
your people."
The other way of virtue-talk is plebeian, the way of Se. Paul.The peasant suffers
yet endures. "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no
power but of God. Owe no man any thing, but to love one another." Faith, hope,
and charity, these three, but the greatest IS charity. It is a "slave morality", bending
to the aristocratic virtues that Nietzsche and other Hellenizers prized. The two
vocabularies of the virtues are spoken in the Camp and the Common. Achilles
struts through the Camp m his Hephaesrian armor, exercising a noble wrath. Jesus
stands barefoot on the mount, preaching to the least of the Commoners.
And yet we live mostly now in the Town, we bourgeoisie, or else we are
moving to rownly occupations as fast as we can manage, trading the old cow for a
lac. The aristocracy is gone, though some intellectuals wish not. And the predic-
tion that the proletariat at the other end would become the universal class has
proven to be mistaken.
It is usual to praise a pagan or a Christian virtue, and then to complain how
much we modems lack it. Shamefully we bourgeoisie are neither saints nor heroes.
The age is one of neither pagan gold nor Christian silver, but mere iron - or alu-
minum, or plastic. The townsfolk are useful, maybe necessary; but not virtuous.
"Why, the very idea. Bourgeois virtue!?" The bourgeois virtues have been reduced
to the single vice of greed.
The intelligentsia thunders at the middle class,but offers no advice on how to be
good within it. The only way to become a good bourgeois, say Flaubert and Sin-
clair Lewis and Paolo Pasolini, IS to stop being one. Not having an ideal of bour-
geois virtue, or devaluing the ideal by comparison with Christian and aristocratic
virtue, leaves us unable in economics to talk about virtue at all. We bourgeois are
left without reasons for ethical standards. We are left with What's Profitable. As the
Manchester man said to Engels in reply to a complaint about the condition of the
working class: "Yet a great deal of money IS made here. Good day, sir." In academ-
ic terms, we are left with the ethical simplicities of utilitarianism. Culture is cut off
from econonucs, and economics from culture.
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Ethics courses in business and medical schools exhibit the dilemma. Some time ago
the Harvard Business School was given $22 million to study ethics in the old way,
all the ethics that money could buy. Harvard Medical School has waxed ethical,
too. The professors staffing the courses believe that ethical questions are matters of
crisis. What are the ethics of insider trading? Would Jesus have Signed on? What
about the transplantation of organs? How would Kant have felt about that one? Yet
aristocratic or peasant virtue, which IS our ethical talk, cannot offer much help
minute-by-minute III being a good bourgeois.
Ethics has turned recently from universal theories to the particular virtues, as in
Alasdair Maclntyre, After virtue, A Study in Moral Theory, or John Casev, Pagan
Virtue: An Essay in Ethics, and to narrative in aid of the virtues, as in Albert Jonsen
and Srcphen Tuulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning or
Wayne Booth's book already mentioned. Feminist thinking on the matter, such as
Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice, or Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to
Ethics and Moral Education, or joan Tronto's astonishing appropriation of the Scot-
tish Enlightenment for feminist purposes, Moral Boundaries: A PoliticalArgument for
an Ethics ofCare, has questioned the presumption of universal ethics, and III particu-
lar the worship of masculine virtues. As Bemard Williams puts it, in the new approach
- as new as Aristotle - "morality IS seen as something whose real existence must con-
sist III personal experience and social institutions, not in sets of propositions." It IS
local knowledge, not universal, located III the camp or common or town.
Consider the virtues of the three classes, matched to their character. The "char-
acter" might be in the eyes of others, or III its own eyes, or, less commonly, in fact.
THE CLASSES AND THE VIRTUES
Aristocrat Peasant Bourgeois
Patrician Plebeian Mercantile
pagan Christian secular
Achilles St. Francis Bcnjamin Franklin
prideof being prideof service prideof action
honor duty integrity
forthrightness candor honesty
loyalty solidarity trustworthiness
courage fortitude enterprise
wit jocularity humor
courtesy reverence respect
propriety humility modesty
magnanimity benevolence consideration
Justice fairness responsibility
foresight wisdom prudence
moderation fmgality thrift
love charity affection
grace dignity self-possession
subjective objective conjective
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The point of such a listing is not to drive us all to the third column (in our lives
from Saturday night to Sunday at Church to Monday on the job we tour the
columns anyway). Nor is it to develop some new Universal Ethic. The point is to
sidestep universals. In some personal and social circumstances, courage IS a virtue.
(In others it is a vice, as Amelie Rorty has noted.) So is humility. (Likewise.) But
when the class left out by the virtue-talk is half the population, on its way to all the
population, the vocabulary of the virtues is not doing its job. Art does the cultural
job of making a vocabulary of virtues. Things Fall Apart, or Barges, makes one act
ethically towards Nigerians or Argentineans more than does any amount of philos-
ophizing about universal good. A modern society needs poetry and history and
movies about bourgeois virtue: integrity, honesty, trustworrluness, enterprise,
humor, respect, modesty, consideration, responsibility, prudence, thrift, affection,
self-possession.
I am suggesting, in other words, that we stop sneering at the bourgeoisie, stop
being ashamed of being middle class, and stop defining a participant in an economy
as an amoral brute. The bad talk creates a reality. Adam Smith knew that a capital-
isr society such as eighteenth-century Edinburgh could not flourish without the
virtues of trustworthiness or bourgeois pride, supported by talk. Smith's other
book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, which even no economist reads, was about
self-respect, not greed; esteem, not venality.Economics is the social theory of town
life,and its ethics is bourgeois. Yeteven many economists have learned by now that
moral sentiment must ground a market. (Some go all trying to solve the Hobbes
Problem, well into its fourth century of irresolution, namely: can a mob of unso-
cialized brutes be proven on a blackboard to create in the end a civil society? The
problem lacks point if people have already the cultural character of French people
or Americans.)
The growth of the market promotes virtue, not vice. Most intellectuals since
1848have thought the opposite: that it erodes virtue. Dickens wrote: "It was a fun-
damental principle of the Gradgrind philosophy that everything was to be paid for.
Gratitude was to be abolished, and the virtues springing from it were not to he.
Every inch of the existence of mankind, from birth to death, was to be a bargain
across a counter." Asjames Boyd White puts it in his otherwise admirable Justice as
Translation, bourgeois growth is bad because it is "the expansion of the exchange
system by the conversion of what is outside it into its terms. It is a kind of steam
shovel chewing away at the natural and social world."
And yet we all take happily what the market gives - polite, accommodating,
energetic, enterprising, risk-taking, trustworthy people; not bad people. In the Bul-
garia of old (I was told by Poles who claimed to have seen it) the department
stores had a policeman on every floor, not to prevent theft but to stop the cus-
tomers from attacking the arrogant and incompetent clerks selling goods that fell
apart at the moment of sale. The way a salesperson m an American store greets
customers startles foreigners: "How can I help you?" It is an instance in miniature
of bourgeois virtue.
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Even an ethics of greed for the almighty dollar, to take the caricature at its face
value, is not the worst. An ethics of greed is better than an ethics of slaughter, by
patrician sword or plebeian pike. Commercial greed must work by mutual agree-
ment, not by violence. Dr. Johnson said, "There are few ways in which a man can
be more innocently employed than in getting money." The disdain for modest
greed is ethically naive, because it fails to acknowledge that the greed prospers in a
market economy only by satisfying the customer.
And even from a strictly individual view the bourgeois virtues, though not those
of Achillesor Iesus, are not ethical zeroes. Albert Hirschman (who speaks precisely
of "bourgeois virtues") recounts the career from Montesquieu to Marx of the
phrase "doio: commerce," quoting for instance William Robertson in 1769: that
sweet commerce "tends to wear off those prejudices which maintain distinctions
and animosity between nations. It softens and polishes the manners of men." In his
play at the dawn of bourgeois power, Ceorge Lillo has his ideal of the London mer-
chant, Thorowgood, assert that "as the name of merchant never degrades the gen-
tleman, so by no means does it exclude him." Thorowgood on leaving the office
instructs his assistant to "look carefully over the files to see whether there arc any
tradesmen's bills unpaid." The aristocrat will sneer at such goody-goodness among
the bourgeoisie. But after all, in seriousness, IS it not a matter of virtue to pay one's
tailor? What kind of person accepts the wares of tradesmen and refuses to give
something in return, though promised? No merchant he.
A potent source of bourgeois virtue and a check on bourgeois vice and a lesson for
an economics that is going to take ethics seriously is the prerruum that a bourgeois
society puts on discourse. The bourgeois must talk. The aristocrat gives a speech,
the peasant tells a tale. But the bourgeois must in the bulk of his transactions talk
to an equal. It is wrong to Imagine, as modern eccnorrucs does, that the market is a
field of silence. "I will buy with you, sell with you, talk with you, walk with you,
and so following ... What news on the Rialto?"
The aristocrat does not deign to bargain. Hector tries, and Achilles answers:
"argue me no agreements. I cannot forgive you.! As there are no trustworthy oaths
between men and lions,! Nor wolves and lambs have spirit that can be brought into
agreement." The Duke of Ferrara in Browning's "My Last Duchess" speaks of his
late wife portrayed there upon the wall, "Even had you skill! In speech - (which I
have not) ~ to make your will! Quite clear to such an one. ! E'en then would be
some stooping; and I choose! Never to stoop." The aristocrat never stoops; the
peasant stoops silently to harvest the grain or to run the machine; the bourgeois
stoops metaphorically to make his will quite clear, and to know the will and reason
of the other. The aristocrat's speech is declamation, and his proofs are like com-
mands, which is perhaps why Plato the aristocrat and some Western intellectuals
after him loved them so. The proof of the irrationality of the square root of 2 con-
vinces iuincere. to conquer). The bourgeois by contrast must persuade, sweetly
("suadeo," from the same toot as English "sweet").
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The bourgeois goes at persuasion with a will.About a quarter of national mcome is
earned from merely bourgeois and feminine persuasion: not orders or information
but persuasion, sweet talk (Klamer and McCloskey 1995)' Is the sweet talk of the
bourgeoisie "empty," mere comforting chatter with no further economic signifi-
cance? If that was all it was then the economy would be engaging in an expensive
activity to no purpose. By not talking we could pick up a $20 bill (or more exactly
a $1,500,000,000,000 bill). A quarter of national income is a lot to pay for eco-
nomically functionless activity. The fact would not square with the most modest
claims of economics. The businesspeople circling La Guardia on a rainy Monday
night could have stayed home. The crisis meeting in the plant cafeteria between the
managers and the workers would lack point.
Adam Smith as usual put the matter well. The division of labor is the "conse-
quence of a certain propensity ... to truck, barter, and exchange. [I cannot pause
here to consider] whether this propensity be one of those original principles in
human nature, of which no further account can be given; or whether, as seems
more probable, it be the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and
speech." The Wealth of Nations did not again mention the faculty of speech in a
foundational role, though Smith, who began his career as a freshman English
teacher, did remark frequently on how business people and politicians talked
together. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments he called speech "the characteristic
faculty of human nature."
Half of the Smith formula, the faculty of reason, became in time the characteris-
tic obsession of economists. Smith himself did not much pursue it. Economic Man,
rationally seeking, is not a Smithian character. It was later economists, especially
Paul Samuelson during the 1940S, who reduced economics to the reasoning of a
constrained maximizer, Seeking Man, Homo petens. Samuelsonian seeking has a
peasant cast to it: the maximizarion of known utility under known constraints
sounds more like PiersPloughman than Rohinson Crusoe. The utilitarian reduction
of all the virtues to one maxim makes all virtues into prudence. The wind-up mice
of modern economic theory know nothing of humor, affection, integrity, and self-
possession. Smith's notion of Homo loquans, Speaking Man, squares better with
the varied virtues of the bourgeoisie.
The virtues of the bourgeois are those necessary for town life, for commerce and
self-government. The virtue of tolerance, for example, can be viewed as bourgeois.
Its correlations in European history, such as contrasted between Spain and Hol-
land, suggest so. The experience of trade creates a skepticism about certitude - the
arrogant and theoretical certitude of the aristocrat or the humble and routine certi-
tude of the peasant. As Arjo Klamer has pointed out, "the dogma of doubt" is
bourgeois, an attitude suited to the vagaries of the marketplace. On the town hall
of Gouda, overlooking the market, is the motto "Audite et alteram partem", listen
even to the other side.
Bourgeois charity, again, if not the "charity," meaning spiritual love, of the
English bibles, runs contrary to the caricature of greed. More than the peasant or
the aristocrat the bourgeois gives to the poor - as in the ghettos of Eastern Europe
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Bourgeois charity, agaIn, if not the "charity," meaning spiritual love, of the
English bibles, runs contrary to the caricature of greed. More than the peasant or
the aristocrat the bourgeois gives to the poor - as in the ghettos of Eastern Europe
or m the small towns of America. Acts of charity follow the bourgeois norm of
reciprocity. The American Gospel of Wealth, founding hospitals, colleges, and
libraries wherever little fortunes were made, IS a bourgeois notion, paying back
what was taken m profit. Annenberg gives $500 million to schools in one jolt and
we are not astonished. Middle class people in the nineteenth century habitually
gave a biblical tenth of their incomes to charity. The intrusion of the state into
charity killed the impulse, remaking charity mto a taille imposed on grumbling
peasants: [ gave at the office.
But the intellectuals since 1848 have despised this virtuous bourgeoisie, and have
produced the conviction that Economics and Culture are opposed. Popular
literature from the Horatio Alger stories to Dale Carnegie and The Reader's Digest
continue to reflect on bourgeois virtues. And yet the clerks have steadily attacked
the bourgeois virtues. They won in the end. High culture does.
But the intellectuals were mistaken about the growth of table, one of the deaf
honorable gentlemen, rationality. They mistook bourgeois life the way a rebellious
son mistakes the life of his father. The life of the bourgeoisie is not routine but
creation. W'hat has raised income per head in the rich countries by a factor of
twelve since the eighteenth century is originality backed by commercial courage,
not science. Dickens was mistaken to think that Facts alone are wanted in the lifeof
manufactunng. Manufacturing depends on enterprise and singlemindedness far
from coolly rational. Weber was mistaken to think that the modern state embodies
principles of rationality in bureaucracy. Anyone who thinks that a large modern
bureaucracy runs "like an army" cannot have experienced either a large modern
bureaucracy or an anny. Freud was mistaken to claim that modern life compels a
choice between the reality principle and eroticism. A business person without an
erotic drive, suitably sublimated, achieves nothing.
The lack of insight by the intelligentsia into business life is odd. It reminds one,
I repeat, of an adolescent boy sneering at his father: remarkable how the old chap
matured between my r-th and arst birthday. The European novel contains hardly a
single rounded and accurate portrait of a businessman (Thomas Buddenbrook is a
notable exception). The businessman IS almost always a cardboard fool, unless he
proves III the end to evince aristocratic or Christian virtues (thus Scrooge in
Dickens' Christmas story). Intellectuals in the West have had a tin ear for business
and its values.
A change is overdue. 11.) admire the bourgeois virtues is not to buy into
admiration for selfishness. Capitalism needs encouragement, being the hope for the
poor of the world and being m any case what we are. But capitalism need not be
hedonistic or monadic, and certainly not unethical. An aristocratic, country-club
capitalism, well satisfied with itself, or a peasant, grasping capitalism, hating itself,
are both lacking in virtue. And neither works in town. They lead to monopoly and
economic failure, alienation and revolution. We need a capitalism that nurtures
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communities of good townsfolk, in South Central LA as much as in Iowa City. We
encourage it by talking seriously about the bourgeois virtues.
And yet there is an ethical problem In the theory and practice of economics. The
problem is deeper than the mere distaste for calculation or selfishness or greed.
Booth argues persuasively that a good author is a good friend, the good friend
being "a kind of company that is not only pleasant or profitable, in some Immediate
way, but also good for me, good for its own sake. Hours spent with this best kind
of friend are seen as the way life should be lived. (M)y true friend is one who
[quoting Aristotle] 'has the same relations with me that he has with himself'"
(1988, p. 146-147).
Modern economics conserves on this sort of friendship, trying to get along on
as little of it as possible. Economics was once described as the science of conserving
love. The notion is that love is scarce, and that consequently we had better try to
get along without it, organizing our affairs to take advantage of the abundant
selfishness instead. The argument is economic to the core. As Adam Smith said
famously, "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker,
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest" (I776, p. [6).
But Smith also pointed out (this is Joan Tronto's point) that people have a
"feminine" desire to be part of a polis or familyas well, and to warrant affection in
such a group. People just do. It is Aristotle again: humans are political [that is,
polis-Ioving] animals. The analytic mistake is getting along with no love when
people are in fact lovers. I have called it the "Hobbes Problem," but it is the problem
of Machiavelli, Mandevi1le, Benrham, and the modern economists: let's see what
would happen if people were unsocialized brutes. But they are not unsocialized
brutes. And so economists "predict" that people will defect from social
arrangements at the drop of a hat. Massively, in wars and families, and experiments
on college undergraduates, they do not. Something is wrong with an economic
analysis that ignores the acculturated character of people, as economists are
gradually coming to understand.
If economists tell stories and exercise an ethical sense when telling them, then
they had better have as many stones as possible. This is a principled justification of
pluralism, an argument for not keeping all one's eggs in a single narrative basket.
"Powerful narrative," writes Booth, "provides our best criticism of other powerful
narratives" (1988, p. 237). Maybe. Powerful metaphors do the job, too. A variety in
economic narratives is good for the soul. Marxist narrative provides a criticism of
the bourgeois "neoclassical" narrative, and viceversa. "The serious ethical disasters
produced by narratives occur when people sink themselves into an unrelieved hot
bath of one kind of narrative" (p. 237). Dogmatic Marxists, dogmatic neoclussicals,
dogmatic Austrian economists, dogmatic institutionalists, who have put the other's
writings on an index of forbidden books, are ethically dangerous, all of them. They
are true believers, or, rather, believers in Truth. The best lack all conviction, while
the worst! Are full of passionate intensity.
The Boothian pluralism of stories, then, speaks to economics. Albert jonsen and
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to reduce ethical questions to a system of axioms. The stones of economists could
better be used casuistically, as jonsen and Toulmin would urge. The case-by-case
method is quite opposed to modernism, and was attacked by Pascal in his Provincial
Letters of 1656-57 on modernist grounds (jonsen and Toulmin, Chap. 12). It does
not seek universal principles to be applied by social engineers. It seeks an ethical
conversation in which principles of less-than-universal applicability are discovered.
The best economists do exactly this. Ronald Coase, for example, is a British
educated economist who has been for a long time on the faculty of the Law School
of the University of Chicago. His approach to economics is casuistic, looking for
the stories and metaphors and facts and logics that fit the case at hand, and avoid-
ing the unreasonable obsession with one of them alone. His most famous article,
"The Problem of Social Cost" (1960),is exactly casuistic. It has therefore been mis-
understood by modernist economists, who see in it a "theorem" for their social
engineering. The theorem, as it happens, is due to Adam Smith, some years in
advance of Coase (namely, that exchange free of trammels works well; Coase's
point was the opposite, that m a world of trammels the particular trammels need to
be examined one by one to decide about air pollution and property fights). A style
of ethical storytelling that insists that cases matter as much as principles is foreign
to most of modern eccnonucs. Such a style is foreign to its peculiar culture, which
is modernist and masculine and has never really worked.
Dialogue
Klamer: When rheard you presenting these arguments for the first time rwas pleas-
antly suprised. It seems you have made a conversion by trying to make the ethics
explicit in your account of economic behavior, Your new way of reasoning, by
including virtues, friendship and even love, appears to be so much warmer and
more humane, I'd say, than the cold-blooded approach that is so characteristic of
your colleagues III the Old Chicago school. Would you agree with this observation?
McCloskey: The old Chicago economists were not cold at all. Frank Knight, Milton
Friedman and Theodore Scbulrz had a way of doing economics that left room for
passion. But the Old Chicago school has become nouvelle Chicago school domi-
nated by Gary Becker and Robert Lucas who are Benthamites in a way that Milton
Friedman is not.
Then there is a personal point. rhave changed my mind 011 this although rhave
a long history of changing my mind. r was once a Marxist and then changed my
mind, I was once a social engineer and changed my mind. That does not mean that
I have thrown everything out that I learned as a marxist or a social engineer.
Klamer: How would you characterise your most recent change?
McCloskey: The change, which started before my change III gender bur was accel-
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erared by that change, was brought about by the recognition of the obvious point,
the point of Aristotle, that humans are political animals. The Greek 'politike' is
translared into the modern word political but it does not have the same connota-
tion in Greek. In the Greek it is closely connected with the polis, that is, with the
community. The recognition that people like to be in groups will, r think, change
the economics.
Klamer: Byaccounting for relations, for example.
McCloskey: Yeah. That would be the really spectacular way to show that hard
nosed economic analysis makes mistakes when it forgets that humans are political
animals. Such as the mistake of assuming that people will not ever voluntarily sac-
rifice themselves for the public goood. That is obviously false for a mother's love
for her child, but it is obviously false more generally.
Klamer: The paper reads like a celebration of bourgeois virtues. At the same time
you stress the importance of love and friendship. Don't the two conflict?
McCloskey: I don't think so. rdon't think bourgeois life is any less loving than aris-
tocratic or peasant life. I think it is early nineteenth century romantic nostalgia that
town people are loveless. There is all this foolish modern talk about the alienation
of people in big cities or in markets or on the job in factories. I don't think that that
is true. Markets are often occasions for love. Think of your relationship with your
dry cleaner or your friendly bicycle mechanic. It's true, as you say in your inaugur-
al, that there can be a conflict between markets and friendship but they also can be
complements. For example, you can come to know your bicycle mechanic and if
you have the ability to love at all, you come to love him to some degree. There is a
conviction on the left that all markets are anonymous but as you have emphasized
in your own work, that is not true. Even under modern advanced capitalism many
markets are face to face.
Furthermore, we are not confined to one of the three columns of virtues. You
are the one who convinced me that a person can easily be an aristocrat on Saturday,
a Christian on Sunday morning and a bourgeois on Monday.
Klamer: What will the good old Chicago economists think of this?
McCloskey: People like Armen Alchian, Ronald Coase, james Buchanan, and Mil-
ton Friedman for that matter, can understand such an argument and will agree with
it. People who can't understand and agree with it are the heirs of Samuelson and
Bentham.
Klamer: Historians seem to have a problem with your analysis as well. At least, that
is the impression I got from their reactions to your paper during the conference.
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Klamer: Historians seem to have a problem with your analysis as well. At least, that
is the impression I got from their reactions to your paper during the conference.
McCloskey: I am a historian too. I was in the history departments of Chicago and
Iowa. Look, I am writing an essay here, not a historical monograph. Some
historians have difficulties with that. Some don't. I can understand and sympathise
with the view that essays of this sort are not scientific. I don't pretend to be
scientific here. I am trying to change present day sensibilities. rdon't want to write
false history, but I don't have to make a scientific contribution to history In order
to use history.
Klamer: So your intent is normative.
McCloskey: I am acting like aunt Deirdre, but mostly to the profession of
economics. Economics has fallen on bad times; the mistakes that economists are
making are those of boys. So exactly as an aunt might scold the boys who are
trampling all over the flowers in the garden, I am scolding the boys in economics
for spoiling economics.
Klamer: And you think that economists will do better by paying more attention to
the ethical dimension of economics.
McCloskey: It will bring economics back to Adam Smith where it started. It will
make for an economics that in the words of an economic historian named Ashton
walks on both legs.
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PART FOUR
On Art
FROM CULTURE we return to the subject of art. In the preceding chapters thevalue of art was discussed in various ways, but mostly in general. This partfocuses on specific art and artists. Kattenberg demonstrates the possibility
that the aesthetic value of a work of art interacts with its economic value. His case
in point is the work of the American artist Andy Warhol. The next and last chapter
contains a discussion with a few artists in which they give their perspective on the
process by which the value of their art comes about.
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The Value ofWaIhol
PETER KATTENBERcI
Kattenberg (I954) and I met when he wasstudyingin New York at theNew Schoolof
Social Research. At the time he was still active as an art dealer and had opened a
gallery in New York. He is currently a minister at a Remonetrant church in Leiden,
Holland and isactive asan artist. He has sculptures at various sites in Holland. the
courtyard ofa newly built prison near Rotterdam among them. He is {urthennore
working on a monograph about the Last Supper Paintings of Andy Warhol. This
study was the main, but not the only, reason for me to invite him to contribute.
Warhol appears to contradict thediscomfort with the worldofmoney that we - [have
to implicate myselfhere - areusedto impute to the worldofthearts forheappears to
embrace and celebrate the commercial possibilities of art. Warhol shows that the
world ofmoney can be an integral partof the world of the arts. Thus he appears to
overcome, if not eliminate, the tensionbetweenthoseworldsto whichseveral authors
in this volume, including myself,havepointed. The valueofart may be measured in
monetary termsafterall, and may evenincrease when it is!
"I'D PREFER to remain a mystery. I never like to give my background and,
anyway, I make it all different all the time I'm asked. It's not just that it's part of
my image not to tell everything, it's just that I forget what I said the day before
and I have to make it all up over and over again. I don't think I have an image,
anyway, favourable or unfavourable".2
Thus spoke Warhol, born August 6, 1928 in Pittsburgh, to Roman Catholic
immigrant parents of (Ruthenian) Czechoslovakian stock, Andrej and ]ulia
Warhola, about himself in 196+ That year he broke through as an artist after a
successful and distinguished career as a commercial illustrator, by making the
Thirteen Most Wanted Men at the New York World's Fair, at the same time
starting the Self-Portraits, while concurrently exhibiting the Disaster Series at
Sonnabend Gallery. He showed the Brillo Boxes at Stable Gallery, was present in
American Pop Art at the Stedelijkin Amsterdam and simultaneously presented the
Flowers at Leo Castelli's, while receiving the Independent FIlm Award from Film
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that very same year 1964 a woman entered his studio, the Factory, with a gun and
fired it at a stack of four fresh Marilyns.J
My primary concern is with the artistic and cultural values of Warho\'s work.
When the value of art is at issue, as it is in this volume, I intend to focus on the artis-
tic qualities of the work. The economic value does not directly concern me here,
although indirectly I have to be concerned with a fact like that one of those Mari-
Iyns, the so-called "Shot Red Marilyn, 1964", sold in early 1996 at Chrisne's New
York Auction for $3.632..5°0. It does matter that the market values his work at such
a price, but in order to understand that value we first need to know more about the
work and the man himself.
Warhol died on February 22, 1987 in New York City, as a result of a hospital mis-
take following gall-bladder surgery. At the time he was arguably one of the most
important artists of the twentieth century. His work is represented in every major
collection of modern art. Yet even though he was famous and drew much attention
to his work and his own person, he was an enigma at the time of his death and con-
rinues to be so.e Despite his glamorous reputation for always being at the right
place at the right time and his ability of being constantly in one spotlight or anoth-
er, he revealed little of himself. He seemed to hide his own person in what appeared
to be a staged performance as an artist. In that way he gave testimony to the propo-
sition that the personality of the artist is of no importance for the appreciation of
his work. The artist is a 'yours faithfully'. Warhol did not want to talk about him-
self: "The interviewer should just tell me the words he wants me to say and I'll
repeat them after him".5 This remark resembles Jesus' ipsissima. When Jesus asked
his disciples, "Who are men saying the Son of Man is?" and some said "john the
Baptist, others Elijah, still others Jeremiah or one of the prophets", He said to them,
"You, though, who do you say I am?,,6
Warhol achieved public recognition as a celebrity nicknamed Drella. He had cre-
ated a kind of anrichurch within the Factory, his silver-walled studio on West Forty-
seventh Street, where his followers - many of whom, like Warhol, had been raised
Catholic - were involved in exploitative sexual games with, as the artist Map-
plethcrpe noted, the apparent need to confess their sins to him and seek absolution
from him. He became a sort of saint to art students like Mapplethorpe himself.? In
his art work, however, Warhol mainly presented the ordinary, everyday images
such as Coca-Cola bottles and Campbe]! Soup cans and he did so with an enduring
resonance. He appropriated straigrhforward, shockingly simple images, usually
from commercial adds or mass-media photography, and applied to them his own
authorship.f In presenting the very same thing over and overagain he made them
timeless signs of reverence m the minds of modern man. The repetitive representa-
tion gives the image something magical.v
When asked why he presented the Coca-Cola bottle and the Campbell soup can
over and over again, he answered: "Because I used to drink it. I used to have the
same lunch every day for twenty years, I guess, the same thing over and over
again"."? The straightforwardness of this remark is typically Warhol. The mrerpre-
tor of his work, however, may detect more in his presentations than he is willing to
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say.I I In light of his Catholic upbringing and his daily attendance of morning
mass.t- I am tempted to see the presentations of Coke and Campbell in multiplied
images as a ceremonial serving just as a priest would serve the blood and the body
of Christ. Let me stress that I do not mean this literally. Rather, Warhol is priestly
in a metaphorical sense. As he has said so repeatedly, Warhol saw the artist as
someone who makes himself subservient to the work and disappears in its execu-
tion. One of Andy's favourite characterisations was "It's just work".
"Andy was a Catholic, the ethic ran through his bones
He lived alone with his mother, collectinggossip and toys
Every Sunday when he went to Church
He'd kneel in his pew and say, 'It's just work,
all that matters is work"'.13
There appear to be all kinds of unarticulated affinitiesbetween the idiom of religion
and modes of expression in modern and contemporary art. A striking example is
'Noli me tangere', a work ofJan van Munster shown at an exhibition with the same
title which was held in the Musee Cantonal des Beaux Arts in Sion (Swiss) in the
summer of 1990.14 "Noli me tangere" ('Don't touch me') is a black steel object, in
the form of a phallic lingam, it includes a compressor which chills the top of the
sculpture and so produces a cap of sparkling white crystals. The title of the piece of
work refers to a historical art theme that goes back for centuries and is taken from
a passage of the Gospel according to St. John in which Mary Magdalene, on the
morning after the crucifixion, is faced with the nsen Christ In front of an empty
grave. Shocked and surprised, she wants to touch him, but He stops her from doing
so with the words 'Noli me tangere', thus declaring that he is no longer of this
world.Jan van Munster's 'Noli me tangere' does not literally refer to this Christian
theme but it does conram a comparable essence. Just as Mary Magdalene wants to
convince herself of Christ's presence hy touching him, so the observer of Van Mun-
ster's object IS tempted to touch the intriguing white top in order to convince him-
self of its material identity which cannot be determined with the eye alone. How-
ever, touching is impossible without disturbing the surface itself. The spell of the
crystalline layer is broken. Just like in the Bible story when Christ, after his resur-
rection,while still outwardly appeanng to be present, was unapproachable to the
common people. The essence here lies in the mystery that should remain a mystery.
The similarity or intimacy between the Mysteria fidei of religion and the mysteries
of art in the twentieth century may well be accountable for their mutual attraction.
A distinctive issue in religion and art is the concept of rransformation.u In a
work of art the artist is modifying the ordinary beyond the established, the conven-
tional into something new. This something new does not represent reality per se
and yet it has the quality of representation in its own right. A work of art repre-
sents, instead of reality as is, a possibility. It may suggest a factual quality and con-
vey a claim to the truth, but whatever facts and truths are represented will be hard,
if not Impossible to test. When Marcel Duchamp took objects from the banal world
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hard, if not Impossible to test. When Mareel Duchamp took objects from the banal
world and placed them In an artistic setting, resulting in his so-caUed Readymades,
the viewer is compelled to lmagme the transformed image. The work ofWarhol has
the same characteristic. He was arguably the most gifted artist of the twentieth
century when it comes to transforming the banal mto non-anecdotal, highly
sophisticated and meaningful works of art. 16 He was a master of metaphormoses
having the power to make the ordinary extraordinary. He found his subjects III the
fan magazines which he read to follow the lives of the stars he adored, and in the
papers with their ads, their comics, and their screaming headlines. They were easy.
to use one of his favorite words, because they were what he loved. The times
proved him right. The sixties turned out to be the right time for the exploration of
vulgarities, as other artists, like Dine, Oldenberg, Johns and Lichtenstein, also
found out.
From the artistic and cultural point of view the value of Warhol, therefore,
shows in the magic of transformation. By taking the ordinary and making it
extraordinary in a ritualistic repetitive representation he adds to real, ordinary life
an artistic quality rhat it did not have without his art. Because of his work we are
now able to view the grocery store as a gallery. Criticisms that reject his work for
being superficial and commercial, do not, in my view, do justice to these
remarkable effects the work has had on the culture of his times. It is for good
reasons that curators of every major collection of modern art want to have one or
more Warhols.
Possibly more than any of the pop-artists, Warhol was best suited to become the
Maestro of Metaphormoses. From all early age on he wanted to change his
identity, to transform lumself and to transcend the limitations of his family and
partake more fully of the glamorous America portrayed in the movies, on the radio,
in magazllles and newspapers. Warhol wanted most what he missed by birth:
beauty, wealth and fame.
His last great transformations are the Last Supper paintings, which he produced
in the mid-eighties. Early ill 1986, Warhol's first NewYork dealer, Alexandre Ioalas,
who had closed his Manhattan gallery and settled permanently in Europe,
commissioned him to make some works based on Leonardo da Vinci's fresco If
Cenacolo. The dealer offered to show the works III a Milan gallery, right across the
street from the refectory of the Dominican Church of Santa Maria delle Grarie;
which houses the famous Renaissance wall painting. Warhol found the project
extremely appealing for several reasons. He had very recently appropriated and
adapted other masterpieces of western art history and in doing so he had broken
with his previous commitment to ordinary and everyday images. But perhaps the
most obvious was that "he felt comfortable with the subject of food, a recurrent
theme III his art from Wild Raspberries and Campbell's Soup through a 1979 series
of screenprints of grapes, peaches, and other fruits. To an artist who frequently
fretted that he had 'so many mouths to feed' and who enjoyed serving dinner to
needy people (and even throwing bread crumbs to the pigeons on Park Avenue),
the opportunity to update Leonardo's dining scene was pretty irresisnble''.'?
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Insilkscreening Leonardo daYinci's 'Last Supper'Warhol presents hispriestly self
2°9
Warhol approached Leonardo's The Last Supper with vigor and ingenuity in
comparison with his treatment of most other found or pre-existing images. The
hard part for him was finding a reliable source to base his paintings on. Art-book
reproductions were generally too dark. Sharp-focus photographs revealed that very
little remained of Leonardo 's original pigment. Finally, he seems to have decided to
work from kitsch and secondary render ing of The Last Supper as well as an
expensive Italian-rnadc Capo-di-Monte bisque sculptural rendition and a schematic
outline drawing based on the composition of the kind found in art books, on the
works of, for instance, Shusaku Arakawa.18
Warhol made both hand-painted and silkscreened versions of The Last Supper.
He produced a dozen monumental paintings, together with a group of smaller
canvases, each a square meter, and numerous works on paper. In the silkscreened
paintings he repeated Leonardo's composition in grids as many as sixty times and
in different colours. Some Last Suppers he did on camouflage grounds and he
produced several pictures that offered details ofJesus superimposed on overlapping
colored rectangles.
The result is that , quoted in parts, camouflaged, or multiplied in pieces, the
supreme Christian icon of Western art, Leonardo da Vinci's If Cenacolo is back in
business and that now the image of Jesus amidst his disciples is forever fixed in
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clans leur fragmentation. Une eucharistic sans communion. Une eucharistic qui
serait la deconstruction de l'eucharistie't.w In the Eucharist the substance of the
bread and wine is transformed into the body and blood of Christ, while the exter-
nal appearance of bread and wine remains. In Warhol's work Campbell and Coca
Cola are transformed into emblems of modern society, while the external appear-
ance of can and bottle remains.
In fide both the lover of Warhol's images and the faithful attendee of the
eucharist celebration may acknowledge that the objects presented to them are not
for real, but they do not question that something took place by painting or
praying. They experience the transformed image as meaningful in an artistic or
religious sense. This leaves the question of how the transformation occurs, that is,
how people come to attach a surplus of ffieanJng to pieces of bread handed out or
to multiple Images of a can of Campbell soup. I can give no definite answer but
advance here the possibility that Warhol's work, especially his Last Supper Paint-
mgs, derives part of its value from the possibility of a connection with the religious
experiences that the viewer may have had. Warhol is a priest because he has been
creating new images by transforming a single soup can into an icon of religion,
recalling the fixed isolation of holy relics in an abstract space. In the words of
Robert Rosenblum "both ingenuous and shrewd, blasphemous and devour,
Warhol not only managed to encompass In his art the most awesome panorama of
the material world we all live in, but even gave us unexpected glimpses of our new
forms of heaven and hell".2.0
Given Warhol's inimitable combinations of cliche with spiritual resonance, he
established in his Last Supper Paintings a relationship with the Holy. In the words
of Lynn Cooke "for it permitted him to veil whatever private sentiment or invest-
ment he personally might have felt for it under the mantle of an hommage to one of
the greatest of artists of the past - and to do this without relinguishing its identity
as a commonplace mass media motif, the echt [soc] signifier of the Pop Art move-
ment to which his own contribution was so instrumental"."
Dialogue
Klamer: This makes for an intriguing interpretation of Warhol's work. Frankly, I
had not made the connection with religion but can now imagine that the value of
his work is at least partly determined by that connection. What still eludes me in
your analysis is the connection with the economic value of his work. Early on you
refer to the high prices that the market is willing to pay for his work but thus far
you have left that dimension out entirely.
Kattenberg: That is right. My account is incomplete and the value ofWarhol's work
has not yet entirely come out of the paint, as we say in Dutch. I need to add more
to the story III order to persuade you that the economic and artistic values interact
III his case.
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Noteworthy is for instance Warhol's business instinct. In the seventies he devel-
oped, with the aid of good advisors, a business, the Andy Warhol Enterprise. He
exploited his special relationship with food, and organised ritual lunches for highly
selective groups of people, each of which was strictly staged. He brought very
famous and glamorous people together with a few less famous and glamorous peo-
ple who very much wanted to be part of fame and glamour and with simple food
and inexpensive wine would persuade them to have their portraits done.
It became a multi-million business. At the end of 1974the price of a Warhol por-
trait was $25,000. That was actually the price for the rust portrait. If he thought he
could sell more to a client, he would do a second which he sold for $15,000, a third
for 10,000, a fourth for 5,000, and so on. The additional works were very popular
among art dealers. After all, where could you buy a Andy Warhol for such a price?
The value of this enterprise for Warhol himself was that through these ritual
lunches he worked himself into the milieus he had dreamed to be part of. He
aspired to be in the royal milieus of the world around.
50 here you have an artist, who creates a business with advisors, who conducts
the business according to very strict marketing principles, places products at well-
chosen values, and as a consequence saw the value of his work increase. He is the
ultimate social climber in that American society of his. Here you see the effect of
the circles in which an artist moves. For Andy Warhol, those were the highest and
that is reflected in the economic value of his work. This makes him a good example
of an artist who creates economic value.
In this case the value that he had created for himself had a spin-off for the artis-
tic cultural in general. Other artists benefited from the cultural and economic value
that he generated for himself. It is furthermore well-known that young people who
wanted to attend art school but ran into opposition from their middle-class parents
benefited from Warhol's example which showed that art could be a good and hon-
est business. Jeff Koons is another great example of that.
But in the case of Warhol that is not all. The ultimate value of his work is not
exhaustively characterised by all the money and the prestige that he generated. I
think he really is a great artist because, as a wide-eyed celebrant of mass culture as
Lynn Cooke once called him, he represents one moment in the great tradition of
art and that is because he dealt with the real themes of the history of art. That is
why he will have earned a spot in that history.
Kfamer: Not everyone agrees with this.
Kattenberg: In my reading of Warhol I have been very much influenced by Leo
Steinberg's book on the sexuality of Christ in Renaissance art. Sreinberg shows that
the demonstrative emphasis on the genitalia of Christ in Renaissance painting calls
for an ostentauc genitalium comparable to the canonic ostentatio vulnerum, the
showing of the wounds.
By making use of such rare and queer source material as sermons preached
before Renaissance popes, he makes plausible that artists, in humanizing Christ by
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applying classical Greek eroticism to the Son of Man were m fact confirming the
wonder of Incarnation, that is to say God's descent into manhood. And what is
peculiar in this respect is the fact that Renaissance artists did this on purpose.
According to Steinbcrg these artists knew exactly what they were domg. In other
words, their intention was unmistakably to transmit the Faith of the Church and to
communicate the mysteries of the Creed. So a Renaissance artist was everything
but a fool. If necessary, he was even a theologian. And I think that is also true about
Andy Warhol. Steinberg and I spoke about this and he disagrees with me. He hap-
pens to think that Warhol is some sort of an artistic whipper who exploited his art
to commercial ends and considers his body of work devoid of meaning. I don't
agree with him. I still think that Warholls very much like, for instance, da Vinci. A
Renaissance artist was not doing something for aesthetic or artistic reasons only.
He was conveying the dogmas of the church. And that's also what Warhol does.
Klamer: Whose dogmas does he convey then? The dogmas of modern commercial
life in American society?
Kauenhcrg: That could be, but that would be too obvious. I suspect there IS more
to it than that. It is in the work, as a close reading of his work will reveal. .Ifyou read
the Last Supper Paintings you are justified to think that more is at stake than a
clever exploitation of an Icon of the art. He IS possibly showing the emperor's new
clothes. He showed things that really matter, that always will concern people; he
showed the flowers and the frivolous on the one hand, and the suffering and the
pain on the other, and in his best works both worlds in one.
Ultimately I do not think that there is a separation between the economic realm
and the world of the art. The two values are connected. He represents a 11lIXlllg of
value spheres. Charles Stuckcy, for instance, is quite explicit on this. Let me check
his writing to quote him:
"looking both ways, at the highest sacred art and at the lowest commercial
design, and fusing them m his hallmark fashion, these late pictures seem to sug-
gest that, for a Pop god, the meek and the poor in spirit among artists are no less
Important than Ruphael or Leonardo't.s-
Everything IS contaminated. The pure thing does not exist. You cannot say any-
more that you don't believe, or that you believe absolutely. The real, sincere Chris-
tian is not of this time anymore. Neither is the real artist. That, at least, has become
clear to me in my exploration of the value that Warhol's work represents.
It IS common to start from the ideal of integrity and purity. As an artist you are
not supposed to think about what you arc earning. Here people will often refer to
PierMondnaan as the real pnest of modern art, purist and a-commercial as he was.
gut that position is a deceit. And that is what Warhol is showing. An art work is
good when it stinks, when you sniff money. That applies to everyone. There is a lot
of discussion in the arts whether we are simply fooling each other. Surely, people
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get screwed in rhe arts. There has to be a connection between the cultural value and
the economic value.
Klamer: But if you would be too explicit with the money, it would not work.
Kattenberg: Possibly. But watch it. Steinberg disparages Warhol on the grounds that
he was making a lot of money with his art. The evidence will be in the history
books and that evidence will prove me right. Apparently, corruption and honesty
go together. I defy herewith the habit of reserving the priestly role for purists like
Mondriaan. Warhol is more honestly so.
Klamer: So what does the priest do according to you?
Kattenberg: The priest mediates between two worlds. That is what you see in art.
Klamer: Which two worlds?
Kattenberg: In his case he connects all kinds of conceivable worlds: the everyday
world, the world of illusion, the commercial world, and finally the religious world.
Critics are used to saying that he uses things from everyday life and appropriates
them as a kind of vampire without scruples. On the contrary, he ritualises these
everyday things and by doing so shows possible worlds, and, at the end of his life,
revitalises old worlds as in "Details of Renaissance Paintings", for instance.
Klamer: I can't help connecting your reading of Warhol with your own roles as an
artist and minister. Do you think there is a connection?
Kattenberg: No, I don't think so. Or I am at least not aware of that. There is some-
thing personal at stake in what I say here, but more so for me as an artist than as a
minister.
The case of Warhol convinced me that in order to be a successful artist you have
to become a phenomenon. I want to be a great artist. I am not a bad one. But to be
a good one you have to persuade others. If I do not succeed at that, I will never be
a great artist. You might say that it is marketing, but it is more than that. It's like a
priest trying to win over souls.
14
The Value of Making Art
A conversation with the artists Ronald Glasbergen,
Liesbeth Bik and jeep Lieshout
Thus far academicians havedominated the discussion in this volume. We haveargued
the valueofart but left the artists out ofthe discussion. Todo so iscustomary practice
in academic discourse, especially in economic discourse. It allows us, the academics, to
stick 10 our rhetoric. Furthermore, when artists are the subjectofour inquiry, we pre-
(er to trust our own analysis rather than the opinions ofthe artists themselves. In this
particular conversation, however, we have broken with the code and involved various
artists. They interrupted my inaugural speech and took part in the conference that fol-
lowed. One afternoon was reseroed (or an interchange with threeartists from Rotter-
dam. As was to be expected, there was the usual rhetorical confusion that occurs when
people from different disciplines try to communicate. The languages we speak are dif-
ferent and so are the concerns and even some values. Thus the discussion accentuated
the difference between the realms ofthe aesthetic and the economic.
After the conference [ talked with three of the artists involved, namely Joep van
Lieshout ("[like McCloskey's extreme position"), Liesbeth Bile ("I liked Amariglio,
Ruccio and Graham for their discussion ofvalue - and because they responded well to
my work'? and Ronald Glasbergen. All three work in Rotterdam. Glasbergen is
besides a visual artist, an artistic entrepreneur who organises spaces, exhibitions, and
discussions; he was also responsible for bringing us together.Joep van Ueshout is what
is called a successful artist. At the time we were talking he was furnishing and decorat-
ing caravans, among other projects. We talked in the space ofLiesbeth Bik where she,
in collaboration with other artists, had constructed an exact replica of her kitchen.
This kitchen piece will come up several times in the following conversation.
KLAM ER ; Ronald, it seems that you argue [in a written contribution] that thevalue of art is in the nature of the beast, that the value is derived from thevalue of art as a distinctive activity. What does the price of a work of art say
then about its value?
Glasbergen: It is a historical question. Some time ago art was a form of craft and it
was valued like that. For the ancient Greeks art was dearly something separate.
That was especially the case for poetics. You could compare the status of modern
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art to that. It is very important for culture as a whole and therefore valued highly,
but not in terms of money. It's the same with religion, with moral values. Some-
thing is at stake at the moment. Many people say it IS a product like any other
product but it still has the aura of something else.
Klamer: So why is the distinction of art as a specificactivity such a critical issue?
Gfasbergen: For the same reason. For art in general you have different value sys-
tems. So when the distinction between art and non-art becomes unclear, it becomes
even more difficult to value art than when it was clearly meant to be art. But it can
also get more interesting. As art it can be more interesting because it differs from
the conventional understanding of what art is.
Klamer: Liesbeth, during the discussion at the conference you expressed your
doubts about the possibility of measuring the value of your work m money terms.
Bik: Yeah, that would be very difficult. I have no idea what to ask for this kitchen
piece [a copy of a kitchen in her studio where we were talking]. That would be a
problem. The value will become clear when it is shown at other places and when
people start talking about it.
Klamer: Does it matter to you what people are willing to pay for your work? Does
that mean much to you?
Bik:To me? No, nothing. All that counts IS that I can work.
Klamer: But now imagine that the kitchen piece fetches a million guilders. Would
that not make a difference?
Bik: It never will. But no, it would not make a difference.
Klamer: joep, what do you think of this?
Lieshout: I think that there are two values to a work of art. You have the money
value and the cultural value. The real value of art is its importance 1O society. On
the other hand, the money value of a work of art is very realistic. On that count art
works like any other product.
Klamer: So you disagree with Ronald who just argued that there is something
inherently different about art?
Lieshout: No, I think that the market determines the money value of art. People
want to have it and so they want 1O pay for it.
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Klamer: Does that mean that the money value determines the value of art?
Ueshout: Not necessarily. There are 30 million dollar pieces of art I do not like. It is
the same with gold. In my opinion gold is too expensive. You understand.
Klamer: In economics we dearly distinguish between the value that we attach to
something personally and the value that the market gives. Economists would say
that the social value comes about in markets, in the interaction between demand
and supply. Price equals the objective value, in other words.
Lieshout: When you keep your work to yourself you may attach emotional value to
it, but that would be different from the value that it gets in a market. Sure. But art
does not need to be sold to have value. It can also acquire value when people write
about it or when museums exhibit it. The problem is only to get that attention.
At any rate, I am not interested in the value of art. I am almost not interested in
art. That is why I make my work probably.
Kfamer: 'lX'hat does interest you then?
Lieshout: The making of art, doing whatever you like to do, even if it is not art. I
value it when someone makes a birdcage.
Glasbergen: I Just want to reiterate that there IS a difference between market value
and the value that you attach to your work yourself. Moral support is important,
too, as when people in various capacities comment on your work.
Klamer: How do you respond tu joep when he says that he IS not interested in the
value of art.
Gfasbergen: He also says that he just wants to make an.
Lieshout: No, no. I said that at first. Then I realised that I want to do the things I
like to do whether it IS art or not. Whether other people like it or not does not rnat-
ter much to me. It is better when they like it because you get more money when
they do. 'When I have more money I can make more things and I have a wider
choice of things I can do. If rdon't have any money I have to draw on paper. When
you have loads of money, you can do amazing things. Then again, it is possible that
in the future r have loads of money and still make drawings.
Glasbcrgen: To me it does not matter what people's motives are for making art. It
can be money or it can be the appreciation of their mother - as long as the results
are interesting.
lieshout: I try to be as indifferent as possible, as free as possible.
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Bik: It is very well possible that if you try to make art as art, it will not be as inter-
esting. You have to wait and see whether the work will turn out to be art, whether
people will see it as art, whether it poses questions, whether people real, to it. r
don't think what happens III the name of art is all that interesting
Lieshout: So much that was not made as art in the past, is now considered art. Just
think of cave people and their drawings. Then there were people who could paint
or were good carpenters. Only now we consider them artists.
To get back to the economics. I am not interested in the pnce of art. Recognition
is much more important. Take this kitchen piece. It is just a very good piece of art
but it does not have a price.
Glasbergen: When I saw it for the first time, I did not know whether it was art or
not, but I liked it a lot. Of course it does not matter whether it is called art or not.
It has a meaning.
Bik: I'd say that something you make is art when other people see it as such.
Klamer: How do you, the artists, think that art gets priced?
Lieshout: It is whatever you can get for it.
Klamer: That is what you say. But do you know how it works?
Lieshout: It is a matter of trial and error, maybe. When you become more famous
you get a higher price. I work now with galleries that sell works for at least 30 to
40,000 dollars. Now I am part of them. They know which clients can afford that
much. They are more famous. They read about you in the newspaper so they are
willing to pay more for your work. You have to be famous.
Klamer: Sure, I can understand that fame plays a role. There must be other rules. Is
it possible to charge too much?
Lieshout: There are many different circuits. There is the modern, avant garde cir-
cuit; there is the circuit of kitsch art; and there is the art circuit of public commis-
sions. You have a circuit for bronze sculptures; they pay a lot of money for those. I
am working in the circuit of modern, contemporary an. It works different In each
circuit.
More in general fame is decisive. So it is important where you sell your work, or
where you exhibit. The quality is important, too. You understand?
Klamer: How does it really work? You, your gallery sets the price. Do you bargain
after that?
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Lieshout: No. You have listed the piece for a price and that is it.
Klarner: Is it conceivable that you raise the price when more people want the piece?
Lieshout: Nor really. There is no bidding. The first person who wants to pay the
price, gets it.
Klamer: Can you lower the price?
Lieshout: Yes, when someone does not have enough money, you can give a reduc-
tion.
Bik: That depends on the people.
Lieshout: Does it?
Bik: Somewhat. Sure. Sometimes you can sell to a close friend for less. Sometimes
I ask more money.
l.ieshout.: It depends on what you can get. If I have a price of 3000 dollars in mind
for a painting and someone comes III who seems to be able to pay 10,000 I ask
10,000.
Bik: Immediately.
Lieshout: Yeah, sure. It all depends on the client. It is trial and error.
Klamer: Is there a connection between the activity of selling and that of making art?
Glashergen: Selling, insofar as it is a matter of getting response and appreciation for
what you do, surely plays a role in what you do.
Klamer: Do you think about selling when you are making a work of art?
Glasbergen: No. The appreciation is important though. When you work in this
market, you have to have a long term m mind. Of course you work for some kind
of appreciation. Self-appreciation is important, too. You don't get that necessarily
for each work that you produce.
Bik: When I am making art, I am not thinking of people buying it. I just want to get
a reaction.
Lieshout: The most important thing is to be satisfied with the work. On the other
hand I need lots of money. So when I can sell my work, I do it. But I also have other
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means of earning money. I do not necessarily make all my money with art. For
example, I also do some decorating and architecture. I am happy when my work
has a functional value as well. Every museum that needs a new table or desk comes
to me because they think that what I make is very special.
Klamer: What do you think of the scaling back of the public support of the arts,
which as you may know has been especially generous here in Holland.
Lieshout: That is a pity. Foreigners always think that all Dutch artists are state
artists. In fact, traditionally kings, merchants, churches, and rich people had been
sponsoring the arts. Some time ago the state assumed that task. But that does not
mean that we are all state artists. Far from it.
At any rate, as far as those subsidies are concerned, so-called experts advise the
government as to whom to give money to and how much. They are artists, gallery
owners, museum people, and so on. Frankly, I have more confidence in such a care-
fully selected jury than in the judgment of the market. But that serves my own
interest.
Bik: I think it is allright that the government provides a little less money. This
whole subsidy system is a state business; everyone here considers it as such. As a
consequence, many people who otherwise would, now do not get involved in art.
Furthermore, Dutch people can now become a member of some subsidised organ-
isation and can get art work for 50 guilders (30 dollars). Thar is stupid. That way
they don't get any sense of the value of that art.
Klamer: What about the government support for artists?
Bik: The committees who allocate the funds may consist of experts but they are
always a selectivegroup.
Lieshout: Yes, and they tend to be very fashionable. They always want to know
how many exhibitions you have done. They look at what you get in the market and
then they reward you. So their judgment is in fact market driven.
Klamer: Do subsidies make artists lazy, as some people would argue.
Bik: Sometimes. Well,yes, sure.
Lieshout: I think so, but I don't care.
Glasbergen: A much bigger problem than the alleged laziness of artists is the lack of
interest of people for art.
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Lieshout: I think it is a good thing that artists who do not get supported in the mar-
ketplace, and who arc good artists, get money to do their work. You can also think
of the government as just another client with a lot of money.
Klamer: Now, here is something I don't understand. You were very much taken
with McCloskey who has a firm laissez-faire attitude and wants to keep the gov-
ernment out. She strongly opposes government support partly because it tends to
be unfair, favonng some over others. What about that argument?
Lieshout: Yes,I talked with her. I said then that r consider the government as anoth-
er client. That is the end of the line. If there is another company, or a private person
who wants to support an artist, that would be fine too. I don't particularly care
how the money gets here.
Klamer: Well, it must make a difference how the money gets to you. In case you get
the money from the government, the tax payer pays.
Lieshout: I pay raxes and I pay Sony when I buy a taperecorder. What difference
does that make?
Klamer: What if you pay 200 guilders to Sony and Sony turns around and spends a
big chunk of that on art? Would you not have preferred [Q have paid less?
Lieshout: If I don't like that, I could buy a Panasonic. I have a choice. This means
that the financing through the government is the less desirable option because they
force people to pay taxes. I do nor have a choice in that case. I cannot choose
among governments as I can among companies.
I am curious about the United States. Do they have more people there who buy
art? Is there more sponsorship?
Klamer: The critical difference is the amount of private donations. Sponsorship is
not such a big deal. Art can get financed in many different ways. Quite a bit of art
m the US gets financed through universities. What also helps is a flexible job mar-
ket that allows artists to earn extra money on the side.
Bik: If you can do that here, too, you are clever.
Klamer: I wonder about the valuation of art. The process of valuation might be
quite different in a market culture, as in the US, from a culture that focuses on gov-
ernment subsidies.
Lieshout: Maybe, but the government funding is also related to what you do in the
market.
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Bik: More and more so. When we left the academy the system was still very
different from what it is now. Unfortunately, abroad they think the old system is
still intact.
Whatever, the aim is to get out of the system of government support. It's good
that they support us in the beginning when it is very difficult to support yourself.
The strategy is to get less and less.
Glasbergen: In the US a lot happens without government subsidies. Maybe we can
do without subsidies for art.
Epilogue
I am reminded of Hurrer's notion of the play (see chapter 9) and Abbing's artistic
conscience (see chapter 10). To "play" art, these artists have to incorporate ele-
ments of the play of the economy. The rules are not firm and fast, the strategies not
transparent. Their artistic conscience tells them to adhere to the standards of artis-
tic integrity; at the same time they are looking for appreciation with Lieshout being
the one least concerned about crossing the borders between art and non-art. They
all play with the economic value of what they do. Their accounts bring out the ten-
sions that exist due to the differences between the realms of economics and the
arts. Those differences are what this book is all about.
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ham's The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It).
1 [ Of course, the loss in aesthetic experience that has occurred fwm the present distinctions
of high and low in culture can be equally stressed, as it is in Lawrence Levine's excellent
historical account (1988) of the diminishment of a public culture that has taken place in
the rise of a "cultural hierarchy" in the United States.
11.. The problem of distinguishing between movements toward equilibrium and that which is
"outside" equilibrium is discussed in Ruccio and Wolff (1989).
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The Becker pressure group model has been described as a "vote-your-pocketbook"
model because government spending is determined by the interaction of only two pres-
sure groups - those that are taxed to pay for government spending and those that are
subsidized. Non-budgetary, or social costs associated with taxes and subsidies determine
the amount of political pressure that each of these groups brings to bear either to support
Notes Chapter S
or to oppose such subsidies. For example, as the social cost of taxation increases, the
taxed group has an incentive to increase their pressure against increasing taxes.
2- Unlike the case of direct government spending, however, the importance of these fiscal
considerations depends on whether contributors suffer from a kind of fiscal illusion. If, for
example, people act as if tax deductible private contributions have no fiscal impact, then
the fiscal consequences of such subsidies would play no role in the individual's choice.
3 See for example, Helmur Anheier and Stefan 'Ibepler (1995).
4 This point is made by Mark Schuster (1985).
5 It has been pointed out to us that, contrary to Weisbrod's assertion, Holland does not
subsidize religion, either.
6 A proposed public sculpture by joel Shapiro "became the object of a furious debate when
the public (or press) dubbed the rather innocuous-looking piece with a heavy price tag
'the headless Gumby.'" (Senic, 1992-a, P.240) Gumby was a popular flexible plastic chil-
dren's toy with a stick-figure-like appearance. A 1975 Noguchi sculpture in front of the
Seanle Federal Building and consisting of five natural stones incised by the artist was
"related to the contemporary 'pet rock' craze." (p.aao}, The so-called Chicago Picasso,
which turns out to be a "conflated image of his wife Jacqueline and his pet Afghan," was
sometimes alternatively described as: "a baboon, bird, phoenix, horse, sea horse, Afghan
hound, nun, Barbara Streisand, and a viking helmet" [p. 2.39). "Most tellingly, one out-
spoken colonel when first confronting the 'Chicago Picasso' suggested, 'If it is a bird or an
animal they ought to put it in the zoo. If it is art, they ought to put it in the An Insti-
tute ... '" (P.2.43)
7 One of the authors viewed it on Washington's Channel 32. on December 18, 199+ It may
have aired on other dates in other locations.
8 This "growing acceptance" interpretation is not shared by all observers, or necessarily
supported by other examples. One of this volume's contributors, David Ruccio, com-
mented to us that, while many in Chicago may have come to accept the fact of the Chica-
go Picasso's existence, his impression as a resident of Chicago is that many of them
actively dislike its presence. This holds true in his view for a number of other public sculp-
tures around the Chicago area. Another example involves a sculpture by George Sugar-
man in front of a federal courthouse in Baltimore, installed 17 years ago. The Washington
Post reported on June 2.1, 1995 that, in the wake of a bombing of a federal building in
Oklahoma City, an official responsible for security at the courthouse recommended
removal of the sculpture because it might pose a "security risk." (Valentine, 1995). The
Post article makes it clear that this recommendation was greeted with strong approval by
judges and other personnel using the building, who greatly disliked the sculpture, even
though it had been there 17 years. One former official commented "It may be a security
hazard today, but it was a hazard to the eyesight long before Oklahoma City." A criminal
defence lawyer said its removal "would be a public service."
9 Arjo Klamer, "The Value of Culture." Chapter I in this volume.
10 Klamer, op. cit.
1I Khmer, "The Value of Culture," p. 303.
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Notes Chapter 6, 7, 8
That view was effectively ubliterated by Peacock ((983).
2 Possible reasons for this are discussed in 'Iowse (1996).
3 See Peacock and Weir (1975), Peacock (J979), Towse (I994b), and Peacock and MacQueen
(1995)·
4 Those with a whetted appetite might like to look at my book on singers, which attempt-
ed to pUI real flesh on the bones of the operation of that market (Towse, 1993).
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Klamer's criticism of the single-minded use of economic concepts to activities that are
generally thought to be important elements of a "good life", such as art, friendship and
love, is a member of an ancient family. In fact, Klamcr echoes in many respects Aristotle's
critique on Plato's ideas about rationality in ethics. Cf. (Nussbaum 1990, Chpr. 2.and 3.)
2 Durkheirn 1964) Durkheim's conscience commun or collective is the set of beliefs and sen-
timents common to the avarage member of a single society which forms a determinate
system that has its own life. The French word conscience embraces the meanings of the
two English words "conscience" and "consciousness". Cf. (Lukes 1973)
3 This is obvious for Weber and Simmel. Although 1will not go into details here, it is also
arguably true for Durkheun.
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T The phrase is not simply a play of words. It reflects the applicability of the same notion to
theory construcciun itself.
2 However, among the authors making use of the term in more than suggestive ways are
Bourdieu, Caillois, Derrida, Gadamer, Goffman, Goodman, Sennett and Wittgenstein.
3 Of course, there are numerous older references. In the German discourse, for instance,
Schiller holds a prominent place for his discussion of art in terms of "play without inter-
est" (1962.: 407), following, in turn, Kanrian notions.
4 Huizinga illustrates this fundamental point by noting that we speak of "playing a play"
because there is no other verb that could he substituted (1956:48).
.l In his brief discussion of Huizinga, Sennett (1977: Ch.14) quotes the first three criteria in a
very similar fashion, but leaves out the fourth one.
6 Explicit rules are always only a small subset of the total set of rules. Wittgenstein
(1971:59) makes that point with reference to tennis games.
7 Bnreson wrote down his theory after observing monkeys playing "combat" (1972.: 179)·
8 Barcson was able to demonstrate that maltreatment of logical typing - being confused
about the borders of different plays one is involved in - can be the cause of schizophrenic
symptoms (Bareson 1979: 139)·
Bateson also traces humor 10 the paradoxical nature of something rhat is and is not at
the same lime. "In the absence of the distortions of logical typing, hurncr would be
unnecessary and perhaps could not exist." [Bateson 1979: 129)
9 The logical slructure of such an event is one of "double contingency": the participants
depend on C<\Ch other's premises in a circular fashion. The structure has been well
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explored in sociological systems theory. See, with an application to the topic of play,
Baecker (1997).
IQ In fact, the term "play" as it is used in this paper is synonymous to the term "social sys-
tem" as it has been developed by Luhmann (Luhmann 1995). The advantage of the term
"play" lies in its immediate focus on self-generated, bordered events.
II Some contributors to business economics recognize that the ongoing social process with-
in corporations can be observed in terms of play {Crozier/Friedberg I977}.
12 On new developments in the form of economic organizations see HutterlTeuhner 1993.
13 See Agnew 1986: 2Of.
14 Pre-modern times were rich in the symbolic use of plays to indicate closure and disnnc-
tion. For a detailed study on Renaissance courts see Guerzoni 1994.
15 Note that the subject of the sentence is play itself. If we were to introduce other subjects,
like players, we would violate the consistency of the theory which calls for strictly inter-
nal self-organisation: events lead to new events, everything else remains in the environ-
ment of that social world.
16 In contemporary social systems theory one would use the distinction of form and medi-
um (Baecker 1996). Form is defined as anything that consists of rigidly coupled elements,
whereas the medium is the loose coupling of the same elements. For instance, air waves
are a medium for the forms of words, musical sounds or the patter of applause, alphabets
are the medium for written words.
17 The notion of a ratio, in the sense of a continuous comparison, is due to Simmel (1905).
Simmel also points out that only equality "at the margin" counts, not a comparison of
total value.
Althuugh Simmel's Philosuphy u(Money is clearly part uf the uld value debate, its clar-
ity of insight is unsurpassed. See Hutter 1994h for a longer discussion.
18 Theories of value have lost currency in economics. The notion was hotly debated until
the early days of this century, particularly by the German-speaking economists, but inter-
est waned after the success of the new epistemology which equated the ancient "intrinsic
value" with subjective utility (Hicks 1938). relative (money) prices are the only indications
of value recognizable in a world of Rational Choice. At the same time, there is a popular
presumption that the conduct of science is or ought to he disinterested, and thus free of
self-value.
19 The term "use value" IS an unfortunate one, because it suggests a comparability between
individual valuatinns which does not exist. Use value refers to individuals and thus to
mental processes. These processes are internal to human minds, but outside of the moves
of a particular play.
Mental evaluation is the reflection of social value ratios. In the mental process, the val-
nations of different plays are, in turn, brought into relationship, and the values of different
plays are weighed with respect to the individual's intentions. In human beings, that reflec-
tion assumes the form of specific feelings. The intensity of such feelings makes values, like
money ratios, recognizable and memorable to organisms. Through social values, obser-
vations are translated into feelings, but that translation process is, to repeat the point, the
reflection of events taking place in the plays, not a distinct and separate phenomenon.
2.0 The relationship is, in fact, circular. One may therefore transpose the notion of self-mean-
ing also to use the value, and thus to a system outside the play. Note, on this point, the
following obvervarion by Baudrillard: "Value in the case of use value is enveloped in a
total mystery, for it is grounded anthropologically in the (self-) 'evidence' of a naturalness,
in an unsurpassable original reference Value becomes absolutely self-evident, 'la chose
la plus simple"'(1981: 130).
'1° Notes Chapter9
2.J Sennetr makes the point that the aesthetic training inherent in child's play serves to
increase the confidence in the expressivity of behavior that is artificially structured (Sen.
nett 19n' 354}·
II There is a second aspect worth mentioning: artistic value serves as an indicator for the
position of players in the Economy. Anistic forms provide a way to signal and to read
positions, and thus they help to organize the play, particularly in situations outside of
organizations. See Simmel 1905.
23 Organisation plays also maintain themselves by "fceding" on external values. Corpora-
tions depend on the coding activity of the economic play. Given the relative prices, they
are able to plan their own activities of material and communicative transformation.
2.4 On the role of ambiguity in the evolution of monetary forms see Hutter I994C.
2.5 Science is, in the chosen perspective, another Play of Meaning, the one that draws its clo-
sure from the cuncept of truth. Thus, science loses the uniqueness uf its position. It con-
structs fictions just like any other Play of Meaning. Similar to Art, the play uf Science takes
place in texts and books, and in performances, ranging from lectures to conferences. Also
in a similar manner, the autonomy of scientific value with respect to economic valuation
is always at risk.
In fact, the sub-play of economic science seems to be an excellent example: reputation
in economics reproduces itself according to internal criteria. The initiation of new con"
tnbutors implies changes in personal identity {Colander/Klamer 1987). One can add
now: the continuity of complex tautologies around a basic core of belief is a necessity fur
such complex plays.
2.6 In terms of the metaphor introduced by Samuel Butler: individuals are the hens used by
the (genetic) eggs to make more eggs.
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Cf P.Bourdieu, for instance: Bourdieu, Pierre "The production of belief" Media Culture
and Society 11, 3, 1980.
2 The concepts of habitus and field were introduced by P.Bourdieu. See for instance Hour-
drcu, Pierre, The fieldofcultural production. Essays on artand literature. Editedby Randall
johnsulI, Oxford: Polity Press, 1992.
3 O. Williamson stressed the importance of idiosyncratic exchange and investment. Wil-
liamson, Oliver E., Economicorganisation: [mns, markets and policy control, New Yurk:
New York University Press T986.
4 Ibidem.
5 The idea uf art as systems of symbols or "language" has been stressed and analyzcJ by
Goodman, Nelson, Languages of art,an approach to a theoryufsymbols (1954), London:
Oxford University press, 1968.
6 Compare Goodman, ibidem.
7 Booy, Hanneke, Frank van Puffc1en en Birgit Schumacher, Omvang markt beeldende
kunst in Nederland, Amsterdam: Stichting Economisch Onderzoek, 1992 (Rapport nr.
284), p.63. On the basis of a sample it is estimated that the government is responsible for
more than half of market-demand for visual an products. Due to the way the sample is
drawn the role of the government may he slightly overestimated, but it is bound to be
very substantial.
8 Abbing, Hans, "Kunsr en marktgeriehtheid: een schijntegenstelling. Over ruil, markt en
transactie-kosten in de kunst." Bocemancahier IV, nr.r-q, 1992. [Art and rnarket-oricnta-
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'3'
tion. About exchange, markets and unequal opportunities in the arts.] An unpublished
English translation is available.
9 The myth of the all important self-taught artist (autodidacr] is nourished in the am. Sta-
tistical analysis proves him to be the exception to the rule. As talent should be God-given,
artists often present themselves as aurodidacts, even when they are not. Moulin, R. Les
artistes. essai de morphologie sociaie. Paris: Documentation Francaise, 1985.
ID Goodman, ibidem.
IJ Bourdieu, Pierre and Loicj.D. Wacquant, An invitationto reflexive sociology, Cambridge:
Polity press, 1992.
12. I am thinking of the equilibrium theory with its emphasis on a harmonious result. The
presence of conflict and of antagonistic interests is veiled and denied.
I} I am aware of the fact that in this paper the extreme uncertainties and high profits in the
arts have not received the necessary attention for drawing conclusions like these. I have
treated these subjects more extensively in publications in Dutch.
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dam/Ann Arbor: Amsterdam University Press/The University of Michigan Press, 1995)
and Poverty and Political Culture: The Rhetoric of Social Welfare in the Netherlands and
France, 1815-1854 (Lanham, MD/Amsterdam: Rowman & Littlefield/Amsterdam Univer-
sity Press, 1.995)
Gertrude Himmclfarb, Poverty and Compassion. The Moral Imagination ofthe LateVicto-
rians (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), p.}; RichardJohnson, "Towards a Cultural The-
ory of the Nation, A British-Dutch dialogue," in Annemieke Calema, Barbara Henkes,
and Henk te Velde, eds., Images of the Nation. Different Meanings ofDutchness, 187°-1940
(Amsterdam/Atlanta, Rodopi, 1993), pp. r97, 2.04-207; and Taufik Abdullah, "Islam and
the Formation of Tradition in Indonesia, A Comparative Perspective," ltinerario. I}, No. I
(1989), p. 18.
2. Louis Chevalier, l.aIJoring Classes and Dangerous Classes in Paris during the First Halfof
the Nineteenth Century (1958; repr. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 197}), p. Ill.
3 Michael Ignatieff, "State, Civil Society, and Total Institutions: A Critique of Recent
Social Histories of Punishment," in Stanley Cohen and Andrew Scull, eds., Social
Controland the State: Historical and Comparative Essays (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983),
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land, r870-1940 (Amsterdam, Boom/Meppel, 1984), p. 244, and Kathenne A. Lynch,
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PuMic Expenditures (Berkeley, University of California Press, 197.1"), pp. 9, 46-49.
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his impressively detailed discussion of charity in Amsterdam, Biistand in Amsterdam ea.
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don, Macmillan, 1976), pp. 87'"IlO.
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USA in the Modem Era (Oxford, Basil Blackwell/Polity Press, 1988), p. 23.
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(Paris, Paulin,1840), I, p. 108.
15 Le Moniteur, November 27, 1828, Fosseyeux, liasse 711-2, Archives de l'assistancc
puhhquc, Paris. For biographical information about the prefect of police, see M. Bertin,
Biographic de Mr. de Belleyme (Paris, Durand, 1865), and "Letabiissernent des maisnns de
travail darts la villede Paris," 7 November, 1828, Fosseyeux, liassc 711-2, Archives de I'As-
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16 Dnvid Pinkney, Decisive Years in France 1840-r847 (Princeton, Princeron University Press,
1986), pp. 94-97, and Christopher johnson, Utopian Communism in France. Cabet and the
lcarians l1i39-r1i51 [lthaca, Corned University Press, 1974), p. 66.
I] Simon Vissering, "Politiscbe vertooghen," m Hermnenngen (Collection of essays and
memoirs written between 1840 and 1860),3 vols. (Amsterdam, PN. van Kampen, 1863), 2,
p.21.
18 Of the many French social investigators writing in the period r815-1848, Louis-Rene
Villenne was the best known in the Netherlands, whereas Baronjoseph-Marie de Cerun-
do - as well as the Scottish Presbyterian minister Thomas Chalmers - inspired Dutch
notions of middle-class patronage. InHolland itself the work of Samuel Senior Coronel,
who was politically much less conservative, was inspired by methods similar to his French
colleagues. See, among many other writings, Cczondbeiddcer toegepast op de {abneks-
niioerbeid (Haarlem, De Erven Loosjes, 186r), and Idem, "De diamantwerkers te Amster-
dam," in De Economist (1865), Bijblad, pp. 89-12.0. For a more recent examination of
Coronet's conrriburions, see A.H. Bergink, Samuel Senior Coronel en zijn betekenis voor
de sociale geneeskunde in Nedcrtand (Asscn, Van Corcum, 1960).
19 H.W. Tydeman, J. Heemskerk, and Mr. ].W. Tydernan, Het ontwerp van de wet op het
armhestuur (Amsterdam, Ccbroeders Kraay, 1852), p. 10. See also their Denhbeelden
omtrent een useueiijee rege/in? van bet armusezen in Nederland (Amsterdam, Cebroeders
Willems, 1850 ).
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20 According to JA. Bcrger, in Van annenzorg tot werkelozenzorg (Amsterdam, Arbeidcr-
spers, 1936), Van den Bosch was the first analyst in the Netherlands to use the term
"unemployment," p. 25.
21 Thomas Lacqueur, "Bodies, Details, and the Humanitarian Narrative," in Lynn Hunt, ed.,
The New Cultural History (Berkcley, University of California Press, 1989), p. 177.
22 D.E van Alphen, "lets over armoede en het gebrek aan arbeid in betrekking tot de staat-
shuishoudkunde and staarkunde," in H.W. Tydeman, ed., Magazijn voor het armwezen in
het Koninkrijk derNederlanden (Leiden, 1820), pp. J-4.
23 jeroen Sprenger, who is the current spokesperson for the Dutch Federation of Trade
Unions, repeated the same story in almost identical language in an interview in The Wash-
ington Poston April 12, 1993:"[Holland is] still a prosperous country, we do not have the
levelsof poverty that yuu see in other countries, like the United States. Let's be proud of
that, let's see it as a kind of decency, a levelof civilization we have reached in [our] coun-
try."
24 Van Leeuwen, Biietand in Amsterdam ea. 1800-[85°, p- 289.
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tation of reality, but a creator of new being by way of transformation.
16 See for example Kynaston McShine, ibid. p.20
17 David Bourdon, o.c., P'406
I8 Shusaku Arakawa, Next to the LastSupper, 1971, silkscreen, 271/4" x 42 S/r6", The Muse-
um of Modem Art, N.Y [The entire composition has been squared and numbered, the
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identified with stenciling and arrows.] in: Jean Lipman and Richard Marshall (with an
introduction of Leo Steinberg), Art about Art. New York, E.P_ Dutton Press, 1978, p_62
19 In Le sensdu monde, thanks to Frank Vande Veire, Gent (B).
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